Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the operative amended complaints in two actions seeking to hold defendant bank liable under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), for providing banking services to a charitable organization with alleged ties to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) alleged to have committed a series of terrorist attacks in Israel in 2001-2004. The actions also seek to deny leave to amend the complaints to allege aiding-and-abetting claims under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. 2333(a) principles announced in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018), were properly applied here. The court explained that, in order to establish NatWest's liability under the ATA as a principal, plaintiffs were required to present evidence sufficient to support all of section 2331(1)'s definitional requirements for an act of international terrorism. The court saw no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to proffer such evidence and thus NatWest was entitled to summary judgment dismissing those claims. The court also concluded that the district court appropriately assessed plaintiffs' request to add JASTA claims, given the undisputed evidence adduced, in connection with the summary judgment motions, as to the state of NatWest's knowledge. Therefore, based on the record, the district court did not err in denying leave to amend the complaints as futile on the ground that plaintiffs could not show that NatWest was knowingly providing substantial assistance to Hamas, or that NatWest was generally aware that it was playing a role in Hamas's acts of terrorism. The court dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's amended judgment following defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, one count of securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1348 and 2, and six counts of insider trading in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 and 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. 2.In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court concluded that defendant's execution of confidentiality agreements with a company whose acquisition he was exploring was sufficient to subject him to prohibitions against insider trading. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant signed two nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with the company; that in both NDAs, each party agreed not to disclose any confidential or proprietary information of the other; and that the fact that the parties' exploration and evaluation of the potential acquisition of the company was explicitly classified as "Proprietary Information" that was to remain "Confidential." Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support inferences that defendant knowingly and intentionally breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing material nonpublic information as to the prospects for a merger agreement between the company and his fund, intending for the third party to make trades based on that information. Furthermore, defendant's challenges to his convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit such fraud also fail. Finally, venue was proper in the Southern District of New York. View "United States v. Chow" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for various crimes stemming from his role in two schemes to automatically subscribe consumers, without their knowledge or consent, to premium SMS text messaging services. Counts One and Five charged defendant with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; Counts Two and Six charged defendant with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2; Counts Three and Seven charged defendant with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A; and Counts Four and Eight charged defendant with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h).The court held that the district court's conduct did not create an appearance of partiality warranting recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a); the district court properly instructed the jury on conscious avoidance because sufficient trial evidence supported that theory of criminal liability; and defendant's conduct, as pled and as proven at trial, fit squarely within the scope of the aggravated identity theft statute. The court explained that, by participating in a scheme that employed victims' cell phone numbers to sign them up for paid text message services without their knowledge or consent by means of an auto-subscribing computer program, defendant used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person within the meaning of section 1028A. View "United States v. Wedd" on Justia Law

The City filed suit against five multinational oil companies under New York tort law seeking to recover damages for the harms caused by global warming. In this case, the City asserts that its taxpayers should not have to shoulder the burden of financing the City's preparations to mitigate the effects of global warming. Rather, the City suggests that a group of large fossil fuel producers are primarily responsible for global warming and should bear the brunt of these costs.The Second Circuit held that municipalities may not utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions. The court explained that global warming is a uniquely international concern that touches upon issues of federalism and foreign policy. Consequently, it calls for the application of federal common law, not state law. The court also held that the Clean Air Act grants the Environmental Protection Agency – not federal courts – the authority to regulate domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, federal common law actions concerning such emissions are displaced. Finally, the court held that while the Clean Air Act has nothing to say about regulating foreign emissions, judicial caution and foreign policy concerns counsel against permitting such claims to proceed under federal common law absent congressional direction. Because no such permission exists, the court concluded that each of the City's claims is barred and the complaint must be dismissed. View "City of New York v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of carjacking resulting in death, multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery, and related firearms offenses. The court concluded that defendant's challenges to the district court's instructions on the mens rea and causation elements of carjacking resulting in death, both fail because these claims lack merit and the purported errors were in any event harmless. The court also concluded that defendant's evidentiary challenges fail because the district court acted within its discretion in making each of the rulings at issue. