Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of assaulting the mother of his child, which constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under New York law. Several years later, he was arrested in New York City for possessing a firearm, specifically a .380 caliber pistol, after having been previously convicted of that domestic violence misdemeanor. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after a domestic violence conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). At sentencing, the district court considered his criminal history, including a 2013 state drug conviction, and imposed a forty-eight-month prison term and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 2013 state drug conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a lower base offense level for sentencing. Both the defendant and the government appealed: the defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment and the reasonableness of his sentence, while the government contested the district court’s interpretation of the drug conviction under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, because it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, such as those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. The court also found that the defendant’s sentencing challenges were moot, as he had completed his prison term and there was no indication the district court would reduce his supervised release. Additionally, the court agreed with the government’s concession that its cross-appeal was foreclosed by recent precedent. The court dismissed the appeal in part as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Luis Rodriguez was convicted by a jury in 2006 for his involvement in a murder-for-hire plot that resulted in the deaths of two individuals, including a fourteen-year-old, as part of a drug trafficking conspiracy. He was also found guilty of related drug and firearm offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction, Rodriguez pursued several post-trial challenges, including a direct appeal and a habeas petition, both of which were unsuccessful. While incarcerated, Rodriguez filed a motion for compassionate release, citing his conduct in prison, alleged harsh conditions and radon exposure, health risks from COVID-19, and purported sentencing errors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release. The court found that Rodriguez had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, noting his significant disciplinary record while in custody and the lack of evidence supporting his claims about prison conditions and health risks. The court also determined that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), particularly the seriousness of his offenses and the need to protect the public, weighed strongly against reducing his sentence. The court declined to consider collateral attacks on his conviction, as such arguments were not appropriate in a compassionate release motion and had already been rejected in prior proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of compassionate release. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Second Circuit held that the district court acted well within its broad discretion in denying relief based on the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court found that Rodriguez’s appeal lacked any arguable basis in law or fact and dismissed the appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The court also denied his motions for appointment of counsel and for a certificate of appealability. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff brought a defamation claim against Donald J. Trump, based on statements he made in June 2019 during his first term as President. The suit was initially filed in New York state court. In September 2020, the Department of Justice, acting under the Westfall Act, certified that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment and removed the case to federal court, seeking to substitute the United States as the defendant. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied substitution, finding Trump was not acting within the scope of his employment. Trump appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and certified a question to the D.C. Court of Appeals regarding the scope of employment under D.C. law. The D.C. Court of Appeals clarified the law but did not resolve whether Trump’s conduct was within the scope of employment. The Second Circuit remanded for the District Court to apply the clarified law.On remand, the Department of Justice declined to certify that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment, and neither Trump nor the government sought substitution before trial. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. Trump appealed. After the appeal was fully briefed, and after Trump began his second term as President, Trump and the government jointly moved in the Second Circuit to substitute the United States as a party under the Westfall Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the motion to substitute. The court held that the motion was statutorily barred by the Westfall Act because it was not made before trial, that both Trump and the government had waived any right to seek substitution by failing to timely petition the District Court, and that equitable considerations also warranted denial of the belated motion. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

A medical device distributor sued a former employee, alleging that he breached a non-compete agreement, his duty of loyalty, and misappropriated trade secrets after joining a competitor. The employee responded with counterclaims and third-party claims. During the litigation, the employee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which stayed the district court proceedings. In the bankruptcy case, the distributor filed a proof of claim for damages, which the employee did not contest. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, and the distributor received a partial distribution from the bankruptcy estate. The employee also waived his right to discharge, leaving him potentially liable for the remaining balance.After the bankruptcy case closed, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont lifted the stay. The distributor sought summary judgment for the balance of its allowed claim, arguing that the bankruptcy court’s allowance of its claim should have preclusive effect. Initially, the district court denied this request, finding that using claim preclusion offensively would be unfair. Upon reconsideration, however, the district court reversed itself and granted summary judgment to the distributor for the remaining balance, holding that claim preclusion applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Second Circuit held that, even if claim preclusion could sometimes be used offensively, it could not be applied in this case because it would be unfair to the employee, who had less incentive to contest the claim in bankruptcy. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the distributor and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that claim preclusion cannot be used offensively to secure a judgment for the balance of an allowed bankruptcy claim under these circumstances. View "Thermal Surgical, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

