Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Hartford and enjoining defendants, who are administrators and clerks at the Connecticut Superior Court, from enforcing a Connecticut statute that mandates automatic sealing of all judicial records and closure to the public of all court proceedings in criminal prosecutions of juvenile defendants transferred to the regular criminal docket.The court held that Public Act Number 19-187 is unconstitutional. The court concluded that the Courant has a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal prosecutions of juveniles in regular criminal court. The court agreed with the district court that, for cases in criminal court, even those involving juvenile defendants, the "place and process" have historically been open to the public. Furthermore, public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. The court also concluded that the Act infringes on that right because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Finally, the court concluded that the Courant has shown that all four requirements for a preliminary injunction have been met. View "Hartford Courant Co., LLC v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Connecticut prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that state correctional officials violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him a meaningful opportunity to exercise for six months. In this case, the alleged denial occurred when prison officials required him to wear full restraints when exercising in the prison yard. After a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the district court granted the Warden's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis that plaintiff's personal involvement was for too short a time to support an Eighth Amendment claim.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that plaintiff was subjected to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Warden had the requisite state of mind for the entire six-month period during which plaintiff was required to exercise in restraints when outside of his cell, not just the two weeks that the district court found; the jury's verdict was not based on "sheer surmise and conjecture," but on abundant circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably inferred that the Warden's actual knowledge of plaintiff's recreation status and the concomitant risk to plaintiff's health from being required to exercise in restraints; and the Warden's claims that there can be no Eighth Amendment violation are unavailing. The court also concluded that the Warden was liable for the Eighth Amendment violation, and that the Warden is not protected by qualified immunity where he knowingly violated plaintiff's clearly established right to meaningful exercise under the circumstances and lacked a sufficient justification for doing so. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Quiros" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and sentencing him principally to 24-months in prison. The court concluded that, even though the procedures used to obtain the victim's two out-of-court identifications were unduly suggestive, both identifications were nonetheless reliable. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by admitting them. Furthermore, because the victim testified at the supervised release hearing, the district court was not required to find good cause before admitting his hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court also concluded that, although the district court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements without first finding good cause, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendants Stillwell, Samia, and Hunter appealed their convictions for murder-for-hire and related crimes. Long after defendants filed their appeals, the NDDS filed a notice in the Second Circuit, advising the court that the district court had entered a sealed protective order upon the filing of an ex parte motion by the NDDS, which barred prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and defense counsel from reviewing certain documents. The court later vacated the protective order and ordered disclosure of the material to the U.S. Attorney and then to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related authorities.In this appeal, defendants claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. The court declined to consider, let alone resolve, defendants' Brady claims, which are raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the claims in the first instance. View "United States v. Stillwell" on Justia Law

After defendant was sued for medical malpractice in state court, he removed the case to federal court and moved to substitute the United States as defendant. Defendant claimed that the alleged malpractice occurred within the scope of his employment at a federally deemed community health center, entitling him to immunity and the substitution of the United States as the defendant under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA). The district court concluded that some of the alleged malpractice occurred outside the scope of defendant's employment because he had billed for some of his services privately, in contravention of the Federal Tort Claims Act Health Center Policy Manual. Therefore, the district court concluded that defendant was not covered by the FSHCAA implementing regulation. The district court denied substitution of the United States as to that conduct, remanding the case in part to state court. The government argues that the Second Circuit lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because defendant appealed from an unreviewable remand order.The Second Circuit held that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), remand orders are unreviewable except in cases that were originally removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442 or 1443. The court concluded that, because defendant removed this case under section 1442, the court is not barred from reviewing the district court's remand order. On the merits, the court concluded that defendant was acting within the scope of his employment under the relevant law—New York law—for the acts for which he billed privately. Therefore, the FTCA Manual is not entitled to deference to the extent that it provides otherwise. