Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Attorney General of the State of New York (OAG) appealed the district court's order denying it a preliminary injunction against defendants relating to their protest activities in violation of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), the New York Clinic Access Act (NYSCAA), and the New York City Clinic Access Act (the City Act). Defendants appealed from the district court's order denying the OAG a preliminary injunction, challenging the district court's conclusion that FACE and its analogs are not facially unconstitutional and arguing that the City Act's follow-and-harass and clinic-interference provisions are void for vagueness. Defendants also challenged the district court's conclusions that the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act and that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients.The Second Circuit vacated and remanded in part, concluding that the district court made certain improper evidentiary and credibility rulings, relied on clearly erroneous factual findings in assessing the OAG's physical obstruction claims, erred in its interpretation of the FACE statute and its state and local analogs, and abused its discretion in finding no irreparable harm. The court affirmed as to the remainder. In regard to the cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Defendant George violated FACE, NYSCAA, and the City Act by physically obstructing patients; the statutes do not violate the First Amendment; and the OAG has parens patriae standing to sue under the City Act. View "People of the State of New York v. Griepp" on Justia Law

The Government seeks forfeiture of the Building, as well as other assets owned by claimants. The parties subsequently cross-appeal the district court's order determining that the Government had probable cause to forfeit the Building and granting the motion of claimants to modify a protective order by releasing to them a portion of the rental income generated from the Building.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of probable cause where the district court described at length the non-tainted evidence on which it relied to find probable cause, and the district court did not refuse to consider claimants' statute-of-limitations defense. The district court also did not commit reversible error by concluding that, at this stage, claimants' statute of limitations defense did not defeat a probable cause finding. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion where the district court declined to draw an adverse inference against the Government for failing to produce statute-of-limitations discovery following the court's 2016 and 2019 opinions requiring it to do so. However, the court concluded that the return-of-rents remedy is appropriate here and modified the district court's order releasing the rental income to cover rental income generated from January 5, 2018, until October 13, 2020. View "In Re: 650 Fifth Avenue Co. & Related Properties" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and similarly-situated employees of Joe's Shanghai restaurant, alleging violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL). The district court certified the class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) of all nonmanagerial employees at the Flushing, Queens location of Joe's Shanghai on the NYLL claims. However, five days before the trial was scheduled to start, the district court sua sponte decertified the class, determining that class counsel was no longer adequately representing the class. The district court held a bench trial on plaintiff's individual claims and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against three of the defendants.As a preliminary issue, the Second Circuit concluded that, although plaintiff prevailed on the merits of his claims, this appeal is not moot because he maintains standing as to the class certification issue. On the merits, the court concluded that because class counsel's conduct made clear that counsel was no longer adequately representing the class, the district court acted within its discretion in decertifying the class. In this case, the record is replete with counsel's shortcomings before the class was decertified. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Jianmin Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc." on Justia Law

8 U.S.C. 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula in 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(1), which deducts processing time from the age of an F2A visa beneficiary. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that plaintiff's daughter was statutorily under 21 years old when plaintiff naturalized and thus the daughter qualifies for an immediate-relative visa. At issue in this appeal was whether the term "age" in section 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula set forth in section 1153(h)(1). Based on the text, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the Child Status Protection Act, the court held that it does. View "Cuthill v. Blinken" on Justia Law

