Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tiffany filed suit against Costco under the Lanham Act and New York law, alleging that Costco was liable for, inter alia, trademark infringement and counterfeiting in connection with its sale of diamond engagement rings identified by point-of-sale signs containing the word "Tiffany." The district court granted summary judgment for Tiffany and awarded Tiffany Costco's trebled profits along with punitive damages and prejudgment interest, for a total of $21,010,438.35.The Second Circuit vacated, holding that the district court's determination was inappropriate at the summary judgment stage. The court held that Costco has raised a question of material fact as to its liability for trademark infringement and counterfeiting and, relatedly, its entitlement to present its fair use defense to a jury. In this case, Costco argued that it was using the word in a different, widely recognized sense to refer to a particular style of pronged diamond setting not exclusive to rings affiliated with Tiffany. Costco claimed that its use of the term was not likely to confuse consumers—the essence of a claim for infringement—and that even if some degree of confusion was likely, it was entitled under the Lanham Act to the descriptive fair use of an otherwise protected mark. Accordingly, the court remanded for trial. View "Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.The court held that petitioner's conviction for two counts of felony possession of narcotics with intent to sell, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 21a5 277(a)(1), qualify as CIMTs. Although the court acknowledged that Connecticut's legislature has broadly defined "sale" to encompass exchanges, gifts, and offers of a narcotic substance even for no consideration, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute encompasses every instance in which a defendant offers to, or does in fact, "barter, exchange or gift" narcotics to another. The court explained that the fact that the statute may cover scenarios in which a defendant "offered," "exchanged," or "gifted" a narcotic substance, even a small amount, to a friend for no or little renumeration does not foreclose its conclusion under the categorical approach. View "Mota v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the quarantine decisions of certain Connecticut state officials in response to an Ebola epidemic in West Africa. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for class certification and dismissing their suit for lack of standing and based on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs primarily argue that they suffered actual or imminent injuries that create standing to seek prospective relief to avert allegedly unconstitutional future quarantines; clearly established law required that any quarantine imposed be medically necessary and comport with certain procedural safeguards; and their class is sufficiently numerous to merit certification.The Second Circuit affirmed and held that the district court properly deemed plaintiffs' injuries too speculative to support standing. In this case, plaintiffs failed to plead a sufficient likelihood that, under the revised policy, any of them faces a substantial risk of suffering a future injury. The court also held that the law surrounding quarantines was not clearly established such that a state official may be held liable for the actions taken here. The court did not reach the class certification issue because it is mooted by the court's conclusion as to standing. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to clarify that the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Liberian Community Ass'n v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking records from the Department of Commerce (DOC); the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency within the DOC; and the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), an independent entity within the NTIA. The FOIA requests concerned the operations of FirstNet, which was created by Congress in 2012 at the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to oversee the development of a National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) for first responders. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims in part and granted summary judgment for defendants in part.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that FirstNet is not subject to FOIA and that an agency need not search for records if it has reasonably determined that a search would be futile. The court also held that plaintiffs' challenge to the district court's determination, that the agency declarations establish beyond genuine dispute that the NTIA and the DOC did not have a practice or policy of referring FOIA requests to FirstNet, are meritless. Finally, plaintiffs waived their claim that defendants violated section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002. View "Whitaker v. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BuzzFeed for using one of his photographs without crediting him in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). The district court awarded plaintiff statutory damages. BuzzFeed appealed, arguing that it did not know its conduct would lead to future, third-party copyright infringement.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's award of statutory damages and held that the plain language of the DMCA does not require plaintiff to prove that BuzzFeed knew its actions would lead to future, third-party infringement. In this case, the district court correctly applied the DMCA by finding that Buzzfeed, through its own journalist, distributed the photo knowing that plaintiff's gutter credit had been removed or altered without his permission and distributed the photo with a gutter credit reading "Fisher & Taubenfeld" knowing that doing so would conceal the fact that a BuzzFeed journalist did not have authority to use the photo. View "Mango v. Buzzfeed, Inc." on Justia Law