Two noncitizens, one from Egypt and one from Guatemala, each entered the United States in the 1990s and were granted asylum after claiming persecution in their home countries. Both later committed criminal offenses—one was convicted of stalking and child endangerment, the other of multiple driving while intoxicated offenses. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security initiated proceedings to terminate their asylum status, arguing that their convictions constituted “particularly serious crimes.” Immigration Judges in both cases terminated their asylum status and ordered their removal, but the petitioners sought to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).In the first case, the Immigration Judge initially granted the adjustment application, reasoning that the statute did not explicitly require current asylum status. The Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, relying on its decision in Matter of T-C-A-, which held that only those with current asylum status are eligible for adjustment. In the second case, the Immigration Judge denied the adjustment application on the same grounds, and the BIA affirmed. Both petitioners then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the statutory language and the relevant context, including neighboring provisions and legislative history. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) requires a noncitizen to have current asylum status to be eligible for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that a past grant of asylum is insufficient if that status has since been terminated. Accordingly, the court denied both petitions for review. View "Wassily v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Two fiduciaries, who managed retirement and welfare funds for a New York City law enforcement union, were found to have improperly withdrawn over $500,000 from the union’s annuity fund. The withdrawals, which occurred over several years, were facilitated by one defendant preparing false authorization forms and the other signing and submitting them to the fund’s custodian. The funds were then transferred to the union’s operating account and used for unauthorized purposes, including personal enrichment and unrelated union expenses. The defendants misrepresented the nature of these withdrawals to both the fund’s custodian and union members, and they continued the scheme even after being warned by auditors that their actions were improper.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over a joint jury trial, where both defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. One defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and multiple counts of tax evasion. The district court denied motions to sever the trials, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and imposed restitution and forfeiture orders. The court also addressed government discovery errors by granting a continuance and requiring early disclosure of materials, but declined to impose harsher sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed claims of improper joinder, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in restitution calculation. The court held that joinder was proper because the indictment sufficiently linked the fraud and tax offenses, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the attorney’s illness did not constitute per se ineffective assistance. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery issues or restitution calculation, and no reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynder" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company challenged the federal government’s implementation of a new program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which authorizes the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare. The company’s drug was selected for the program, and it signed an agreement to participate “under protest” while filing suit. The company alleged that the program violated its constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, and that CMS failed to follow required notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when issuing the standard agreement for participation.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to the government on all claims. The district court found that participation in the program was voluntary, so there was no unlawful deprivation of rights. It also held that the program did not impose unconstitutional conditions on participation in Medicare and Medicaid, and that the Inflation Reduction Act expressly allowed CMS to implement the program for its first three years without notice-and-comment rulemaking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that, under its precedent in Garelick v. Sullivan, participation in the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program is voluntary, and thus the program does not effect a taking, deprive the company of property without due process, or compel speech in violation of the First Amendment. The court further held that the program does not impose unconstitutional conditions because it is designed to control Medicare spending and does not regulate the company’s private market conduct. Finally, the court concluded that the Inflation Reduction Act expressly exempted CMS from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement for the program’s initial years. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs." on Justia Law

A group of federally funded health centers and clinics serving low-income populations alleged that several major drug manufacturers conspired to restrict drug discounts offered through the federal Section 340B Drug Discount Program. The plaintiffs claimed that, beginning in 2020, the manufacturers coordinated efforts to limit the availability of discounted diabetes medications at contract pharmacies, resulting in significant financial losses for safety-net providers. The manufacturers, who are direct competitors in the diabetes drug market, allegedly implemented similar policies within a short timeframe, each restricting or eliminating the discounts in ways that had a comparable anticompetitive effect.After the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed their first amended complaint and denied leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient parallel conduct or factual circumstances suggesting a conspiracy, and thus found the proposed amendments futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard to both the dismissal and the denial of leave to amend. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint alleged enough facts to plausibly infer a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court found that the complaint sufficiently pled both parallel conduct and “plus factors” such as a common motive to conspire, actions against individual economic self-interest, and a high level of interfirm communications. The court also determined that Supreme Court precedents cited by the defendants did not bar the plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to file their second amended complaint. View "Mosaic Health, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC" on Justia Law

Several investment funds based in the British Virgin Islands invested heavily in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and were forced into liquidation after the Madoff Ponzi scheme was exposed in 2008. Liquidators were appointed in the BVI insolvency proceedings. Before the collapse, certain investors redeemed their shares in the funds for cash, receiving over $6 billion in payments. The liquidators, seeking to recover these redemption payments for equitable distribution among all investors, initiated approximately 300 actions in the United States, alleging that the payments were inflated due to fictitious Net Asset Value (NAV) calculations based on Madoff’s fraudulent statements.The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the actions after recognizing the BVI proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court dismissed most claims, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over some defendants, that the liquidators were bound by the NAV calculations, and that the safe harbor for securities transactions under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code barred the claims. However, it allowed constructive trust claims to proceed against certain defendants alleged to have known the NAVs were inflated. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, leaving only the constructive trust claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the liquidators’ claims, including the constructive trust claims, should have been dismissed under the safe harbor provision of § 546(e), which applies extraterritorially via § 561(d) in Chapter 15 cases. The court concluded that the safe harbor bars both statutory and common-law claims seeking to avoid covered securities transactions, regardless of the legal theory or proof required. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment allowing the constructive trust claims and otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims. View "In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd." on Justia Law

A company that supplies oil and propane hired a trucking business to deliver 10,000 gallons of heating oil to its property in Putnam, Connecticut. During the delivery, the trucking company’s employee allegedly failed to monitor the filling process, resulting in an overflow that contaminated the soil and groundwater. The supplier claimed it incurred over $500,000 in remediation and related expenses due to the spill.The supplier filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, asserting common-law negligence and recklessness claims under Connecticut law. The complaint cited specific federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) as evidence of the trucking company’s duties and alleged breaches. The trucking company moved to dismiss, arguing that the supplier’s claims were preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) and, alternatively, that the recklessness claim was insufficiently pleaded. The district court granted the motion, holding that the HMTA preempted the state-law claims and that the recklessness claim failed to state a claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit held that the HMTA does not preempt the supplier’s Connecticut common-law claims for negligence and recklessness, so long as those claims are based on duties that are “substantively the same” as federal requirements under the HMTA and HMRs. The court found that the mental state required for negligence and recklessness under Connecticut law is not inconsistent with the HMTA’s standards for civil violations. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DCC Propane LLC v. KMT Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law