Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of 210 months' imprisonment for obstruction of justice based on destruction of evidence. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not make the findings of fact required under United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), before imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 relating to defendant's trial testimony. The court remanded in part for further proceedings. The court disposed of defendant's remaining claims in a separate summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the State of New York. The court held that the arbitral panel – which did in fact consider the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) – reasonably concluded that its task in this case was a straightforward matter of contract interpretation not subject to the Secretary of the Interior's approval. The court explained that the panel did not disregard the IGRA, and deferral to the Department of the Interior was not warranted. Therefore, the arbitral panel did not manifestly disregard governing law, and the district court properly confirmed the award. View "Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of final judgment for Mixpac on its claims of unfair competition, infringement of common law trademarks, and its claims under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) for trademark counterfeiting, infringement of registered marks, and false designation of origin. Mixpac and defendants are competitors in the U.S. market for mixing tips used by dentists to create impressions of teeth for dental procedures, such as crowns.The court disagreed with the district court's holding that Mixpac's trade dress—its use of yellow, teal, blue, pink, purple, brown, and white on mixing tips—is not functional. Instead, the court held that the use of these colors on mixing tips is functional, as the colors signify diameter and enable users to match a cartridge to the appropriate mixing tip. Accordingly, the court remanded for entry of final judgment in favor of defendants on the unfair competition, trademark infringement, trademark counterfeiting, and false designation of origin claims. The court declined to address defendants' counter claims and to address in the first instance Mixpac's civil contempt claim. View "Sulzer Mixpac AG v. A&N Trading Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Synchrony Financial and others involved in a December 2017 promissory note offering are liable for materially misrepresenting the scope and degree of changes to the company's underwriting practices beginning in mid-2016 and the impact these changes had on its business relationships with retail companies. The district court dismissed the case in its entirety.With one exception, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that, from the face of the amended complaint, many allegations were too vague to constitute material misrepresentations on which a reasonable investor would rely. The court also agreed that many alleged material misstatements were properly contextualized by the total mix of publicly available information and appropriately dismissed. However, in regard to one alleged misstatement claiming that a corporate representative of Synchrony Financial publicly stated that the company had received no "pushback" from retail partners during negotiations, the court found that the alleged statement was sufficiently specific to plausibly allege a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court explained that because the alleged statement purported to make a factual assertion about events that had already transpired or were currently in progress, it is materially distinct from the other allegations. Furthermore, particularized allegations in the amended complaint explain how and why this statement may have been false at the time it was made. View "In re: Synchrony Financial Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. Defendant was one of the leaders of a Norwalk, Connecticut-based organization that trafficked powder and crack cocaine. In 2003, defendant was convicted of multiple drug- and racketeering-related crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.The court agreed with the district court that defendant is ineligible for First Step Act relief because his existing sentence was imposed in accordance with the relevant terms of the Act. In this case, defendant's 2015 plenary resentence, the operative sentence in this appeal, was imposed after the effective date of the crack cocaine provisions in section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and the district court sentenced defendant in accordance with these provisions at the 2015 hearing. View "United States v. Burden" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argues that he was tortured in Italy when he was subjected for more than six years to solitary confinement and other restrictive conditions in Italy’s 41-bis prison regime, and that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Italy. The court concluded that the conditions petitioner alleged he faced or would face do not rise to the level of torture as that term is used under the CAT and its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. 1208.18. In this case, although the court recognized that petitioner developed various persisting mental ailments while in 41-bis detention, the court cannot agree that he faced severe mental pain and suffering of the kind envisioned in section 1208.18(a)(4)(ii) View "Gallina v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against several laboratory testing companies, alleging that the companies violated federal and Connecticut law by submitting fraudulent or overstated claims for medical services purportedly provided to plaintiffs' plan members. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after concluding that plaintiffs' claims are time-barred by Connecticut’s three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort claims.The Second Circuit found, under Connecticut law, that plaintiffs' equitable claims, which include their federal claims, are subject to no statute of limitations and are instead governed only by the doctrine of laches. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision in part. However, the court nonetheless affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state law claims, and specifically reject plaintiffs' argument that the limitations period applicable to those claims was tolled during the pendency of a prior action between the parties. The court explained that, although plaintiffs note that several sister circuits have tolled limitations periods applicable to compulsory counterclaims as a matter of federal law, the legal claims at issue here are all brought under state law, subject only to state law tolling rules, and provide no relief for plaintiffs. View "Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. BioHealth Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

The State of New York enacted new party-qualification requirements in the spring of 2020, requiring political organizations to earn the greater of 130,000 votes or 2 percent of the vote in elections for President and for Governor to achieve party status and the automatic place on the ballot it confers. In this appeal, the SAM Party and its chairman challenged the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction against the party-qualification requirements.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that appellants are not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim because the burden imposed by the presidential-election requirement is (1) not severe and (2) justified by the State's interest in uncluttered ballots, effective electoral competition, and the preservation of resources dedicated to public financing of elections. Therefore, the district court appropriately denied the SAM Party's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "SAM Party of New York v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants unlawfully used photographs of them to advertise strip clubs owned by defendants in violation of New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that plaintiffs signed full releases of their rights to the photographs.The Second Circuit concluded that the terms of Plaintiff Shake and Hinton's release agreements are disputed material facts, and defendants concede that neither they nor the third-party contractors that created and published the advertisements secured legal rights to use any of the photographs at issue. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants and in denying summary judgment to plaintiffs on liability. Therefore, the court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.The court affirmed in part and held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs had not accepted the offer of judgment because the offer's settlement amount term was ambiguous, the parties disagreed over how to interpret the term, and there was accordingly no meeting of the minds. Finally, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), New York General Business Law Section 349, and libel claims. View "Electra v. 59 Murray Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying as untimely petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner contends that this circuit's recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), created a newly discovered fact that extended his filing deadline under section 2255(f)(4).The court concluded that an intervening development in case law does not constitute a newly discovered "fact" within the meaning of section 2255(f)(4). In this case, a decision issued after a conviction but before the filing of a motion under section 2255 is not a newly discovered "fact" pursuant to section 2255(f)(4). Therefore, Townsend, in pronouncing a new rule of law, gave rise to no new facts and thus did not extend the limitations period for petitioner's section 2255 motion. View "McCloud v. United States" on Justia Law