Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction of five counts arising from his operation of a prostitution business. The Second Circuit held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his Facebook account, because even if the warrants authorizing seizure of that evidence were defective, the officers who collected and reviewed the evidence reasonably relied on them in good faith.The court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty on Counts Two and Five, and that the testimony that defendant challenges was properly admitted non-hearsay. However, the court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence of venue in the Southern District of New York with respect to Count One, which charged defendant with enticement to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Accordingly, the court reversed as to that conviction and affirmed as to all other counts, remanding for dismissal of Count One. View "United States v. Purcell" on Justia Law

After expungement of his disciplinary record of theft, plaintiff filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim with prejudice at the pleading stage and then awarded summary judgment to defendants on the due process claims.The Second Circuit held that plaintiff received adequate notice in regard to the charges against him. However, the court held that plaintiff's disciplinary conviction was not sufficiently supported by the evidence and the proceedings were tainted by procedural lapses that violated plaintiff's' due process rights. In this case, the defendant prison officers failed to consult readily available prison records to identify the officers with relevant information, limiting defendant's ability to defend against the charges. The court also held that the district court exceeded the permissible bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim without providing him a meaningful opportunity to seek leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Elder v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count One) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy (Count Three). The Second Circuit held that defendant has not shown that the error in his conviction on Count Three, made plain by the decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), invalidating the stated crime-of-violence predicate for that offense, affected his substantial rights. In light of defendant's willingness to plead guilty to Count Three in order to gain dismissal of Count Two and avoid its mandatory minimum 10-year term of imprisonment, the court held that defendant has not shown any reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty to Count Three in order to secure that beneficial result based on the permissible drug-trafficking-crime predicate alleged in Count Three. View "United States v. Dussard" on Justia Law

MPM appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment dismissing its claims for recovery of "remedial action" costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as barred by the statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. 9613(g)(2). UCC cross-appealed the district court's holding after a bench trial that UCC is liable to MPM for 95% of the cost of future "removal action."The Second Circuit held that the district court's conclusion that MPM's claims for recovery of remedial action costs were time-barred relied on an incorrect interpretation of the court's decision in New York State Electric and Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2014). Although the court agreed with the district court that UCC's corrective actions undertaken in the 1990s were remediation, the court did not understand NYSEG to mean that, for purposes of determining the timeliness of a cost recovery action, all remediation activity at a site regardless of circumstances is deemed to be part of a single remediation, so that the six year limitations period necessarily begins to run at the start of the first remedial activity. The court also held that the district court did not err in adjudicating the allocation of future removal action costs, or in allocating 95% against UCC. View "MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal and affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case. The court held that Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2013), foreclosed petitioner's claim that the application of former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) as written violates his right to equal protection. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). Pet. Br. at 14, did not invalidate Pierre.As to petitioner's alternative argument that the BIA must consider in the first instance whether his conviction for assault in the second degree under NYPL 120.05(2) is an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), the court held that his argument is precluded by Singh v. Barr, 939 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam). View "Dale v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The court held that the district court correctly held that a defendant in a SORNA prosecution may not collaterally challenge his underlying sex offender conviction. The court also held that circuit precedent precludes the argument that sex offender registration and notification requirements are punitive. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that SORNA does not violate the Fifth or Eighth Amendments. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court held that the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that "any" witness with "an interest in the outcome" of the trial had "a motive . . . to testify falsely." Furthermore, there is a reasonable probability that defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous witness credibility instruction. The court considered the government's arguments in support of affirmance and found them unpersuasive. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Solano" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that defendant's denial of plaintiff's application pursuant to the Child State Protection Act (CSPA) for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court set aside defendants' October 2017 decision denying plaintiff's adjustment of status application and directed defendants to reopen and readjudicate the application.The court held that the government is equitably estopped from initiating rescission proceedings to reopen plaintiff's adjustment of status application or placing her in removal proceedings. In this case, the undisputed facts show that USCIS failed to issue a rejection notice, despite controlling regulation and, consequently, plaintiff was not advised of any defect in her application, depriving her of the opportunity to correct the issue. View "Schwebel v. Crandall" on Justia Law

New Hope Family Services, a voluntary and privately funded Christian ministry devoted to providing adoption services, filed suit alleging that OCFS violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by advising New Hope that it either had to change its policy of not recommending adoptions by unmarried or same-sex couples or close its operation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied New Hope's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.The court held that the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to New Hope, state plausible claims under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the Constitution because they (a) raise a plausible suspicion that OCFS acted with hostility towards New Hope because of the latter's religious beliefs, (b) plausibly allege that New Hope would be compelled to speak or associate in violation of those beliefs if the regulation in question were enforced, and (c) do not permit a court to conclude as a matter of law that New Hope's speech equates to government speech merely because New York State has authorized New Hope to provide adoption services.The court also held that this case is not analogous to Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020), now pending before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, because New Hope's Free Exercise and Free Speech claims should not have been dismissed, the court held that its motion for a preliminary injunction was not moot and should not have been denied on that ground. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed New Hope's Free Exercise and Free Speech claims, and vacated the judgment insofar as it denied New Hope's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed suit against various corrections officials alleging that (1) New York DOCCS Rule 105.13 banning gang insignia or materials is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his photographs depicting family and friends wearing blue and making hand signs and (2) his placement in a special housing unit for six months following a prison disciplinary hearing determination that he had violated Rule 105.13 by possessing those photographs violated his due process rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that Rule 105.13 provides adequate standards for prison guards to determine whether pictures of people wearing blue and intentionally making "C" hand signs are prohibited. In this case, no reasonable prison guard could have doubted that plaintiff's possession of photographs of people wearing blue and making "C" hand signs violated Rule 105.13 and, therefore, there was no danger that the Rule's enforcement would be arbitrary with regard to plaintiff's photographs. The court also held that plaintiff received a hearing that provided the minimal requirements of procedural due process. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Williams v. Korines" on Justia Law