Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was shot in the stomach by Officer Miller in the course of Miller's execution of a no-knock search warrant, plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was the victim of negligence on the part of both Miller and other police personnel involved in the planning of the raid.The Second Circuit concluded that there was no error in the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to overturn the jury verdict in favor of Miller; in regard to the City's motion, the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on the basis of New York's bar on claims for "negligent investigation," because that rule does not apply to plaintiff's claim; and plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the City, through its employees, violated acceptable police practice, so that discretionary immunity did not apply, and those violations caused his injury.However, the court found conflicting guidance from the New York Court of Appeals as to whether the district court correctly held that plaintiff's claim was barred by New York's "special duty" rule. Therefore, the court certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: Does the "special duty" requirement—that, to sustain liability in negligence against a municipality, the plaintiff must show that the duty breached is greater than that owed to the public generally—apply to claims of injury inflicted through municipal negligence, or does it apply only when the municipality's negligence lies in its failure to protect the plaintiff from an injury inflicted other than by a municipal employee? View "Ferreira v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the individual defendants conspired against him in arbitration and judicial proceedings arising out of an employee compensation dispute.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint based on failure to state a claim and declined to address the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to his claims. In this case, plaintiff's claims against Justice Farneti are barred by absolute judicial immunity; plaintiff's allegations of a corrupt agreement, which rest on rank speculation, are inadequate to support his conspiracy claims under RICO and section 1983; and plaintiff's allegations that the private defendants made false statements in their various filings and in the course of testifying in the arbitration and Article 75 proceedings cannot support a claim of a substantive RICO violation. Furthermore, the court stated that it may assume hypothetical statutory jurisdiction in order to resolve this appeal on the merits because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not implicate Article III jurisdiction. The court explained that doing so is particularly appropriate in this case, where the jurisdictional issue is both novel and arguably complex, while plaintiff's claims are plainly meritless. View "Butcher v. Wendt" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b–5. The court held that defendant had a duty to refrain from trading on nonpublic inside information and that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. In this case, defendant served as a principal investigator for a clinical trial of a cardiac drug developed by Regado Biosciences, a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company, that was designed to prevent blood clotting. After defendant learned that patients suffered adverse effects during the trial, he traded on that nonpublic inside information to avoid a loss and earn a profit in the shares of the company. The court concluded that, taken together, the evidence of defendant's deceptive activity was sufficient for the jury to find that he was a sophisticated investor that knew his actions were unlawful under the charge given by the district court. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the Board's conclusion that Aleutian violated certain statutory and regulatory requirements governing the H-1B temporary foreign worker program, and order requiring Aleutian to pay back wages to two Program workers.The court held that agency regulations duly promulgated under the statute unambiguously require H-1B employers to make wage payments in "prorated installments," "no less often than monthly." Therefore, the court concluded that an employer's failure to satisfy this requirement constitutes a failure to comply with the Immigration and Nationality Act's overall "required wage obligation"—a conclusion that supports DOL's award of back wages to Employee Gangjee.The court declined to adopt the proposed limitations on DOL's investigatory authority by holding that DOL's investigation into an H-1B Program complaint may not exceed the specific allegations of misconduct made in that complaint. Rather, the court affirmed DOL's authority to investigate Aleutian's compliance with the H-1B Program's wage requirement as to Employee Horn, as well as to Gangjee. The court stated that such an inquiry was reasonably within the scope of DOL's investigative authority into the allegations made in Gangjee's complaint and is lawfully contemplated by Program regulations. View "Aleutian Capital Partners v. Pizzella" on Justia Law

After the government removed petitioner from the United Stated, the removal mooted the government's appeal of the district court's order directing the government to release petitioner from immigration detention. The government now moves to dismiss the appeal as moot and requests vacatur of the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d), a regulation that the government had invoked to detain petitioner. Petitioner opposes the government's request for vacatur and separately requests vacatur of the Second Circuit's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal.The Second Circuit held that because the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) could have legal consequences in future litigation between the parties, those decisions should be vacated so that "the rights of all parties are preserved." However, this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal does not warrant vacatur because it does not have legal consequences for the parties. The court held that a decision concerning a stay is not a final adjudication on the merits of an appeal and lacks preclusive effect. Therefore, the court denied petitioner's motion to vacate this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, granted the government's motion to vacate the district court's decisions related to section 241.14(d), dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded with instructions to dismiss petitioner's challenge to his detention as moot. View "Hassoun v. Searls" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact class action against their would-be employer. Plaintiffs, African-American men who were hired at a technology services provider before their offers of employment were revoked because of past criminal convictions, cited national statistics showing that African Americans are arrested and incarcerated at higher rates than whites relative to their share of the national population.The court held that plaintiffs have set forth no allegations plausibly suggesting that the company's hiring policy has a disparate impact on African Americans within the relevant hiring pool. The court stated that, while national statistics may be used to advance a disparate impact claim if there is reason to believe that the general population is representative of the qualified applicant pool subject to the challenged policy, plaintiffs' complaint suggests that the jobs they applied for required substantial educational and technical credentials, and plaintiffs have provided no basis on which to presume that their proffered statistics are representative of the applicant pool in question. View "Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's 2018 decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA found that petitioner was convicted of "sexual abuse of a minor" based on his 2010 New York state conviction under New York Penal Law 130.65(3) for sexual abuse in the first degree.The Second Circuit rejected petitioner's contention that section 130.65(3) criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" covers. The court held that, because a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65(3) requires both that the victim be under the age of eleven and that the perpetrator's contact with the victim be "for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire," the state statute reaches no farther than the crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" as set forth in section 101(a)(43)(A) and construed by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. Therefore, a conviction under the state statute is an aggravated felony under the INA. View "Rodriguez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal of petitioner to the Dominican Republic. The court held that a conviction under New York Penal Law 165.50 is categorically an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). The court deferred to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous term "including" in "including receipt of stolen property" in section 1101(a)(43)(G). Under that interpretation, "'receipt of stolen property' is a distinct aggravated felony independent of theft and the property received need not have been stolen by means of 'theft' as generically defined." The court also determined that an intent to deprive is inherent in the requirement that an offender "knowingly" possesses stolen property. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. View "Santana v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the Benefit Review Board's decision affirming the ALJ's award of disability benefits to an employee of a defense contractor under the Defense Base Act (DBA), which extends workers' compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to certain employees of U.S. government contractors working overseas.In this case, the employee alleged that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, thereby establishing a prima facie case for benefits under the LHWCA. The court held that the record supports the Board's conclusion that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the named defendants were not employers. Therefore, the Board did not err when it affirmed the ALJ's finding that the employee's claims were not barred under Section 933(g) of the LHWCA. View "G4S International Employment Services (Jersey), Ltd. v. Newton-Sealey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Section 431 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which requires all vessels arriving in the United States to maintain a manifest on which is recorded information about the just-completed voyage and an account of what is on board, requires aircraft entering the United States to make available for public disclosure such manifests detailing the journey and cargo aboard.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part of plaintiffs' complaint. The court considered the different tools of statutory interpretation and held that section 431(c)(1) continues to require the government to make available for public disclosure manifests only of vessels, meaning "water craft or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water, but...not...aircraft." The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. View "Panjiva, Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law