Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm discovered after police officers pat-frisked defendant during a traffic stop. The court held that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that defendant was armed and dangerous. The court stated that, at most, the officers had reason to believe that defendant possessed something illicit, but the Constitution requires that the officers have reason to believe this something was dangerous. Therefore, the suppression of the firearm was warranted as the fruit of an illegal search conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law

New York State appealed from the district court's consolidated judgments invalidating the State's Opioid Stewardship Act (OSA), which requires opioid manufacturers and distributors to make an annual payment to fund statewide opioid-related services but prohibits them from passing the costs of those payments through to their customers.The Second Circuit held that the OSA's opioid stewardship payment is a tax within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), and that the district court should have dismissed plaintiff's challenges to the payment under the TIA for lack of jurisdiction. After considering the factors in Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 737 F.3d 228, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2013), and San Juan Cellular Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir. 1992), the court concluded that the primary purpose of the opioid stewardship payment is to raise revenue, not to punish or regulate plaintiffs and other licensees who are required to make the payment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgments, except insofar as they relate to the pass-through prohibition, which is not before the court. View "Association for Accessible Medicines v. James" on Justia Law

On January, 2020, the Supreme Court stayed a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York enjoining DHS from implementing a final rule setting out a new agency interpretation of immigration law that expands the meaning of "public charge" in determining whether a non-citizen is admissible to the United States. While the appeal of that preliminary injunction was pending before the Second Circuit, the district court issued a new, nationwide, preliminary injunction preventing DHS from enforcing that same rule based on the COVID-19 pandemic.The Second Circuit granted DHS's motion to stay the second preliminary injunction, holding that DHS has shown a likelihood of success on the merits based primarily on the district court’s apparent lack of jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction during the appeal of its prior, virtually identical injunction (coupled with DHS's showing of irreparable harm resulting from its inability to enforce its regulation). The court also doubted whether the nationwide application of the injunction was proper in light of the considerations the court set forth in New York v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., which was not available to the district court at the time it issued the second injunction. Finally, the court concluded that DHS has shown irreparable injury from the district court's prohibition on effectuating the new regulation. View "New York v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his attempted robbery of a convenience store. After a bifurcated trial where the jury convicted him of all counts, the district court dismissed the violence-in-Hobbs Act robbery count as duplicative of the Hobbs Act robbery count and then rejected the government's argument that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandated imposition of a 15-year minimum incarceratory sentence on defendant.The Second Circuit held that defendant's arguments with respect to Count Three, the firearm-in-crime-of-violence count, are foreclosed by the court's opinion in United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018), in which the court held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies, categorically, as a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); defendant's jurisdictional challenge to his conviction on Count Four, the felon-in-possession count, is similarly foreclosed by United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 92 (2d Cir. 2019), and he cannot establish that the asserted evidentiary and other failures on the part of the government and the district court amount to plain error requiring vacatur or reversal; and the district court acted well within the permissible bounds of its discretion in its various evidentiary rulings and in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.In regard to the government's cross-appeal, the court held that its recent precedents confirm that New York Robbery in the Second Degree falls within the ACCA's definition of "violent felony" and that thus resentencing is required. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), of plaintiff's amended complaint alleging that defendants violated Connecticut and District of Columbia law in entering into a licensing agreement with respect to a group plan for Medicare supplement insurance. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' royalty fee arrangement constituted an unlawful "premium rebate" in violation of Connecticut and District of Columbia anti-rebating insurance laws.The court held that plaintiff did not state an unlawful rebate claim under Connecticut or D.C. law because he failed to plausibly allege any ascertainable loss or injury as a result of his purchase of Medicare supplement insurance ("Medigap") or the AARP royalty fee. Likewise, the court held that plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a cognizable claim based on his purchase of Medigap insurance through the AARP-UnitedHealthcare plan. In regard to plaintiff's consumer protection claims, he failed to show any concrete and particularized injury because he paid only the regulator-approved rate and received the Medigap insurance he contracted for. Finally, plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the requisite elements for his remaining common law claims and his statutory theft claim under Connecticut law. View "Dane v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant on remand of the Government's petition to enforce two Internal Revenue Service summonses, one sent to defendant in his personal capacity and one sent to him in his capacity as a trustee, based on the foregone conclusion and collective entity exceptions to the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause. Defendant's appeal stemmed from the IRS's efforts to investigate his use of offshore bank accounts to improperly conceal federally taxable income.The court agreed with the district court that the Government has shown with reasonable particularity the documents' existence, defendant's control of the documents, and an independent means of authenticating the documents such that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies. The court also agreed with the district court that, as a matter of first impression in this Circuit, a traditional trust is a collective entity subject to the collective entity doctrine. View "United States v. Fridman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for (1) conspiring to submit false voter registrations and buying voter registrations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 52 U.S.C. 10307(c) and (2) conspiring to violate the Travel Act by paying bribes for voter registrations and votes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1952. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a criminal voting scheme to further a real estate development project.The court held that 52 U.S.C. 10307(c) applied to defendant's conduct because it exposed future federal elections to corruption. In this case, the prohibitions in section 10307(c) apply to any voter registration practices that expose federal elections – present or future – to corruption, regardless of whether any federal candidate is on the immediate ballot. The court explained that New York's registration process is unitary and thus defendant's fraudulent conduct has the potential to affect future federal elections.The court also held that defendant's payment to influence voter conduct fits within the generic definition of bribery and thus violated the Travel Act. The court explained that, because Travel Act bribery is construed broadly, the lack of a precise fit between New York Election Law 17-142 and the New York bribery statute does not matter. View "United States v. Smilowitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that C&I violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by sending him a debt collection notice, information subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, and restraining notices in connection with C&I's efforts to collect on a state court judgment for an unpaid debt, though plaintiff was not the debtor.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to C&I as to the bona fide error defense under Section 1692k(c) of the FDCPA. In this case, a reasonable jury could find that C&I's error was not bona fide and that C&I did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid its error. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and judgment, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding that C&I's conduct did not violate Sections 1692e(5) where C&I unintentionally sent otherwise valid and lawful debt collection communications to a non-debtor. Furthermore, C&I did not violate Section 1692f where its conduct did not constitute unfair or unconscionable means of debt collect. View "Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP" on Justia Law

