Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting debtor's motion to avoid a judicial lien. Debtor seeks, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(1) and (f)(1)(A), to exempt her interest in, and avoid a judicial lien upon, a property that her dependent son uses as a non-primary residence.The court held that the term "residence" in the so-called homestead exemption of section 522(d)(1) includes both primary and nonprimary residences. In this case, the ordinary meaning of the word "residence" does not exclude non-primary residences. Furthermore, Congress's deliberate choice of terminology, the text of the statute, and the legislative history weigh in favor of the court's conclusion. View "Donovan v. Maresca" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilmington Savings in an action seeking to quiet title and discharge a mortgage under New York law. Windward Bora argues that New York's six-year statute of limitations has expired as to any foreclosure action under the mortgage and Wilmington Savings argues that it is immune from this statute of limitations by virtue of its status as an assignee of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that assignees of the federal government are entitled to its immunity from state statutes of limitations. These courts generally reason, and this court found persuasive, that under traditional common law principles governing assignments, "the assignee of the United States stands in the shoes of the United States and is entitled to rely on the limitations periods prescribed by federal law." Moreover, this result is warranted "because it improves the marketability of instruments held by the United States, thereby giving the United States greater flexibility in monetizing its claims." The court also concluded that Wilmington Savings is entitled to such immunity here and rejected Windward Bora's contentions to the contrary. In this case, Wilmington Savings' status as a HUD assignee offers a sufficient basis for affirming the district court's conclusion that Wilmington Savings is immune from the state limitations period. View "Windward Bora, LLC v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society" on Justia Law

Time Warner petitions for review of a Board ruling that Time Warner committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by coercively interrogating employees about communications leading to an unprotected demonstration and work stoppage that contravened the no-strike agreement between Time Warner and the Union.The Second Circuit held that the Board's standard, interpreted to prohibit Time Warner from coercively questioning employees who participated in an unprotected work stoppage about any communication prior to the stoppage except to identify actual participants, represented an unexplained and unjustified departure from the Board's precedents. The court explained that the portion of the Board's standard requiring that in coercive questioning, employers "focus closely" on unprotected activity where it might touch on protected activity has a reasonable basis in law, but the Board's requirement that an employer "minimize" intrusion into Section 7 activity in such questioning, at least as understood by the Board in this case, does not. Because the Board's enunciated standard, at least as applied here, lacks a reasonable basis in law, the court vacated the Board's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Board should determine, employing a standard consistent with its precedent, whether Time Warner's questioning interfered unreasonably with employees' rights protected by Section 7. View "Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Dylan filed suit in district court seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The district court converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion to compel arbitration and granted the motion, dismissing Dylan's complaint without prejudice.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal; clarified that the district court had federal question jurisdiction to decide whether Dylan was entitled to the declaratory relief requested; and held that, because the Funds have adequately initiated arbitration, regardless of timing, Dylan is required to arbitrate by the terms of the CBA. The court also agreed with the district court's analysis that it was proper in this case to compel arbitration and dismiss Dylan's complaint without prejudice. The court considered Dylan's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Dylan 140 LLC v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissal of plaintiffs' products liability claims after precluding, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the opinions of plaintiffs' expert witnesses as to general causation.The court concluded that, not only was it appropriate for the district court to take a hard look at plaintiffs' experts' reports, the court was required to do so to ensure reliability. Furthermore, plaintiffs' contention that the district court impermissibly focused on plaintiffs' experts' conclusions instead of their methodologies is similarly unavailing. Even assuming that the district court required experts to back their opinions with studies definitely supporting their conclusions, the district court did not err in doing so. Therefore, the district court appropriately undertook a rigorous review of each of plaintiffs' experts, and based on that review reasonably found that the experts' methods were not sufficiently reliable and that their conclusions were not otherwise supported by the scientific community.The court also concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants where no reasonable juror could find that it was more likely than not that general causation had been established based on plaintiffs' admissible evidence. The court was not persuaded that the district court erred in holding that there is a general causation requirement across all states. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court prevented them from obtaining and presenting evidence of general causation. In this case, plaintiffs failed to explain how admitting portions of the expert reports would have established general causation; the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in excluding differential-diagnosis evidence; and the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in managing discovery. View "In Re: Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. While the court agreed with defendant that he was eligible for relief, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court explained that it was permissible for the district court to consider the fact that defendant received a below-Guidelines sentence and to consider the statements the judge made at his resentencing. Furthermore, the district court did not consider these factors to the exclusion of others. Rather, the district court made several other considerations, including defendant's past engagement in violent conduct, his offsetting exemplary conduct while incarcerated, and the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.The court also concluded that a district court is not categorically required to hold a hearing at which the defendant is present before denying a motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to a hearing at which he was present. View "United States v. Gadsden" on Justia Law