Neither the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua nor the 1842 Treaty with the Seneca Nation create an individualized exemption from federal income taxes for income "derived from" Seneca land. In this case, petitioners filed suit in tax court seeking a redetermination of their 2008 and 2009 joint individual tax returns, in which they sought an exemption for income derived from their gravel operation, contending that their gravel sales during 2008 and 2009 were exempt from federal income taxes pursuant to the two treaties.The Second Circuit affirmed the tax court's determination that neither treaty created an exemption and rejected petitioners' argument suggesting otherwise because petitioners' view is premised upon the erroneous presumption that an exemption from federal taxes for income derived from land held in trust for American Indians extends to land that remains in the possession of the Seneca Nation of Indians. The court also noted that, to the extent the 1842 Treaty with the Seneca creates an exemption from taxes on Seneca land, that exemption does not cover income derived from Seneca land by individual enrolled members of the Seneca Nation. View "Perkins v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

After the district court granted defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleging violations of the federal securities laws and entered judgment for defendants, plaintiffs brought a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) for relief from the judgment and for leave to file a third amended complaint.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion and held that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). The court held that the district court applied the correct legal standard to plaintiffs' post-judgment motion by considering whether plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b), and committed no abuse of discretion in denying the motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to identify an adequate basis for relief pursuant to those rules. In this case, plaintiffs failed to proffer any newly discovered evidence that would entitle them to relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) and, even if the purported newly discovered evidence was indeed new, the result would be the same because amendment would be futile. View "Metzler Investment GmbH v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), of plaintiffs' amended complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against various state officials, alleging that New York State's firearm licensing laws, N.Y. Penal Law 400.00, violate plaintiffs' rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The district court dismissed on grounds of mootness or lack of standing the claims of all but two plaintiffs, against all but two defendants, for failure to plead injury-in-fact or traceability of injury to other defendants; dismissed claims for money damages against the two remaining defendants on grounds of judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity; dismissed individual-capacity claims against those defendants for injunctive relief as barred by 42 U.S.C. 1983; and dismissed the surviving claims on the grounds that the section 400.00 licensing criteria of "good moral character," "good cause," and "proper cause" are not unconstitutionally vague, and that the statutory scheme, while impacting Second Amendment rights, does not burden those rights substantially, closely relates to the State's interests in public safety, and thus survives intermediate scrutiny.The Second Circuit has been informed by the parties of events that have rendered the claims of certain plaintiffs moot and the court otherwise affirmed the rulings of the district court principally for the reasons stated by the district court. The court dismissed as to the Libertarian Party, which expressly disclaimed any request for appellate relief; dismissed as moot insofar as it pursues relief on behalf of plaintiff Rober, who is deceased with no successor or representative having been substituted for her; dismissed insofar as it pursues relief on behalf of plaintiff Kuzma, whose acquisition of a firearm license has made moot any claim that was pursued for him; and dismissed insofar as it pursues injunctive relief on behalf of plaintiff Cuthbert, whose relocation to Colorado has made him ineligible to apply for a New York concealed-carry permit. The court considered all of the other arguments properly before it and found them to be without merit. View "Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss in an action arising out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The bankruptcy court held that, in the context of synthetic collateralized debt obligations, certain "Priority Provisions" that subordinated LBSF's payment priority to claims of the Noteholder defendants are enforceable by virtue of section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts "swap agreements" from the Code's prohibition of "ipso facto clauses."Like the district court, the court held that, even if the Priority Provisions were ipso facto clauses, their enforcement was nevertheless permissible under the section 560 safe harbor. The court explained that the Priority Provisions are incorporated by reference into the swap agreements and thus, for the purposes of section 560, are considered to be part of a swap agreement; the contractual right to liquidate included distributions made pursuant to Noteholder priority; the Trustees exercised a contractual right to effect liquidation when they distributed the proceeds of the sold Collateral; and, in doing so, the Trustees exercised the rights of a swap participant. Because the Priority of Payments clauses are enforceable under the Code, the court held that LBSF's state-law claims also fail. Finally, the district court and bankruptcy court correctly concluded that LBSF is not entitled to declaratory relief. View "Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 2253, in a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.The Second Circuit determined, sua sponte, that it lacks jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal because a district court's order denying a certificate of appealability is not an appealable final order. In this case, petitioner moves for a certificate of appealability and for leave to file an oversized motion for a certificate of appealability, challenging the district court's order denying a certificate of appealability. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied petitioner's motion as moot. View "Lasher v. United States" on Justia Law