Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the county, the sheriff's department, and Defendant Foti and Santacroce, alleging claims in connection with Foti's alleged sexual harassment and sexual assault of female inmates at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility.Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Second Circuit held that summary judgment on the Monell claim was unwarranted because there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a material issue of disputed fact as to whether supervisory officials at the Riverhead Facility consistently ignored Foti's widespread pattern of sexual assaults and sexual harassment of female inmates, such that it constructively supported the inference that policymakers, at the very least, had a custom or practice of acquiescing to Foti's sexual misconduct. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs Lucente and Culoso's claims against Suffolk County and the individual defendants. In this case, there is evidence upon which the continuing violation doctrine can apply as to all of the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims and there is evidence of sexual assault and/or sexual harassment by Foti against Lucente and Culoso within the limitations period. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff Viola's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lucente v. County of Suffolk" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed in part the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint, alleging claims of unreasonable force applied by security personnel endeavoring to remove a plaintiff, a former professional basketball player and spectator, from Madison Square Garden.The court held that plaintiff's allegations sufficed to defeat a motion to dismiss the assault and battery claims in the amended complaint. In this case, plaintiff alleges that he was "thrown to the ground" by actions that "greatly exceeded the amount of force that was necessary" and "clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonable behavior," and that he "has suffered and continues to suffer harm." The court explained that the reasonable inference to be drawn is that plaintiff has been subjected to an unreasonable amount of force. The court reversed as to the causes of action for assault and battery and affirmed as to other causes of action in a summary order filed this date, remanding for further proceedings. View "Oakley v. Dolan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for international parental kidnapping and passport fraud. After determining that defendant's vagueness challenge fails insofar as it is premised on deficient notice, the court held that the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. In this case, the IPKCA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to someone who retains children abroad without first abducting them, when the children had not been in the United States for several years prior to the unlawful retention.The court also held that the district court properly applied two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for substantial interference with the administration of justice and for fraudulent use of a United States passport. View "United States v. Houtar" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied the petition for appealability, holding that assaulting a federal officer, an offense under 18 U.S.C. 111(b), is a categorical crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A), using a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence. The court held that petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In this case, petitioner pleaded guilty in 2012 to assaulting a federal officer, in violation of section 111(a)(1) and (b), and to using a firearm during that assault, in violation of section 924(c). View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against several groups of defendants for malicious prosecution, due process violations, the use of excessive force, and municipal liability. In this case, plaintiff was arrested and charged with murder in January 2011, and he was detained at Rikers Island until a jury acquitted him of all charges in June 2014. Three incidents are relevant to the instant appeal: a correction officer's takedown of plaintiff; a strip search of plaintiff for illegal contraband; and plaintiff's involvement in an incident where inmates refused to leave the recreation yard. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants and dismissed the complaint.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and one of his excessive force claims, but the district court erred in dismissing his due process claim and two of his excessive force claims. The court also concluded that the district court should address the merits of plaintiff's municipal liability claim in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Frost v. New York City Police Department" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 24-month sentence following a violation of supervised release, holding that calculation of the term of imprisonment under USSG 7B1.1(a)(1)(B) includes state law enhancements that increase the maximum penalty for recidivists. Therefore, defendant's crime of second-degree manslaughter was "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years" – a Grade A violation under section 7B1.1(a)(1)(B).The court also concluded that the district court did not err in calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and disagreed with defendant's assertions that the district court committed other procedural errors during the sentencing hearing. In this case, defendant's procedural challenges essentially reduce down to two main points: the district court based its sentencing decision on improper evidence and the district court primarily sentenced her based on the severity of her state offense and not her breach of trust. The court concluded that neither of these arguments has merit. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

