Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff maintains that the Act's three-year statute of limitations for willful violations should apply to his claim because he alleged that his employer willfully violated the Act. Plaintiff asks the court to infer willfulness from the mere fact that he was asked for a period of time to perform job responsibilities typically performed by non-exempt employees even though he was classified as exempt.The court held that the mere allegation of willfulness is insufficient for a plaintiff to secure the benefit of the three-year exception to the Act's general two-year statute of limitations at the pleadings stage. Rather, for the three-year exception to apply at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of willfulness. In this case, plaintiff failed to do so because his allegations permit at most an inference that defendants negligently failed to reclassify him as a non-exempt employee which, without more, is insufficient. The court explained that plaintiff fails to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of defendants' willfulness. Instead, he pleads facts that are merely consistent with defendants' purported willfulness, and thus his claim stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. View "Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of nursing homes that participate in both the Medicare and Medicaid programs, challenge the legality of DHS's Final Rule permitting survey teams conducting certain inspections of nursing homes not to include a registered nurse. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims, brought under the Medicare and Medicaid Acts, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on claim-channeling and jurisdiction-stripping provisions governing claims arising under the Medicare Act.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 over plaintiffs' claim arising under the Medicaid Act, which does not incorporate the same claim-channeling and jurisdiction-stripping provisions as the Medicare Act. The court explained that the Medicare Act's review provisions do not preclude plaintiffs from challenging the Final Rule in federal court because their challenge is independently rooted in the Medicaid Act. Furthermore, plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claim is not inextricably intertwined with a Medicare Act claim for benefits or compliance determination, and the government's policy rationale does not support claim channeling and jurisdiction stripping in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Avon Nursing & Rehabilitation v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims against CLA and its principal for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiff and two other non-appealing plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging state law claims against CLA and its principal based on an errant email sent to all of CLA's employees containing the sensitive personal identifiable information (PII) of approximately 130 current and former CLA workers. On appeal, plaintiff argues that, even though she did not allege that her PII had actually been misused as a result of CLA's errant email, she alleged an increased risk of identity theft sufficient to confer Article III standing.The court agreed that in the context of unauthorized data disclosures, plaintiffs may establish an Article III injury in fact based solely on a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud, even when those plaintiffs have not yet been the victims of such identity theft or fraud. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish an injury in fact in this case. The court explained that plaintiff fails to allege that her PII was subject to a targeted data breach or alleges any facts suggesting that her PII (or that of any others) was misused. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants McCoy and Nix appealed their convictions for charges related to their involvement in a series of home invasions in the Rochester, New York area in September and October 2014. In this case, defendants and others unlawfully conspired and attempted to rob other persons of commodities that had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, such as diamonds, watches, United States currency, and narcotics, and conspired to traffic in the stolen narcotics.Defendants principally contend (a) that they were entitled to a new trial on the ground that the juror's false voir dire responses violated their rights to be tried before a fair and impartial jury; (b) that their firearm-brandishing convictions should be reversed on the ground that none of their Hobbs Act offenses are predicate crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); (c) that in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the section 922(g)(1) charges of being felons in possession of firearms; and (d) that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.The Second Circuit found merit in defendants' contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a section 924(c) crime of violence in light of United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019). Therefore, the court reversed defendants' section 924(c) convictions on Count 2 for brandishing firearms predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. The court affirmed defendants' convictions on all other counts, as well as the denial of their motions for a new trial. The court remanded for resentencing, and for consideration by the district court of what relief, if any, may be appropriate under the First Step Act. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order removing him on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). In this case, petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault meets section 16(a)'s physical force requirement because NYPL 120.05(1) requires that a defendant (1) cause a serious physical injury to another (2) with the intent to do so. The court explained that a person who causes serious physical injury with the intent to do so, in violation of NYPL 120.05(1), necessarily uses physical force. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that NYPL 120.05(1) is overbroad. View "Thompson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order granting in part and denying in part her motions to dismiss and reconsider dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999), seeking money damages for, inter alia, an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff alleged that Pennsylvania state officials violated his rights by using excessive force during an arrest.The court concluded that plaintiff does not state a plausible claim under the Fifth Amendment and that the district court thus erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to defendant on that claim. In this case, plaintiff had no obligation to comply with the transport order from the state court, and plaintiff's complaint does not plausibly allege that the decision to permit plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference only telephonically rather than in person was arbitrary, or in any way prejudicial to his case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order to the extent they denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Bivens claim and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the claim. View "Dixon v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

