Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Plaintiff filed suit in 2016 as representative of an ERISA Plan and its participants, alleging that Ruane, a third-party investment manager and plan administrator retained by plaintiff's employer, DST, mismanaged the assets of DST's 401(k) profit-sharing fund, causing it to lose substantial value.The court concluded that plaintiff's ERISA claims for breach of fiduciary duty are not properly understood to be "related to" his employment because none of the facts he would have to prove to prevail on his claims pertain to his employment. Furthermore, other individuals and entities that were never employed by DST could have brought identical claims, including other Plan beneficiaries, the Secretary of Labor, and DST itself. Moreover, the court explained that Congress explicitly authorized plan beneficiaries and others to sue individual fiduciaries in federal court for breach of their duties under ERISA: to interpret the Arbitration Agreement as mandating arbitration of ERISA fiduciary claims would unacceptably undercut the viability of such actions. Therefore, this result is neither required by the Arbitration Agreement's express language nor acceptable in light of ERISA's protective purposes. View "Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc." on Justia Law

In March 2020, Congress created the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which authorized the SBA to guarantee favorable loans to certain business affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA Administrator promulgated regulations imposing several longstanding eligibility requirements on PPP loan applicants, including that no SBA guarantee would be given to businesses presenting "live performances of a prurient sexual nature." Pharaohs, a business featuring nude dancing, sought a preliminary injunction directing the SBA to give it a PPP loan guarantee.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Pharaoh's motion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pharaohs has failed to show that it is substantially likely to succeed on its claims that (1) the SBA exceeded its statutory authority to promulgate eligibility restrictions, and (2) the exclusion of nude-dancing establishments from the Program violates the First or Fifth Amendments. The court need not address the remaining preliminary injunction factors in light of its conclusion. View "Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's amended judgment awarding costs to Chevron under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), several interlocutory orders declining to dismiss civil contempt proceedings against him and ordering compliance with post-judgment discovery, and a judgment and order finding him in civil contempt.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in awarding costs to Chevron. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that defendant violated the Injunction in several respects and its judgment of civil contempt relating to those violations. However, the court held that the Injunction, previously affirmed by this Court and clear and far-reaching on its own terms, was insufficiently clear and unambiguous, when read alongside the district court's explanation of that Injunction in a subsequent opinion, in prohibiting defendant from raising funds by selling interests in the Ecuadorian Judgment. Thus, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding defendant in contempt for engaging in that conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's amended judgment awarding costs to Chevron; affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's contempt finding and vacated the supplemental judgment awarding Chevron $666,476.34 in compensatory sanctions; and vacated the supplemental judgment awarding attorneys' fees and remanded to the district court to determine the fees reasonably expended to secure the contempt findings affirmed on appeal. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not permit a school district to amend an individualized education program (IEP) unilaterally during the thirty-day resolution period. The Act envisions the resolution period as a time for mediation and agreement, not one-sided action. In this case, the first IEP that the school district prepared for the child and presented to the parents indicated erroneously that the child would be placed in a 12-student classroom, which the parents deemed insufficient. After the parents filed a due process complaint, the school district sought to cure this deficiency by unilaterally amending the original IEP to reflect that the student would be in a 15-student class. The district court found in favor of the parents and ordered the school district to reimburse the parents for the private school tuition.The Second Circuit affirmed and concluded that because the school district argues only that it provided the student with a free appropriate education (FAPE) based on her IEP as unilaterally amended during the resolution period, and does not dispute that the unamended IEP denied the student a FAPE, the school district denied the student a FAPE for her 2016-17 school year. Finally, the district court's other conclusions relevant to the reimbursement order are not challenged on appeal and therefore stand unaltered. View "Board of Education of the Yorktown Central School District v. C.S." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) as moot. While this appeal was pending, defendant completed his federal prison sentence. The court explained that, although defendant is now on supervised release, he has neither requested that the district court reduce his term of supervision nor advanced any arguments to suggest that such a reduction is warranted. The court noted that dismissal will not result in hardship to defendant. If defendant believes that the arguments that he marshaled in favor of compassionate release would also merit a reduction in his term of supervised release, the court concluded that he is free to make such a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c). View "United States v. Chestnut" on Justia Law

