Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

President Trump filed suit against the District Attorney of the County of New York, alleging that a grand jury subpoena issued on August 29, 2019 by the District Attorney to Mazars USA, LLP, the President's accounting firm, is overbroad and was issued in bad faith. The subpoena directed Mazars to produce financial documents—including tax returns—relating to the President, the Trump Organization, and affiliated entities, dating back to 2011. The district court granted the District Attorney's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the claim of overbreadth is not plausibly alleged for two interrelated reasons. First, the court concluded that the President's bare assertion that the scope of the grand jury's investigation is limited only to certain payments made by Michael Cohen in 2016 amounts to nothing more than implausible speculation. Second, the court concluded that, without the benefit of this linchpin assumption, all other allegations of overbreadth—based on the types of documents sought, the types of entities covered, and the time period covered by the subpoena, as well as the subpoena's near identity to a prior Congressional subpoena—fall short of meeting the plausibility standard. Finally, the court concluded that the President's allegations of bad faith fail to raise a plausible inference that the subpoena was issued out of malice or intent to harass. The court considered the President's remaining contentions on appeal and found no basis for reversal. The court ordered an interim stay of enforcement of the subpoena under the terms agreed to by the parties. View "Trump v. Vance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York inmate, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that all employees of the DOCCS violated his constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments when they sexually assaulted him and retaliated against him for filing grievances. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants in part based on its conclusion that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The Second Circuit held that where, as here, an inmate follows the steps prescribed by the DOCCS Inmate Grievance Procedure but prison officials do not respond to the inmate's final appeal within the time allotted under the regulations, he has exhausted administrative remedies under the PLRA. The court held that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to his retaliation claim against Defendant Hoffman but not as to his retaliation claim against Defendant Iarusso. The court also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Dahlke where plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to survive summary judgment as to whether his rights were violated during Dahlke's pat and frisk. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Dahkle" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Connecticut and two of its affiliated candidates filed suit alleging that the State violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring candidates for office to collect signatures from electors before appearing on the general election ballot. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.Applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that Connecticut's laws do not impose a severe burden on plaintiffs' rights and the State's interest in requiring candidates for office to demonstrate some support before appearing on the ballot justified those laws. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Connecticut's laws impose only a reasonable, nondiscriminatory burden. In this case, the petitioning period ran for 218 days and the evidence demonstrates that petitioning was possible even under the challenging conditions in the State of Connecticut. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, and the signature requirements are an appropriate means of vindicating the State's interest. View "Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of accepting bribes and three counts of tax evasion in connection with a bribery scheme that he and others perpetrated while he was an employee of Con Edison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in its restitution order by incorrectly determining that his bribery conduct was "an offense against property" under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) and incorrectly calculating the loss to Con Edison caused by the scheme.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA does not support the restitution order to Con Edison. As urged by the government, however, the court vacated the restitution order insofar as it covers investigative costs incurred by Con Edison and remanded to the district court to allow that court to address the effect of Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018), on its calculation of the restitution amount. View "United States v. Razzouk" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a contract dispute between PepsiCo and one of its independent Peruvian bottlers, CEPSA. After PepsiCo terminated its contract with CEPSA, CEPSA filed suit in district court alleging, inter alia, breach of contract claims based on wrongful termination and PepsiCo's alleged failure to protect CEPSA's rights as the exclusive bottler and distributor of PepsiCo products in specified areas of Peru.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of PepsiCo and held that the contract was terminable at will and that PepsiCo had no affirmative duty under the contract to protect CEPSA against the alleged harm to its exclusive rights. In this case, the court applied the New York common law of contracts, looked within the four corners of the contract, and concluded that the Exclusive Bottler Appointment (EBA) was terminable at will and that PepsiCo had no duty to police or prevent transshipment. The court considered CEPSA's remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. View "Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S.A. v. Pepsi Cola Co." on Justia Law

Absent updated guidance from the Sentencing Commission, the First Step Act freed district courts to consider any potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons that a defendant might raise for compassionate release.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of compassionate release to defendant and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, the district court erroneously concluded that, despite the First Step Act's changes to compassionate release, the previously enacted USSG 1B1.13, Application Note 1(D) remained good law and limited the applicable circumstances the court could consider, without input from the Bureau of Prisons, to matters of poor health, old age, and family care needs. Rather, the court held that Application Note 1(D) does not apply to compassionate release motions brought directly to the district court by a defendant under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Zullo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, but vacated two challenged conditions of supervised release and remanded in part.The court held that defendant's guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon remains valid, even in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), because it is plain that defendant knew of his unlawful status when he possessed the firearm and there is no reasonable probability that he would have not pled guilty had he been properly informed that such knowledge was a requirement for conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court also held that there was no error at sentencing in the district court's consideration of potential sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants, and defendant's 90-month sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Finally, the court held that the two disputed conditions of supervised release imposed on defendant are not unconstitutionally vague, but the court remanded (1) the risk condition so that the district court can formally incorporate its oral amendment of that condition into the written judgment of conviction, and (2) the communication condition so that the district court may provide the necessary justification for restricting defendant's communications with his brother, or exempt such communications from that condition. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action on behalf of members and descendants of the Ovaherero and Nama indigenous peoples against the Federal Republic of Germany, seeking damages for the enslavement and genocide of the Ovaherero and Nama peoples in what is now Namibia, as well as for property they alleged Germany expropriated from the land and peoples.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Germany is a foreign sovereign; the only path for the exercise of jurisdiction is if a FISA exception applies. FSIA’s takings exception, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), provides that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in cases "in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in commercial activity in the United States.” The plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to trace the proceeds from property expropriated more than a century ago to present‐day property owned by Germany in New York. View "Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany" on Justia Law

After the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme collapsed, Picard was appointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aaa (SIPA), as the liquidation trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS). The Act established a priority system to make customers of failed brokerages whole before other general creditors. Where customer property is insufficient to satisfy customers' claims, the trustee may recover property transferred by the debtor that would have been customer property but for the transfer if and to the extent that the transfer is void or voidable under the Bankruptcy Code. 15 U.S.C. 78fff–2(c)(3). The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to the extent that they are consistent with SIPA.Picard attempted to recover transfers of money that the defendants had received from BLMIS in excess of their principal investments. The defendants are BLMIS customers who were unaware of the fraud but profited from it by receiving what they thought were legitimate profits; the funds were actually other customers' money. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Picard. The Bankruptcy Code affirmative defense that permits a transferee who takes an interest of the debtor in property "for value and in good faith" to retain the transfer to the extent of the value given does not apply in this SIPA liquidation. The transfers were not "for value" and recovery would not violate the two-year limitation. View "In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed two special conditions of his supervised release stemming from his conviction for making a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation to FBI agents. The conditions prohibit him from: (a) engaging in conduct online that "promotes or endorses violence"; and (b) possessing or using a computer or other internet-capable device without participating in a monitoring program operated by the U.S. Probation Office.The court concluded that the challenged conditions satisfy the "reasonably related" requirements of USSG 5D1.3(b)(1) and accord with the court's caselaw interpreting that provision. However, the court concluded that because of the vagueness of the condition prohibiting him from engaging in violence-promoting speech online in its present form, it infringes upon his rights to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "United States v. Bolin" on Justia Law