The SEC filed a civil enforcement action against Alpine, a registered broker-dealer specializing in penny stocks and micro-cap securities, claiming that Alpine's failure to comply with the reporting requirements for filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) violated the reporting, recordkeeping, and record retention obligations under Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and Rule 17a-8 promulgated thereunder. The district court granted in part and denied in part the SEC's motion for summary judgment and denied Alpine's motion for summary judgment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the SEC has authority to enforce Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act through this civil action; Rule 17a-8, which requires compliance with Bank Secrecy Act requirements, is a reasonable interpretation of Section 17(a); Rule 17a-8 does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to the SARs; and, in imposing the civil penalty, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Alpine Securities Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the New York City Department of Education and a school principal in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a claim of First Amendment retaliation and Title VII claims of a sex-based hostile work environment and retaliation.The court concluded that plaintiff's speech consisted of grievances about employment disputes that are not matters of public concern, and therefore his speech was not protected against retaliation by the First Amendment. Even if some of plaintiff's speech were so protected, the court concluded that the district court still would have been correct to grant qualified immunity to the principal. Furthermore, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's Monell claim against the Department of Education fails because the principal was not a policymaker, and thus plaintiff cannot identify any municipal policy that allegedly caused a constitutional violation. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's Title VII claims. The court explained that plaintiff's sex-based hostile work environment claim fails because the principal's actions were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of plaintiff's employment. Finally, the retaliation claim also fails because there is insufficient evidence of a causal link between plaintiff's protected activity and the alleged retaliatory acts. View "Agosto v. New York City Department of Education" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's dismissal of its claims under the False Claims Act (FCA) and federal common law against SCI. The government's claims stemmed from its belief that a service-disabled veteran's ownership in VECO was illusory. Rather, the government alleges that the company was controlled by Defendant Lee Strock, who set up VECO as a front to funnel contract work for his company, SCI.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court's finding with respect to materiality was erroneous because it was premised on too restrictive a conception of the FCA materiality inquiry set out in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016); the government has plausibly alleged materiality in this case; the district court's conclusion that the complaint failed to allege defendants' knowledge was erroneous as to Lee Strock, and potentially as to SCI, but not as to Cynthia Golde; and the district court should not have dismissed the common law claims on jurisdictional grounds because it had original jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. 1345. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "United States v. Strock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Clerk of Erie County, filed suit alleging that he could be prosecuted under federal immigration law for performing certain duties under New York's Driver's License Access and Privacy Act (the "Green Light Law"), which establishes certain policies and procedures related to standard licenses. The Green Light Law directs the New York State DMV to accept various foreign documents as proof of identification and age for standard licenses, and prohibits DMV from inquiring about the immigration status of standard-license applicants; restricts DMV’s retention and use of certain applicant information; and requires that within three days of receiving a request for information or records from federal immigration authorities, DMV provide written notification to the subject of the request and inform the person of the identity of the requesting agency. New York law designates certain county clerks as agents of the DMV Commissioner and assigns them discrete functions in that regard. Plaintiff challenges the licensing, nondisclosure, and notification provisions of the Green Light Law.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit based on lack of Article III standing, holding that compliance with the state law would not expose plaintiff to a credible threat of prosecution under federal law. The court explained that the REAL ID Act permits states to issue noncompliant licenses provided that they meet certain requirements, which do not include the verification of lawful status. Furthermore, 6 C.F.R. 16 37.71(a), promulgated by DHS, permits states that issue REAL ID Act-compliant licenses also to issue licenses "that are not acceptable by Federal agencies for official purposes," provided they meet certain requirements. The court concluded that the theory that issuing standard licenses constitutes criminal harboring is directly at odds with federal law that expressly permits the issuance of such licenses, and thus plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the licensing provisions of the Green Light Law. The court also concluded that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the nondisclosure and notification provisions of the Green Light Law. Finally, the court concluded that the threat that plaintiff will be removed from office is speculative. For largely the same reasons that he lacks standing in his individual capacity, plaintiff lacks standing in his official capacity. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Kearns v. Cuomo" on Justia Law