In 2018 plaintiffs, the former and current tenants of a privately owned affordable housing project, filed suit challenging the regulatory approval of rent increases a decade earlier by HUD and the New York HPD. The district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).The Second Circuit held that the tenants lack standing for their procedural violation claim against HUD under the Administrative Procedure Act based on the sequence of regulatory approval because the order of the approval process was not designed to protect the tenants' concrete interests in notice and participation; all of the tenants' APA claims are in any event untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) because they accrued in April 2011, which is more than six years before they filed their complaint; Section 2401(a) is a claims-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar, but the tenants are not entitled to equitable tolling; and the tenants' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and its housing authority are untimely and the continuing violation doctrine does not save those claims because each arises from a discrete approval process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "DeSuze v. Ammon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired "dual status technician" with the National Guard, argues that the civil service pension he received in connection with his employment as a dual status technician – a civilian position that requires concurrent National Guard membership – is not subject to reduction under the Social Security Act's Windfall Elimination Provision because the pension falls within an exception applicable to payments based wholly on work performed as a member of a uniformed service. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff and the Administration appealed.The Second Circuit reversed the Administration's calculation of plaintiff's Social Security retirement benefits. The court read the plain language of the statute and used traditional tools of statutory interpretation, holding that a civil service pension based on federal civilian employment as a dual status technician does not fall within the uniformed service exception. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Linza v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's unlawful search and seizure claims. The court concluded that defendants violated clearly established law by detaining and frisking plaintiff based on nothing more than an officer's unconfirmed hunch that there might be an open warrant for plaintiff's arrest. In this case, police officers stopped plaintiff and his daughters as they walked out of a Target store. Although the officers admittedly had no reason to think plaintiff had committed a crime, one officer speculated that there "might be" a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. The court explained that the officers clearly lacked any facts giving them reasonable suspicion that plaintiff was involved in criminal activity (much less carrying a dangerous weapon) or wanted for a crime. View "Vasquez v. Maloney" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Plaintiff filed suit in 2016 as representative of an ERISA Plan and its participants, alleging that Ruane, a third-party investment manager and plan administrator retained by plaintiff's employer, DST, mismanaged the assets of DST's 401(k) profit-sharing fund, causing it to lose substantial value.The court concluded that plaintiff's ERISA claims for breach of fiduciary duty are not properly understood to be "related to" his employment because none of the facts he would have to prove to prevail on his claims pertain to his employment. Furthermore, other individuals and entities that were never employed by DST could have brought identical claims, including other Plan beneficiaries, the Secretary of Labor, and DST itself. Moreover, the court explained that Congress explicitly authorized plan beneficiaries and others to sue individual fiduciaries in federal court for breach of their duties under ERISA: to interpret the Arbitration Agreement as mandating arbitration of ERISA fiduciary claims would unacceptably undercut the viability of such actions. Therefore, this result is neither required by the Arbitration Agreement's express language nor acceptable in light of ERISA's protective purposes. View "Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc." on Justia Law

In March 2020, Congress created the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which authorized the SBA to guarantee favorable loans to certain business affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA Administrator promulgated regulations imposing several longstanding eligibility requirements on PPP loan applicants, including that no SBA guarantee would be given to businesses presenting "live performances of a prurient sexual nature." Pharaohs, a business featuring nude dancing, sought a preliminary injunction directing the SBA to give it a PPP loan guarantee.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Pharaoh's motion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pharaohs has failed to show that it is substantially likely to succeed on its claims that (1) the SBA exceeded its statutory authority to promulgate eligibility restrictions, and (2) the exclusion of nude-dancing establishments from the Program violates the First or Fifth Amendments. The court need not address the remaining preliminary injunction factors in light of its conclusion. View "Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's amended judgment awarding costs to Chevron under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), several interlocutory orders declining to dismiss civil contempt proceedings against him and ordering compliance with post-judgment discovery, and a judgment and order finding him in civil contempt.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in awarding costs to Chevron. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that defendant violated the Injunction in several respects and its judgment of civil contempt relating to those violations. However, the court held that the Injunction, previously affirmed by this Court and clear and far-reaching on its own terms, was insufficiently clear and unambiguous, when read alongside the district court's explanation of that Injunction in a subsequent opinion, in prohibiting defendant from raising funds by selling interests in the Ecuadorian Judgment. Thus, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding defendant in contempt for engaging in that conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's amended judgment awarding costs to Chevron; affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's contempt finding and vacated the supplemental judgment awarding Chevron $666,476.34 in compensatory sanctions; and vacated the supplemental judgment awarding attorneys' fees and remanded to the district court to determine the fees reasonably expended to secure the contempt findings affirmed on appeal. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law