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Razmzan v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cavello Bay's claims of securities fraud for failure to plead a domestic application of the law. The court assumed without deciding that the transaction was "domestic," and agreed with the district court that Cavello Bay's claims are predominantly foreign under Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014). In this case, the claims are based on a private agreement for a private offering between a Bermudan investor (Cavello Bay) and a Bermudan issuer (Spencer Capital); Cavello Bay purchased restricted shares in Spencer Capital in a private offering; and the shares reflect only an interest in Spencer Capital, and they are listed on no U.S. exchange and are not otherwise traded in the United States. The court explained that it is not enough for Cavello Bay to allege that Spencer Capital made a misstatement from New York (through defendant); planned to use the funds to invest in U.S. insurance services; had its principal place of business and CEO and directors in New York; and was managed by a U.S. company. The court concluded that the contacts that matter are those that relate to the purchase and sale of securities. View "Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Stein" on Justia Law

Former inmate Kotler sued prison officials, claiming that they planted a weapon in his housing area in retaliation for his activities on an inmate grievance committee. He also alleged violations of his due process rights in a disciplinary hearing over the incident. After a second remand, the district court dismissed Kotler’s due process claim as abandoned during prior appeals, and dismissed the alleged linchpin defendant, now-deceased Superintendent Donelli, finding that no one timely moved for substitution of Donelli’s successor after his death. A jury returned a defense verdict on Kotler’s retaliation claims.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The dismissal of Donelli was proper; under FRCP 25(a), the 90-day deadline for a plaintiff to move to substitute a defendant is triggered by service of a notice on the plaintiff of the defendant’s death, regardless of whether that notice was also served upon the decedent’s successor or representative. The district court gave Kotler a fair trial on his retaliation claim. The court asked witnesses questions, limited Kotler’s questioning of a witness, and told Kotler to hurry up numerous times but in light of the entire record, the court’s questions were attempts to clarify and organize information. A supplemental jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error. Kotler did not abandon his due process claim during his previous appeals, so the district court erred in dismissing it. View "Kotler v. Jubert" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs will likely succeed in showing that, as applied, the Dual Enrollment Program's "publicly funded" requirement violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In this case, A.H., her parents, and the Diocese filed suit against the Agency of Education after A.H.'s application for public funding to the program was denied solely because of her school's religious status.The court concluded that, in these circumstances, the State's reliance on the "publicly funded" requirement as a condition for program eligibility imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion, because it forced Rice Memorial High School, a ministry of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, to chose whether to participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution. At the same time, the requirement puts A.H.'s family to a choice between sending their child to a religious school or receiving benefits. In light of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017), the court explained that the denial of a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity can be justified only by a state interest of the highest order. In this case, the Agency has not identified any compelling interest that could survive strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted the motion for a preliminary injunction. View "A.H. v. French" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. Defendants' conviction stemmed from their involvement in a scheme to defraud universities of athletic-based financial aid when they made secret cash payments to the families of college basketball recruits, thereby rendering the recruits ineligible to play for the universities.The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the wire fraud convictions where defendants have not shown that the government failed to present evidence for any rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a scheme to defraud. Furthermore, the jury was also presented with enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that the Universities' athletic-based aid was "an object" of their scheme. In this case, the jury could have reasonably found that defendants deprived the Universities of property -- athletic-based aid that they could have awarded to students who were eligible to play -- by breaking NCAA rules and depriving the Universities of relevant information through fundamentally dishonest means. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and did not commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury. View "United States v. Gatto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a New York State prison official, alleging that she violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping him imprisoned based upon sentencing errors that incarcerated him for almost a year past the date on which state law mandated his release.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, but agreed with the district court's reasoning only in part. The court held that, contrary to the district court's determination, plaintiff alleged a harm of constitutional magnitude under the Eighth Amendment because New York State lacked authority to detain him past his mandatory conditional release date. The court also held that plaintiff has a liberty interest in his right to conditional release protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. Because neither of these rights was clearly established at the time, the court held that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for any responsibility she may have had for plaintiff's prolonged detention. View "Hurd v. Fredenburgh" on Justia Law