These appeals challenge Governor Andrew Cuomo's issuance of an executive order directing the New York State Department of Health to identify yellow, orange, and red "zones" based on the severity of COVID-19 outbreaks and imposing correspondingly severe restrictions on activity within each zone. Appellants, Agudath Israel and the Diocese, each challenged the executive order as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. After the district court denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the order, appellants moved for emergency injunctions pending appeal and to expedite their appeals.Preliminarily, the Second Circuit concluded that Agudath Israel did not move first in the district court for an order granting an injunction while an appeal is pending before filing with this court its present motion for an injunction pending appeal. Rather, Agudath Israel moved for a preliminary injunction pending the district court’s final judgment. Furthermore, Agudath Israel has not explained or otherwise justified its failure to comply with the straightforward requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a). Agudath Israel has also failed to demonstrate that moving first in the district court would be impracticable, or even futile, particularly in light of the fact that a full eleven days elapsed after the district court's ruling before Agudath Israel sought relief from this court. Therefore, the court denied Agudath Israel's motion for procedural reasons.The court also denied the Diocese's motion, concluding that appellants cannot clear the high bar necessary to obtain an injunction pending appeal. The court stated that, while it is true that the challenged order burdens appellants' religious practices, the order is not substantially underinclusive given its greater or equal impact on schools, restaurants, and comparable secular public gatherings. To the contrary, the executive order extends well beyond isolated groups of religious adherents to encompass both secular and religious conduct. View "Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Respondents appeal the district court's grant of an application for discovery in aid of a foreign proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1782 brought by petitioner. The application relates to complex litigation stemming from the sinking of an oil tanker captained by petitioner off the coast of Spain. Petitioner cross-appeals, arguing that the district court should have refrained from entering final judgment and instead maintained the case on its active docket to facilitate further uses of the discovery materials.The Second Circuit concluded that petitioner's cross-appeal, unlike respondents' appeal, no longer presents a live case or controversy and is therefore moot. The court also concluded that the district court erred by failing to conduct a choice-of-law analysis with respect to applicable privileges and in analyzing whether one of the proceedings cited by petitioner as a basis for his application was within reasonable contemplation. Therefore, the court dismissed the cross-appeal and vacated the district court's judgment. The court remanded for further proceedings and ordered respondents to refrain from destroying or altering any records, materials, or documents that may reasonably be considered to be subject to discovery pursuant to the section 1782 applications at issue in this case until July 30, 2021, unless otherwise directed by an order of a United States court. View "Mangouras v. Boggs" on Justia Law

In a challenge to the State of New York's 2011 reduction, through the amendment of a state statute and regulation, of its contribution rates to retired former state employees' health insurance premiums, the Second Circuit certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) Under New York state law, and in light of Kolbe v. Tibbetts, 22 N.Y.3d 344 (2013), M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427 (2015), and CNH Indus. 5 N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018), do 9.13 (setting forth contribution rates of 90% and 75%), 9.23(a) (concerning contribution rates for surviving dependents of deceased retirees), 9.24(a) (specifying that retirees may retain NYSHIP coverage in retirement), 9.24(b) (permitting retirees to use sick-leave credit to defray premium costs), and 9.25 (allowing for the indefinite delay or suspension of coverage or sick-leave credits) of the 2007-2011 collective bargaining agreement between the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. and the Executive Branch of the State of New York ("the CBA"), singly or in combination, (1) create a vested right in retired employees to have the State's rates of contribution to health-insurance premiums remain unchanged during their lifetimes, notwithstanding the duration of the CBA, or (2) if they do not, create sufficient ambiguity on that issue to permit the consideration of extrinsic evidence as to whether they create such a vested right? (2) If the CBA, on its face, or as interpreted at trial upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, creates a vested right in retired employees to have the State's rates of contribution to health-insurance premiums remain unchanged during their lives, notwithstanding the duration of the CBA, does New York's statutory and regulatory reduction of its contribution rates for retirees' premiums negate such a vested right so as to preclude a remedy under state law for breach of contract? View "Donohue v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Scott and Santiago's convictions for their role in the assault of an inmate at the Downstate Correctional Facility and its subsequent cover-up. Defendants were former correction officers with the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision.The court held that there is no set time for a conspiracy to form under 18 U.S.C. 241, for conspiracy to violate civil rights, so long as the surrounding facts and circumstances support the existence of an agreement. The court also held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 for falsifying records does not require knowledge of an impending federal investigation. Furthermore, the court found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. It is clear that the statute was not vague as applied to Scott's conduct, which involved the filing of a false injury report and the orchestration of false use-of-force reports and photographs designed to mislead prison administrators and others into believing that the inmate was the aggressor, as opposed to the victim of a brutal assault. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law