Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eric Tompkins was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and possessing child pornography. During his arrest, a Samsung cellular phone with an SD card was seized. A search warrant was obtained to examine the phone for evidence related to his failure to register. During the search, child pornography was found on the SD card. A second warrant was then obtained to search the phone and SD card specifically for child pornography, leading to the discovery of additional images.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Tompkins's motion to suppress the images found on the SD card, ruling that the search was conducted in good faith. Tompkins argued that the initial search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the SD card, making the search unlawful and tainting the subsequent search.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the initial search warrant, which authorized the search of the cellular phone for electronically stored information, included the SD card as it is a form of electronic storage. The court concluded that the search of the SD card fell within the scope of the warrant. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting Tompkins's argument that the search was unauthorized. View "United States v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michelle Rubin applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in 2019, citing major depressive disorder as her disabling condition. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her claim, concluding that Rubin was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Rubin exhausted the administrative appeals process and subsequently challenged the final decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which affirmed the denial of benefits.The ALJ found that Rubin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and had a severe impairment of major depressive disorder. However, the ALJ determined that Rubin did not meet the criteria for a listed impairment and had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work with certain nonexertional limitations. The ALJ partially discounted the opinion of Rubin’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Paul, who had opined that Rubin met the criteria for a listed impairment and was unable to work full-time. The ALJ also found that Rubin could not perform her past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the ALJ had misinterpreted the medical and lay evidence, failing to appreciate the consistent narrative that supported Dr. Paul’s opinion. The court concluded that the ALJ erred in determining that Rubin did not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, particularly the paragraph C criteria of Listed Impairment 12.04. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings, including a fuller consideration of the existing evidence and the results of a consultative examination. View "Rubin v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

American Girl, LLC, a manufacturer of dolls and related products, sued Zembrka, a Chinese entity operating through websites, for selling counterfeit American Girl products. American Girl alleged that Zembrka's websites sold and shipped counterfeit products to New York, using American Girl's trademarks. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.The District Court granted Zembrka's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing that American Girl failed to show that Zembrka shipped the counterfeit products to New York. The court concluded that without evidence of shipment, the "transacting business" requirement under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), was not met. American Girl's motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence of New York customers purchasing counterfeit products, was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that American Girl had adequately demonstrated that Zembrka transacted business in New York. Evidence showed that Zembrka accepted orders from New York, sent order confirmations, and received payments, which constituted purposeful activity within the state. The court held that actual shipment of goods was not necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). The court also determined that exercising jurisdiction over Zembrka was consistent with due process, given New York's strong interest in protecting its consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods.The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka" on Justia Law

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of a minor. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release. Maxwell appealed her conviction on several grounds, including the applicability of Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), the statute of limitations, jury impartiality, constructive amendment of the indictment, and the reasonableness of her sentence.The District Court denied Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that Epstein’s NPA with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida did not bar her prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The court also found that the second superseding indictment complied with the statute of limitations, as the relevant statute extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for offenses committed before its enactment. Additionally, the District Court denied Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of a juror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. The court also rejected Maxwell’s claim that its response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the indictment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Epstein’s NPA did not bind the Southern District of New York, the indictment was timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, and the response to the jury note did not result in a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The court also found Maxwell’s sentence to be procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law

Bessy Orbelina Castellanos-Ventura, a citizen of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She claimed past persecution due to her membership in a social group of Honduran women, citing physical and sexual abuse by family members and a local criminal. She did not report the abuse to authorities, believing they would not help her.The Immigration Judge (IJ) assumed without deciding that Castellanos-Ventura's social group was cognizable and that she suffered persecution. However, the IJ denied her application, finding she failed to show that the Honduran government was "unable or unwilling to control" her persecutors. The IJ noted her failure to report the abuse and pointed to her mother's success in obtaining a restraining order as evidence of government action. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, adopting the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency incorrectly applied the "unable or unwilling to control" standard. It noted the agency failed to consider whether it would have been futile or dangerous for Castellanos-Ventura, as an abused child, to seek protection. Additionally, the agency did not evaluate significant evidence indicating the Honduran government's inability to protect women and children from violence. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Joel J. Malek, who filed a complaint alleging that Defendants-Appellees, including Leonard Feigenbaum and AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., engaged in a deceptive marketing scheme to trick him and others into replacing their existing life insurance policies with more expensive and less valuable ones. Malek claimed violations of New York law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Malek’s complaint and denied him leave to amend. The court found that Malek’s New York claims were time-barred and that he failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise. Malek served a motion for reconsideration on the Defendants but did not file it with the court until after the deadline. The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely because he did not file his motion for reconsideration within the required timeframe, thus failing to toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. The Second Circuit reiterated its holding in Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) requires timely filing, not just service, of a post-judgment motion to toll the appeal deadline. The court also concluded that under Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling.The Second Circuit found that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court also determined that Malek’s notice of appeal could not be construed to include the order denying reconsideration. View "Malek v. Feigenbaum" on Justia Law

A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. View "Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United" on Justia Law

In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) License Division. Srour subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, particularly the requirement that an applicant have "good moral character" to be issued a permit.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Srour's motion for summary judgment regarding the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" and "good cause" requirements, and declaring them unconstitutional. The district court did not decide the amount of damages. The City of New York and the NYPD Police Commissioner filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seeking review of the district court's judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the case was moot because Srour had been granted the rifle and shotgun permit he sought. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation that the City would resume the challenged conduct, as Srour's permit was subject to automatic renewal unless he violated laws or was rearrested. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" requirement and declaring it unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot. View "Srour v. New York City" on Justia Law

In this case, Denise Kemp, a manager at Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., worked remotely in June 2016 to care for her child with a serious medical condition. Regeneron then restricted her remote work to one day per week and required her to use intermittent leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for additional time away. Kemp sued Regeneron, alleging interference with her FMLA rights, and discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Kemp’s FMLA claim, reasoning that Regeneron had not denied her FMLA benefits and that the claim was time-barred. The court also dismissed her NYSHRL claims on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an employer can violate the FMLA by interfering with an employee’s use of FMLA benefits, even if the benefits are ultimately granted. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kemp’s FMLA claim as time-barred, finding no evidence of a willful violation by Regeneron to extend the statute of limitations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Kemp’s NYSHRL claims for discrimination and retaliation as time-barred, noting that Kemp was informed of the adverse actions before the relevant date. Lastly, the court upheld the dismissal of Kemp’s constructive discharge claim, concluding that her working conditions were not intolerable enough to compel resignation.The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, dismissing all of Kemp’s claims. View "Kemp v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law