Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's final order finding that petitioner was removable as a non-citizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude based on its determination that New York petit larceny constitutes such a crime.The Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York State Court of Appeals: Does an intent to "appropriate" property under New York Penal Law 155.00(4)(b) require an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded? View "Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland" on Justia Law

In Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016), the Second Circuit held that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e, requires "debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees."In this case, the Second Circuit held that Avila's disclosure requirement does not apply to collection notices that extend offers to settle outstanding debt. The court explained that such collection notices do not present the risk that a debtor might pay the listed balance only to find herself still owing more. Furthermore, payment of an amount that the collector indicates will fully satisfy a debt excludes the possibility of further debt to pay. Therefore, the court concluded that a settlement offer need not enumerate the consequences of failing to meet its deadline or rejecting it outright so long as it clearly and accurately informs a debtor that payment of a specified sum by a specified date will satisfy the debt. Applying these principles here, the court held that Forster & Garbus's notice to plaintiff did not violate section 1692e because it extended a settlement offer that, if accepted through payment of the specified amount(s) by the specified date(s), would have cleared plaintiff's account. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Cortez v. Forster & Garbus, LLP" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit followed the logical course charted by longstanding precedent to reach two conclusions with respect to 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2): first, the "agent" of a federally funded organization need not have control over the federal funds, and the agent need not work in a specific program within the organization that uses those federal dollars; and second, the "business" of a federally funded organization need not be commercial in nature.The court affirmed Defendants Dawkins and Code's conviction for conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 666(a)(2), as well as Dawkins's conviction of substantive bribery in violation of section 666(a)(2). Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in a scheme to bribe basketball coaches at NCAA Division I universities in exchange for the coaches' agreement to steer their student-athletes toward Dawkins's sports management company after leaving college and becoming professional basketball players.In this case, the court concluded that the superseding indictment properly alleged a violation of section 666(a)(2); the Government proved a violation of section 666(a)(2) where section 666(a)(2) does not require a nexus between the "agent" of a federally funded organization and the federal funds the organization receives, and the bribes paid by defendants to the university basketball coaches in exchange for influence exerted over student-athletes were "in connection" with a university's "business;" the statute is constitutional as applied to defendants; the district court did not abuse its discretion when making the challenged evidentiary rulings; and the district court made no reversible errors in providing the challenged jury instructions. View "United States v. Dawkins" on Justia Law

The Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) filed suit against the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (together, the "OCC"), challenging the OCC's decision to begin accepting applications for special-purpose national bank (SPNB) charters from financial technology companies (fintechs) engaged in the "business of banking," including those that do not accept deposits. The district court ultimately entered judgment in favor of DFS, setting aside OCC's decision.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that DFS lacks Article III standing because it failed to allege that OCC's decision caused it to suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact. The court explained that the Fintech Charter Decision has not implicated the sorts of direct preemption concerns that animated DFS's cited cases, and it will not do so until OCC receives an SPNB charter application from or grants such a charter to a non-depository fintech that would otherwise be subject to DFS's jurisdiction. The court was also unpersuaded that DFS faces a substantial risk of suffering its second alleged future injury—that it will lose revenue acquired through annual assessments. Because DFS failed to adequately allege that it has Article III standing to bring its Administrative Procedure Act claims against OCC, those claims must be dismissed without prejudice.The court also found that DFS's claims are constitutionally unripe for substantially the same reason. Finally, the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues on appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and concluded that the Government's refusal to make a 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) motion based on its valuation of defendant's cooperation was not an unconstitutional act. The court held that section 3553(e) gives the Government a power, not a duty, to permit a district court to depart from a mandatory minimum based on a defendant's substantial assistance. Absent some other showing of unconstitutionality, it is not unconstitutional for the government to conclude that a defendant's assistance is worthy of a USSG 5K1.1 motion but no more based on its internal assessment of the costs and benefits of a further departure.The court also held that the Government did not act in bad faith. Where an agreement reserves to the Government the sole discretion to determine whether and how to value the cooperation of the defendant, the Government need not express dissatisfaction with the defendant's assistance to conclude that a section 5K1.1 motion but not a section 3553(e) motion is appropriate based on the Government's good faith valuation of the defendant's cooperation. The court remanded for resentencing with instructions that the case be reassigned. View "United States v. Trimm" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit seeking injunctive relief, alleging that the denials of their requests for tuition funding violated their rights to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. Under Vermont's Town Tuition Program (TTP), sending districts pay tuition to independent schools on behalf of high-school-aged students residing in the districts. The district court found that the school districts—endeavoring to comply with a state constitutional provision—denied petitioners' funding requests solely because of the religious status of petitioners' chosen school. Following Supreme Court precedent, the district court ruled that the exclusion of petitioners from the TTP violated the First Amendment, and the district court granted a limited preliminary injunction in petitioners' favor. Because respondents wanted to develop new criteria for TTP eligibility that would satisfy the state constitution, the district court enjoined the school districts from continuing to exclude petitioners from the TTP based solely on the religious status of petitioners' chosen school. However, the district court declined to mandate that the districts allow petitioners to participate in the TTP until the case was resolved. Petitioners appealed and moved for an emergency injunction pending appeal that would prohibit the school districts from continuing to deny their TTP funding requests.The Second Circuit construed petitioners' motion as a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to amend its preliminary injunction. In February 2021, the court granted the petition for writ of mandamus because petitioners clearly had a right to the relief they requested and mandamus was justified to enable them to obtain that relief. In this opinion, the court explained the reasons for its order granting the writ, concluding that petitioners have no other adequate means to attain the relief they desire; the district court was wrong to allow the school districts to continue to withhold TTP funds from petitioners while the districts developed new restrictions and safeguards; and the writ is appropriate where petitioners have been deprived of a public benefit as a result of the state's and the school districts' decades-long policy of unconstitutional religious discrimination. View "A.H. v. French" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order adopting the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting summary judgment in favor of CIT Bank N.A. in a foreclosure action against defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that CIT failed to prove compliance with the pre-foreclosure notice requirements of New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 and the pre-foreclosure filing requirements of RPAPL section 1306.After receiving guidance from the New York Court of Appeals on the issues of state law that govern defendants' arguments, the court found that CIT has adequately proven compliance with RPAPL 1304 and 1306. The court held that defendants have not rebutted the presumption that CIT mailed, and that they received, the required section 1304 notices. The court also held that, because there is no dispute that CIT timely submitted a section 1306 filing with all the required information about one defendant, the wife, it has complied with the statute. The court explained that the fact that CIT did not submit a filing with respect to the husband is irrelevant, as CIT was not required to do so. View "CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 20-year term of supervised release imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to child pornography charges. The court found no procedural error in the district court's failure to separately explain the basis for the term of supervised release after discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in imposing a term of imprisonment. The court explained that nothing in section 3553(c) or its caselaw requires a district court to undertake a separate recitation of the basis for each part of the sentence imposed. Where, as here, the district court explains the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment, the court concluded that it need not repeat the process in imposing a term of supervised release. The court also concluded that defendant's term of supervised release was substantively reasonable in light of the obvious ongoing risk defendant poses to children. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to threatening a federal official and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's charges stemmed from calls he made to the office of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar in which he made threatening statements. Defendant was sentenced to a year and a day in prison and three years of supervised release, as well as a special condition which required defendant to participate in a program known as the Partners in Restorative Initiatives.The Second Circuit vacated the special condition, concluding that it is too vague and impermissibly delegates authority to the probation officer. The court explained that the condition is vague because it would leave a reasonable person guessing as to what the requirements of the Program might be and it fails to put defendant on notice as to what conduct could trigger a charge of violating the condition. Furthermore, the Program has not been approved by the United States Probation Office. The court further explained that the Program is sufficiently ill-defined so that, in supervising defendant, the Probation Office would need to fill in too many blanks. View "United States v. Carlineo" on Justia Law

Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's order rejecting their constitutional challenge to quarterly fees imposed during the pendency of their bankruptcy proceeding. Congress passed in 2017 an amendment to the statute setting forth quarterly fees in bankruptcy cases, 28 U.S.C. 1930. The 2017 Amendment increased quarterly fees in judicial districts in which the United States Trustee Program oversees bankruptcy administration (UST Districts). In 2020, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2020, which requires that UST Districts and BA Districts, judicial districts in which judicially appointed bankruptcy administrators perform the same function, charge equal fees.The Second Circuit held that the 2017 Amendment is a bankruptcy law subject to the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The court also held that, under the version of section 1930 in effect prior to the 2020 Act, the 2017 Amendment violated the uniformity requirement. In this case, the court concluded that debtors have standing to bring its constitutional challenge and to seek reimbursement because it filed for bankruptcy in a UST District prior to October 1, 2018; qualified for and paid a fee increase pursuant to the 2017 Amendment due to the size of its disbursements; and paid more than a similarly situated debtor (with the same filing date and disbursement size) would owe in a BA District, where the increased fee schedule had not yet been implemented by the Judicial Conference. The court explained that, prior to the 2020 Act, the 2017 Amendment was unconstitutionally nonuniform on its face because it mandated a fee increase in UST Districts but only permitted a fee increase in BA Districts. Accordingly, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment and directed the bankruptcy court to provide debtors with a refund of the amount of quarterly fees paid in excess of the amount debtors would have paid in a BA District during the same time period. View "In re: Clinton Nurseries" on Justia Law