The United States appeals from the district court's amended judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, vacating defendant's 22-year sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and related firearms crimes and resentencing him to time served. The district court concluded that it had mistakenly applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Career Offender Guideline, USSG 4B1.1, in determining defendant's initial sentence because two prior convictions relied on as predicates for those enhancements were for New York first-degree manslaughter, which the district court ruled is not a categorical "violent felony" (ACCA) or "crime of violence" (Guideline).The Second Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, agreed with the United States that first-degree manslaughter is a categorical violent felony/crime of violence because a person can be guilty of that crime—whether by commission or omission—only if he (a) causes death, while (b) intending to cause at least serious bodily injury, and the Supreme Court, in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 169 (2014), stated that "the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force." Accordingly, the court vacated the panel decision, reversed the district court's grant of the section 2255 motion, and remanded with directions to reinstate defendant's original sentence and judgment. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, seeking vacatur of his 1998 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). After holding the decision in this case pending disposition of other cases presenting related questions, the court concluded that attempted federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), which requires that the attempt be made "by force and violence, or by intimidation," is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c)(1) pursuant to United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 870 (2020).Furthermore, in light of the court's recent decision in Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465, 471 (2d Cir. 2020), the court found untimely and declined to reach the merits of defendant's additional arguments related to his sentencing under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. In Nunez, the court held that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), did not recognize a constitutional right not to be sentenced under the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's petition is untimely insofar as it challenges his sentence under that pre-Booker Guideline: the right he now asserts has not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court. The court explained that no decision newly announced and now made retroactive excuses him from meeting the one-year time limitation set out in section 2255(f). View "Collier v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner sought relief after he had been threatened and beaten by gang members and police officers who urged him to join the gang. The court concluded that petitioner's negative view of gangs does not amount to a "political opinion" within the meaning of the immigration laws, and that substantial evidence supports the BIA's decision that he has not established a likelihood of future torture if he were to be removed to El Salvador. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Dean and Adam Skelos' convictions on multiple public corruption charges. Dean was a Republican senator from Nassau County, and was the Majority Leader of the New York State Senate. Defendants, father and son, were convicted in 2015 of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right; extortion under color of official right; conspiracy to commit honest services fraud; and solicitation and acceptance of bribes and gratuities. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in the Glenwood, AbTech, and PRI schemes.In 2016, while defendants' appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States, which narrowed the definition of the "official act" that a public official must exchange for benefits in order to be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion or honest services fraud, where those crimes have been defined by reference to the term "official act" in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201. In 2018, a second jury convicted defendants on all counts.The court concluded that any error in the jury instructions in the wake of McDonnell were harmless; the language in the indictment was sufficient where the language in an indictment is not required to be as precise as the attendant jury charge, nor is it required to delineate how the government will prove the elements set forth in the indictment; the district court empaneled a fair and impartial jury, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue; there is no basis to vacate defendants' conviction under 18 U.S.C. 666 where a special verdict form specified that the jury found each defendant guilty under section 666 on both the gratuity theory and the unchallenged bribery theory; the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to quash certain subpoenas and there was no infringement of defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the district court's denial of requests for documents that were irrelevant, inadmissible, obtainable by other means, or part of discovery fishing expeditions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the court rejected Adam's evidentiary challenges and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Skelos" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) whether a judgment debtor suffers cognizable damages in tort when its property is seized pursuant to a levy by service of execution that does not comply with the procedural requirements of CPLR 5232(a), even though the seized property is applied to a valid money judgment; and, if so (2) whether the judgment debtor can, under these circumstances, bring a tort claim against either the judgment creditor or the marshal without first seeking relief under CPLR 5240. View "Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC" on Justia Law