Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying as untimely petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner contends that this circuit's recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), created a newly discovered fact that extended his filing deadline under section 2255(f)(4).The court concluded that an intervening development in case law does not constitute a newly discovered "fact" within the meaning of section 2255(f)(4). In this case, a decision issued after a conviction but before the filing of a motion under section 2255 is not a newly discovered "fact" pursuant to section 2255(f)(4). Therefore, Townsend, in pronouncing a new rule of law, gave rise to no new facts and thus did not extend the limitations period for petitioner's section 2255 motion. View "McCloud v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of GRE's second amended complaint (SAC) challenging the Reconciliation Requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-28m(a)(3), which imposes certain reporting requirements upon GRE, a Canadian cigarette manufacturer, as a prerequisite to the sale of GRE's cigarette brands in Connecticut. GRE alleges that the Reconciliation Requirement violates its due process rights and the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution.The court held that the Reconciliation Requirement has a rational relationship to the State's legitimate interests in collecting excise taxes and combatting cigarette smuggling that satisfies both federal and state due process requirements. The court also held that the State has violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Supremacy Clause by imposing the Reconciliation Requirement on a Nonparticipating Manufacturer as a condition of permitting that manufacturer's brands to be sold within the State. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that GRE's SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Grand River Enterprises v. Boughton" on Justia Law

After NYLAG sought access to non-precedential "unpublished opinions" issued by the BIA in immigrant cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the district court dismissed the case and concluded that FOIA's remedial provision does not authorize district courts to order agencies to make records publicly available. NYLAG seeks disclosure of these opinions, which are not routinely made available to the public, in order to aid in its representation of low-income clients in removal and asylum proceedings.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that FOIA's remedial provision authorizes the relief NYLAG seeks. The court explained that FOIA's text, read in light of its history and purpose, empowers district courts to order agencies to comply with their affirmative disclosure obligations under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2), including the obligation to make certain documents publicly available. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "New York Legal Assistance Group v. Board of Immigration Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Connecticut inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant and other Connecticut state officials, alleging deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. A jury found defendant liable for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights and awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. At issue in this appeal is the satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment. After the judgment became final, the State voluntarily undertook to satisfy the judgment on defendant's behalf. In doing so, the State took actions against plaintiff under Connecticut law to recoup portions of the payment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on plaintiff's "motion for aid of judgment" and "motion to unfreeze assets," as well as defendant's motion for reconsideration and "motion for credit against judgment." The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the district court's ruling that defendant's debt to plaintiff had not been satisfied. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that Connecticut's actions were preempted by section 1983. In this case, the court found no error in the district court's conclusion that the State's attempt to discharge defendant's judgment obligations in significant part through payments to itself and payments to plaintiffs that the state might eventually recoup undermines the objectives of section 1983. Likewise, defendant's motion for reconsideration also failed for the same reasons as the district court's ruling on plaintiff's post-judgment motions. Finally, defendant waived his challenge to the district court's denial in part of his motion for credit against judgment. View "Williams v. Marinelli" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Hartford and enjoining defendants, who are administrators and clerks at the Connecticut Superior Court, from enforcing a Connecticut statute that mandates automatic sealing of all judicial records and closure to the public of all court proceedings in criminal prosecutions of juvenile defendants transferred to the regular criminal docket.The court held that Public Act Number 19-187 is unconstitutional. The court concluded that the Courant has a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal prosecutions of juveniles in regular criminal court. The court agreed with the district court that, for cases in criminal court, even those involving juvenile defendants, the "place and process" have historically been open to the public. Furthermore, public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. The court also concluded that the Act infringes on that right because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Finally, the court concluded that the Courant has shown that all four requirements for a preliminary injunction have been met. View "Hartford Courant Co., LLC v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Connecticut prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that state correctional officials violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him a meaningful opportunity to exercise for six months. In this case, the alleged denial occurred when prison officials required him to wear full restraints when exercising in the prison yard. After a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the district court granted the Warden's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that plaintiff's personal involvement was for too short a time to support an Eighth Amendment claim.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that plaintiff was subjected to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Warden had the requisite state of mind for the entire six-month period during which plaintiff was required to exercise in restraints when outside of his cell, not just the two weeks that the district court found; the jury's verdict was not based on "sheer surmise and conjecture," but on abundant circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably inferred that the Warden's actual knowledge of plaintiff's recreation status and the concomitant risk to plaintiff's health from being required to exercise in restraints; and the Warden's claims that there can be no Eighth Amendment violation are unavailing. The court also concluded that the Warden was liable for the Eighth Amendment violation, and that the Warden is not protected by qualified immunity where he knowingly violated plaintiff's clearly established right to meaningful exercise under the circumstances and lacked a sufficient justification for doing so. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Quiros" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and sentencing him principally to 24-months in prison. The court concluded that, even though the procedures used to obtain the victim's two out-of-court identifications were unduly suggestive, both identifications were nonetheless reliable. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by admitting them. Furthermore, because the victim testified at the supervised release hearing, the district court was not required to find good cause before admitting his hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court also concluded that, although the district court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements without first finding good cause, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendants Stillwell, Samia, and Hunter appealed their convictions for murder-for-hire and related crimes. Long after defendants filed their appeals, the NDDS filed a notice in the Second Circuit, advising the court that the district court had entered a sealed protective order upon the filing of an ex parte motion by the NDDS, which barred prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and defense counsel from reviewing certain documents. The court later vacated the protective order and ordered disclosure of the material to the U.S. Attorney and then to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related authorities.In this appeal, defendants claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. The court declined to consider, let alone resolve, defendants' Brady claims, which are raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the claims in the first instance. View "United States v. Stillwell" on Justia Law

After defendant was sued for medical malpractice in state court, he removed the case to federal court and moved to substitute the United States as defendant. Defendant claimed that the alleged malpractice occurred within the scope of his employment at a federally deemed community health center, entitling him to immunity and the substitution of the United States as the defendant under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA). The district court concluded that some of the alleged malpractice occurred outside the scope of defendant's employment because he had billed for some of his services privately, in contravention of the Federal Tort Claims Act Health Center Policy Manual. Therefore, the district court concluded that defendant was not covered by the FSHCAA implementing regulation. The district court denied substitution of the United States as to that conduct, remanding the case in part to state court. The government argues that the Second Circuit lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because defendant appealed from an unreviewable remand order.The Second Circuit held that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), remand orders are unreviewable except in cases that were originally removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442 or 1443. The court concluded that, because defendant removed this case under section 1442, the court is not barred from reviewing the district court's remand order. On the merits, the court concluded that defendant was acting within the scope of his employment under the relevant law—New York law—for the acts for which he billed privately. Therefore, the FTCA Manual is not entitled to deference to the extent that it provides otherwise. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Razmzan v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cavello Bay's claims of securities fraud for failure to plead a domestic application of the law. The court assumed without deciding that the transaction was "domestic," and agreed with the district court that Cavello Bay's claims are predominantly foreign under Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014). In this case, the claims are based on a private agreement for a private offering between a Bermudan investor (Cavello Bay) and a Bermudan issuer (Spencer Capital); Cavello Bay purchased restricted shares in Spencer Capital in a private offering; and the shares reflect only an interest in Spencer Capital, and they are listed on no U.S. exchange and are not otherwise traded in the United States. The court explained that it is not enough for Cavello Bay to allege that Spencer Capital made a misstatement from New York (through defendant); planned to use the funds to invest in U.S. insurance services; had its principal place of business and CEO and directors in New York; and was managed by a U.S. company. The court concluded that the contacts that matter are those that relate to the purchase and sale of securities. View "Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Stein" on Justia Law