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's challenge to his firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) fail because the predicate crimes on which these convictions are based, Hobbs Act robbery, and federal carjacking, are categorical crimes of violence. View "United States v. Felder" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law assault and battery claims.The court found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes in favor of defendants at the summary judgment stage. In this case, the district court's recitation of the facts elided crucial distinctions between the testimony of the three parties to the encounter. The court explained that, while the officers testified to using a reasonable amount of force to restrain an uncooperative individual matching the description of a suspect, plaintiff testified to an aggressive assault, pleas for help, and a spiteful effort to punish a confused citizen by deliberately slamming his head into the patrol car's exterior as punishment for his confusion. Therefore, the court concluded that it is for a jury and not a judge to decide which of these versions of events is accurate, and qualified immunity would not protect the deliberate infliction of injury suggested by plaintiff's testimony. However, the court did not find that reassignment to another judge was necessary absent any reason to find that the district court would not accept the court's remand and any grounds to reassign the case. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ketcham v. City of Mount Vernon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the denial of his right to a fair trial. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Civil on his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, asserting errors in the jury instructions, both with respect to his fair trial claim.Although the district court erred by relying on a credibility determination, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the detective on the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. In this case, the summary judgment record before the district court was sufficient to establish probable cause without relying on the detective's familiarity with plaintiff's possessions and hence on his credibility. Furthermore, the facts that support probable cause to arrest here were sufficient to "lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty," as required for probable cause to prosecute a claim. As to the fair trial claim, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the detective and remanded for a new trial because the jury instructions contained prejudicial error. View "Ashley v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Foundation on its complaint for a declaratory judgment of fair use and the district court's dismissal of defendant's counterclaim for copyright infringement. This case involves visual art works by Andy Warhol based on a 1981 photograph of the musical artist Prince that was taken by defendant, Lynn Goldsmith, in her studio, and in which she holds copyright.The court concluded that the district court erred in its assessment and application of the fair-use factors and that the works in question do not qualify as fair use as a matter of law. In this case, the court considered each of the four factors and found that each favors defendant. Furthermore, although the factors are not exclusive, the Foundation has not identified any additional relevant considerations unique to this case that the court should take into account. The court likewise concluded that the Prince Series works are substantially similar to the Goldsmith Photograph as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that defendant does not qualify for relief afforded by Section 401(a) of the First Step Act. Defendant was convicted in 2007 of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 812, 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count One), among other offenses, and sentenced principally to a 300-month term of imprisonment. The district court reduced his term of imprisonment to 215 months in 2020.The court concluded that the plain text of Section 401(c) limits the retroactive effect of Section 401(a), making its relief available to defendants who committed offenses before the First Step Act became law but only if they have not yet had a sentence imposed as of the date of enactment. The court also concluded that Section 404(b) of the First Step Act does not require a district court to engage in "plenary resentencing" or "recalculate an eligible defendant's Guidelines range, except for those changes that flow from Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act," United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2020). In this case, because defendant's original sentence on Count One was imposed in 2007—long before the date of the enactment of the First Step Act—he is precluded by Section 401(c) from benefiting from Section 401(a)'s changes to the sentencing enhancement of Section 841(b)(1)(A), which are unrelated to Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's 2020 order. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

In this Fair Housing Act of 1968 case, plaintiff's claims stemmed from his neighbor's verbal attacks and attempted intimidation of plaintiff based on his race. The principal question presented to the en banc court is whether a plaintiff states a claim under the Act and parallel state statutes for intentional discrimination by alleging that his landlord failed to respond to reported race-based harassment by a fellow tenant.The en banc court concluded that landlords cannot be presumed to have the degree of control over tenants that would be necessary to impose liability under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant misconduct. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a claim that the KPM Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of the FHA, Sections 1981 and 1982, or the New York State Human Rights Law. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the KPM Defendants under New York law. View "Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc." on Justia Law