After the district court granted defendant's motion for resentencing under the First Step Act, it vacated its order and denied his motion as moot when the district court learned that defendant had completed serving his term of imprisonment for his 2005 drug offense and remained imprisoned only because he continued to serve two consecutive sentences imposed for offenses committed while in prison that he did not mention in his original application for re-sentencing.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that sentences are imposed separately for convictions on specific violations of criminal statutes and are aggregated only for administrative purposes. The court explained that, because sentences within judgments of conviction are otherwise final orders, they are modifiable only in limited circumstances. The court stated that the First Step Act permits such modification—a district court may "impose a reduced sentence" for a "covered offense." However, where an inmate, such as defendant in this case, has already served the term of imprisonment imposed for a "covered offense," the court held that the statute no longer permits relief. Therefore, defendant's motion is moot because the relief authorized by the First Step Act is no longer possible. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, while still in custody for possession of child pornography, challenges a condition of his supervised release requiring that he submit to verification testing designed to ensure that he is complying with the other conditions of his term of supervision. Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the probation officer to test him using computerized voice stress analysis – a technology that defendant claims is unreliable – and by giving the probation officer unwarranted discretion over which verification testing device to employ.The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's challenge to the computerized voice stress analysis, holding that the challenge is unripe because it turns on a speculative assessment of what the contested technology will look like in six years when he is released from his term of custody. The court affirmed the delegation of discretion to the probation officer, finding that permitting the probation officer to choose among verification testing tools is no more significant than allowing probation to select among different outpatient therapy options. The court dismissed defendant's challenges to other conditions of his supervised release in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Villafane-Lozada" on Justia Law