Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Scott and Santiago's convictions for their role in the assault of an inmate at the Downstate Correctional Facility and its subsequent cover-up. Defendants were former correction officers with the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision.The court held that there is no set time for a conspiracy to form under 18 U.S.C. 241, for conspiracy to violate civil rights, so long as the surrounding facts and circumstances support the existence of an agreement. The court also held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 for falsifying records does not require knowledge of an impending federal investigation. Furthermore, the court found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. It is clear that the statute was not vague as applied to Scott's conduct, which involved the filing of a false injury report and the orchestration of false use-of-force reports and photographs designed to mislead prison administrators and others into believing that the inmate was the aggressor, as opposed to the victim of a brutal assault. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Requena and Raymond's conviction for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance analogue. Defendants were convicted under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, which provides that substances with chemical and pharmacological properties "substantially similar" to those of substances listed on schedule I or II are treated for the purposes of federal law as controlled substances.The court held that the Analogue Act's instruction to treat a substance with chemical and pharmacological properties “substantially similar” to those of a scheduled substance as a controlled substance in schedule I is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, certain Supreme Court decisions notwithstanding. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government's expert to testify; the district court correctly instructed the jury that it need not unanimously agree on which of the six synthetic cannabinoids charged in the indictment meet the statutory definition of a controlled substance analogue; the district court made all of the factual findings necessary to calculate defendants' base offense level at sentencing; and, because defendants are entitled to no relief in connection with their drug conviction, their money laundering conviction likewise stands. View "United States v. Requena" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for charges related to his operation of an illegal payday-loan scheme. The jury found that defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and federal wire fraud and identity theft statutes from 2004 through 2014.As to the RICO counts, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury that, as to his business's loans to New York borrowers, New York usury laws governed the transaction rather than the laws of the jurisdictions specified in the loan agreements, which set no interest rate caps. Rather, the court ruled that New York law applies and that the district court was correct when it so instructed the jury. As to the TILA conviction, the court rejected defendant's contention that his loan agreements disclosed the "total of payments" borrowers would make, as TILA requires, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that these disclosures were inaccurate. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict under TILA. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, finding them unpersuasive. View "United States v. Moseley" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for creating a "loud or unusual noise or a nuisance" in the courthouse, in violation of 41 C.F.R. 102-74.390(a) (the "Noise Regulation"). Defendant's conviction stemmed from her engagement in a loud argument with a court security officer in the lobby of the Binghamton courthouse.The court concluded that defendant forfeited her challenge to the conspicuous posting of the Noise Regulation by not raising the argument on appeal to the district court. The court also concluded that, under United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2001), the Noise Regulation carries only a general intent requirement, and that the evidence supports that defendant acted with this mens rea. Finally, the court determined that the Noise Regulation is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. View "United States v. Wasylyshyn" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of bank fraud based on a conditional guilty plea. Defendant argued that the 11-year delay between his 2007 indictment and 2018 arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.The court applied the Barker factors and held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the delay was attributable to defendant fleeing to Brazil in 2006 to avoid prosecution; the government exercised reasonable diligence in determining whether defendant returned to the United States despite its failure to detect his periodic travel into and out of the United States from 2012 until his arrest in 2018, and defendant has shown no prejudice from the delay. Furthermore, the district court properly balanced the Barker factors in concluding that the delay, though lengthy, did not violate the Sixth Amendment. View "United States v. Debarros Cabral" on Justia Law

Four female employees, including plaintiff, filed suit alleging hostile work environment claims. The jury awarded plaintiff a total of $400,000 on her claims against defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The County then filed motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(b). The district court then sua sponte denied the motions based on the restrictions established by Rule 6(b)(2) on extending time for filing such motions. The Second Circuit vacated the denial order and remanded. On remand, the district court found that plaintiff "constructively waived" her objection to the timeliness of the County's motions and entered orders reducing plaintiff's Title VII award to $75,000 and overturning the jury verdict in her favor on her section 1983 claim for want of evidence of an unlawful municipal custom or practice under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Both plaintiff and the County appealed.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff forfeited her right to object to the untimeliness of the County's post-trial motions by failing to raise the issue contemporaneously with the district court's grant of the extension. The court further rejected the County's position that plaintiff's acceptance of remittitur on her Title VII claims forecloses her appeal of the judgment insofar as it relates to her section 1983 claim. On the merits, the court affirmed the judgment in plaintiff's favor on her Title VII claim and rejected the County's cross-appeal seeking judgment in its favor on that claim as a matter of law. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for the County, because the jury had a reasonable basis for its finding of sufficient municipal involvement to support its award to plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Legg v. Ulster County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs enrolled in a Group Variable Universal Life Insurance (GVUL) policy offered by MetLife. During the enrollment process, neither plaintiff indicated that he smoked tobacco, but MetLife nevertheless designated them as tobacco smokers, thus triggering their payment of higher insurance premiums. Plaintiffs filed suit after MetLife refused to refund the amount of overpayments, alleging breach of contract and tort violations under New York law.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims as time-barred under New York's applicable statute of limitations. The court held that the continuing-violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period for the breach of contract claim where the issue in this case rests on a single allegedly unlawful act, namely MetLife's initial designation of both plaintiffs as smokers. The court noted that determining whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act bar applies here is a fraught and unnecessary endeavor. View "Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his instructor at Charter Oak State College, alleging that the instructor violated his First Amendment rights by removing an online blog post that he made in response to a class assignment. Plaintiff also alleged that the instructor and others violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with disciplining him for the blog post.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the district court did not err by analyzing plaintiff's First Amendment claim under the Hazelwood standard because plaintiff's speech bears the hallmark of school sponsorship. The court also held that, under the Hazelwood standard, the district court did not err in determining that the instructor's deletion of plaintiff's post was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Furthermore, plaintiff failed plausibly to allege that the instructor's actions constituted viewpoint discrimination. Rather, the instructor's deletion of plaintiff's post reflected a content-based restriction that the Supreme Court has instructed the court to tolerate in the school setting. In this context of an online message board for completing course assignments, the court concluded that plaintiff was not subjected to viewpoint discrimination when his post criticizing rather than performing the assignment was deleted. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and held that plaintiff was afforded a full opportunity to be heard and received sufficient process, and any discernible substantive due process claim fails alongside his more particularized First Amendment censorship claim. View "Collins v. Putt" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts of receipt of child pornography, one count of possession of child pornography, and two counts of transportation of child pornography. The court held that the evidence showed that defendant downloaded child pornography files on a peer-to-peer file sharing network, thus making those files available to be downloaded by other users on the network, and that government agents downloaded two video files from his computer. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. Furthermore, even assuming a violation of defendant's entitlement to discovery, defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice.The court also held that defendant's 120 month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court affirmed the monetary fines imposed on defendant for costs incurred because defendant failed to show up for the first day of trial, for an assessment, for a penalty under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and for a special assessment. View "United States v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief to defendant under the First Step Act. The court held that, under the First Step Act, a district court has the authority to lower a sentence only if that sentence could have been lower had the Fair Sentencing Act applied. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to an information that charged, in its first count, that defendant committed three offenses—distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute, crack cocaine, cocaine, and heroin. The court explained that, because the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the mandatory minimum sentences triggered by the quantities of heroin and cocaine charged in count one of the information, defendant's sentence could not have been lower than 120 months. Therefore, because defendant's sentence could not have been lower even if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to reduce defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Echeverry" on Justia Law