After Asset Acceptance received a default judgment against plaintiff in a debt collection action, Asset Acceptance began garnishing plaintiff's wages. Plaintiff then appeared in the action, eventually entering into a stipulation of settlement. When plaintiff learned that Equifax was including the 2013 default judgment on his credit report, he filed suit alleging that, in reporting the judgment as "satisfied" and in its subsequent dealings with plaintiff, Equifax willfully and negligently violated the source-disclosure, accurate reporting, and reinvestigation provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCPA).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Equifax, concluding that the district court correctly determined that Equifax's credit report was accurate; plaintiff could not establish damages arising from Equifax's allegedly negligent conduct; and that Equifax need not prove it actually interpreted the FCRA in line with its claimed reasonable interpretation to rely on the reasonable-interpretation defense established by Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007). The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments on appeal and found no basis for reversal. View "Shimon v. Equifax Information Services LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the operative amended complaints in two actions seeking to hold defendant bank liable under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), for providing banking services to a charitable organization with alleged ties to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) alleged to have committed a series of terrorist attacks in Israel in 2001-2004. The actions also seek to deny leave to amend the complaints to allege aiding-and-abetting claims under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. 2333(a) principles announced in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018), were properly applied here. The court explained that, in order to establish NatWest's liability under the ATA as a principal, plaintiffs were required to present evidence sufficient to support all of section 2331(1)'s definitional requirements for an act of international terrorism. The court saw no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to proffer such evidence and thus NatWest was entitled to summary judgment dismissing those claims. The court also concluded that the district court appropriately assessed plaintiffs' request to add JASTA claims, given the undisputed evidence adduced, in connection with the summary judgment motions, as to the state of NatWest's knowledge. Therefore, based on the record, the district court did not err in denying leave to amend the complaints as futile on the ground that plaintiffs could not show that NatWest was knowingly providing substantial assistance to Hamas, or that NatWest was generally aware that it was playing a role in Hamas's acts of terrorism. The court dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's amended judgment following defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, one count of securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1348 and 2, and six counts of insider trading in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 and 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. 2.In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court concluded that defendant's execution of confidentiality agreements with a company whose acquisition he was exploring was sufficient to subject him to prohibitions against insider trading. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant signed two nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with the company; that in both NDAs, each party agreed not to disclose any confidential or proprietary information of the other; and that the fact that the parties' exploration and evaluation of the potential acquisition of the company was explicitly classified as "Proprietary Information" that was to remain "Confidential." Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support inferences that defendant knowingly and intentionally breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing material nonpublic information as to the prospects for a merger agreement between the company and his fund, intending for the third party to make trades based on that information. Furthermore, defendant's challenges to his convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit such fraud also fail. Finally, venue was proper in the Southern District of New York. View "United States v. Chow" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for various crimes stemming from his role in two schemes to automatically subscribe consumers, without their knowledge or consent, to premium SMS text messaging services. Counts One and Five charged defendant with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; Counts Two and Six charged defendant with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2; Counts Three and Seven charged defendant with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A; and Counts Four and Eight charged defendant with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h).The court held that the district court's conduct did not create an appearance of partiality warranting recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a); the district court properly instructed the jury on conscious avoidance because sufficient trial evidence supported that theory of criminal liability; and defendant's conduct, as pled and as proven at trial, fit squarely within the scope of the aggravated identity theft statute. The court explained that, by participating in a scheme that employed victims' cell phone numbers to sign them up for paid text message services without their knowledge or consent by means of an auto-subscribing computer program, defendant used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person within the meaning of section 1028A. View "United States v. Wedd" on Justia Law