Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Church United filed suit against Vimeo, alleging that the company discriminated against them by deleting Church United’s account from its online video hosting platform. Plaintiffs claimed that Vimeo discriminated against them based on sexual orientation and religion under federal and state law. The district court concluded that Vimeo deleted Church United's account because of its violation of one of Vimeo's content policies barring the promotion of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on its platform.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, agreeing with the district court that Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act provides Vimeo with immunity from suit. The court concluded that, under Section 230(c)(2), Vimeo is free to restrict access to material that, in good faith, it finds objectionable. In this case, plaintiffs' conclusory allegations of bad faith do not survive the pleadings stage, especially when examined in the context of Section 230(c)(2). The court explained that Section 230(c)(2) does not require interactive service providers to use a particular method of content restriction, nor does it mandate perfect enforcement of a platform's content policies. Indeed, the fundamental purpose of Section 230(c)(2) is to provide platforms like Vimeo with the discretion to identify and remove what they consider objectionable content from their platforms without incurring liability for each decision. View "Domen v. Vimeo, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cho and Ulug, individual named plaintiffs in a putative securities class action, appeal the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings and dismissal of their claims against defendants. Plaintiffs argue that they should be permitted to rely on the successful appeal by the lead plaintiffs in this case, and that the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings and dismissing their claims.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 requires that individual named plaintiffs in a class actions – who, unlike absent class members, have chosen to litigate their claims personally – indicate individually their intent to appeal; Cho and Ulug's failure to appeal the district court's first dismissal of their claims rendered that decision final as to them, and the district court properly dismissed their attempt to renew their claims after the lead plaintiffs successfully appealed; Cho and Ulug's claims against the newly added defendant are barred by res judicata; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. View "Cho v. BlackBerry Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Connecticut's Northern Correctional Institute, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights under Article I, Section 10 (the Bill of Attainder Clause) of the Constitution, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On appeal, current and former Connecticut Department of Correction officials appeal the district court's judgment and permanent injunction principally granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying defendants' motion for summary judgment.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred by deciding disputed issues of material fact in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court correctly concluded that, with respect to plaintiff, Conn. Gen. Stat. 18-10b is an unconstitutional bill of attainder; and plaintiff's unreviewable classification score of Risk Level 5 violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the difference in his treatment compared to that of other similarly-situated inmates lacks a rational basis. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Reynolds v. Quiros" on Justia Law

The Attorney General of the State of New York (OAG) appealed the district court's order denying it a preliminary injunction against defendants relating to their protest activities in violation of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), the New York Clinic Access Act (NYSCAA), and the New York City Clinic Access Act (the City Act). Defendants appealed from the district court's order denying the OAG a preliminary injunction, challenging the district court's conclusion that FACE and its analogs are not facially unconstitutional and arguing that the City Act's follow-and-harass and clinic-interference provisions are void for vagueness. Defendants also challenged the district court's conclusions that the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act and that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients.The Second Circuit vacated and remanded in part, concluding that the district court made certain improper evidentiary and credibility rulings, relied on clearly erroneous factual findings in assessing the OAG's physical obstruction claims, erred in its interpretation of the FACE statute and its state and local analogs, and abused its discretion in finding no irreparable harm. The court affirmed as to the remainder. In regard to the cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients; the statutes do not violate the First Amendment; and the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act. View "People of the State of New York v. Griepp" on Justia Law

The Government seeks forfeiture of the Building, as well as other assets owned by claimants. The parties subsequently cross-appeal the district court's order determining that the Government had probable cause to forfeit the Building and granting the motion of claimants to modify a protective order by releasing to them a portion of the rental income generated from the Building.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of probable cause where the district court described at length the non-tainted evidence on which it relied to find probable cause, and the district court did not refuse to consider claimants' statute-of-limitations defense. The district court also did not commit reversible error by concluding that, at this stage, claimants' statute of limitations defense did not defeat a probable cause finding. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion where the district court declined to draw an adverse inference against the Government for failing to produce statute-of-limitations discovery following the court's 2016 and 2019 opinions requiring it to do so. However, the court concluded that the return-of-rents remedy is appropriate here and modified the district court's order releasing the rental income to cover rental income generated from January 5, 2018, until October 13, 2020. View "In Re: 650 Fifth Avenue Co. & Related Properties" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and similarly-situated employees of Joe's Shanghai restaurant, alleging violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL). The district court certified the class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) of all nonmanagerial employees at the Flushing, Queens location of Joe's Shanghai on the NYLL claims. However, five days before the trial was scheduled to start, the district court sua sponte decertified the class, determining that class counsel was no longer adequately representing the class. The district court held a bench trial on plaintiff's individual claims and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against three of the defendants.As a preliminary issue, the Second Circuit concluded that, although plaintiff prevailed on the merits of his claims, this appeal is not moot because he maintains standing as to the class certification issue. On the merits, the court concluded that because class counsel's conduct made clear that counsel was no longer adequately representing the class, the district court acted within its discretion in decertifying the class. In this case, the record is replete with counsel's shortcomings before the class was decertified. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Jianmin Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc." on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula in 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(1), which deducts processing time from the age of an F2A visa beneficiary. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that plaintiff's daughter was statutorily under 21 years old when plaintiff naturalized and thus the daughter qualifies for an immediate-relative visa. At issue in this appeal was whether the term "age" in section 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula set forth in section 1153(h)(1). Based on the text, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the Child Status Protection Act, the court held that it does. View "Cuthill v. Blinken" on Justia Law

In 2018 plaintiffs, the former and current tenants of a privately owned affordable housing project, filed suit challenging the regulatory approval of rent increases a decade earlier by HUD and the New York HPD. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).The Second Circuit held that the tenants lack standing for their procedural violation claim against HUD under the Administrative Procedure Act based on the sequence of regulatory approval because the order of the approval process was not designed to protect the tenants' concrete interests in notice and participation; all of the tenants' APA claims are in any event untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) because they accrued in April 2011, which is more than six years before they filed their complaint; Section 2401(a) is a claims-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, but the tenants are not entitled to equitable tolling; and the tenants' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and its housing authority are untimely and the continuing violation doctrine does not save those claims because each arises from a discrete approval process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "DeSuze v. Ammon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired "dual status technician" with the National Guard, argues that the civil service pension he received in connection with his employment as a dual status technician – a civilian position that requires concurrent National Guard membership – is not subject to reduction under the Social Security Act's Windfall Elimination Provision because the pension falls within an exception applicable to payments based wholly on work performed as a member of a uniformed service. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff and the Administration appealed.The Second Circuit reversed the Administration's calculation of plaintiff's Social Security retirement benefits. The court read the plain language of the statute and used traditional tools of statutory interpretation, holding that a civil service pension based on federal civilian employment as a dual status technician does not fall within the uniformed service exception. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Linza v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's unlawful search and seizure claims. The court concluded that defendants violated clearly established law by detaining and frisking plaintiff based on nothing more than an officer's unconfirmed hunch that there might be an open warrant for plaintiff's arrest. In this case, police officers stopped plaintiff and his daughters as they walked out of a Target store. Although the officers admittedly had no reason to think plaintiff had committed a crime, one officer speculated that there "might be" a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. The court explained that the officers clearly lacked any facts giving them reasonable suspicion that plaintiff was involved in criminal activity (much less carrying a dangerous weapon) or wanted for a crime. View "Vasquez v. Maloney" on Justia Law