Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotics; Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act conspiracy; and possession of a firearm, which had been discharged, in furtherance of the robbery.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the glove DNA evidence. In this case, the five day Daubert hearing exhaustively dissected the Forensic Statistical Tool method of DNA analysis and the district court permissibly found that two Daubert factors favored denial of defendant's motion to exclude the evidence. Even if the district court erred by admitting the Glove DNA evidence, the error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not err by rejecting defendant's proposed jury instruction on multiple conspiracies and in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence as to the credibility of a government witness. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of a BIA decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of an IJ's denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of her motion to suppress evidence. The court held that the agency erred by requiring that petitioner rely on her documentary evidence alone and make a prima facie showing of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation before it would conduct a suppression hearing. The court also held that, because sworn statements and the police incident report that petitioner submitted "could support" suppression under the Cotzojay standard, she was entitled to a hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Millan-Hernandez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's motion to remand and dismissing his appeal of the denial of his asylum and statutory withholding claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court held that the BIA failed to adequately explain its conclusion that petitioner's proposed social group of former gang members in Guatemala was not particular. Furthermore, the BIA failed to adequately explain its reasons for denying petitioner's motion to remand based on evidence of new country conditions.The court also held that under 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D), changed circumstances presenting an exception to the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application need not arise prior to the filing of the application. In this case, the BIA erred when it refused to consider petitioner's alleged changed circumstances on the ground that the change occurred while his application was pending. Therefore, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for reconsideration. View "Ordonez Azmen v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action under S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, following the failure of NewLink's Phase 3 clinical trial for a novel pancreatic cancer drug and the resulting decline in the market value of NewLink shares.The Second Circuit held that defendants' statements about the efficacy of their pancreatic cancer drug were puffery, not material misrepresentations. However, the court held that plaintiffs plausibly pled material misrepresentation and loss causation for defendants' statements about the scientific literature and the design of their clinical trial. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal in part regarding the 2013-2016 Assessments; vacated the dismissal in part regarding the September, March, and Enrollment statements; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nguyen v. NewLink" on Justia Law

The Times filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action seeking acknowledgement from the CIA that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert program of arming and training rebel forces in Syria. The CIA responded to the request with a Glomar response, stating that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of such records.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the CIA. After according appropriate deference to the uniquely executive purview of national security, the court held that President Donald Trump's statements, even when coupled with General Raymond (Tony) Thomas's statements, left lingering doubts and thus were insufficient to amount to an official acknowledgement of the alleged covert program in Syria, much less the existence of records related to the program. The court stated that it is still logical or plausible that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of an intelligence interest in such a program would reveal something not already officially acknowledged and thereby harm national security interests. The court also held that President Trump's tweet and statements to the Wall Street Journal interviewer did not declassify the existence of the covert program. View "The New York Times v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), seeking discovery from four investment banks related to their work as underwriters in the Tencent Music IPO. Petitioner alleged that he intended to use the documents in his pending CIETAC arbitration against the Ocean Entities and its founder.28 U.S.C. 1782(a) authorizes federal courts to compel the production of materials "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" upon "the application of any interested person." In In National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) ("NBC"), the court held that the phrase "foreign or international tribunal" does not encompass "arbitral bod[ies] established by private parties."The court held that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), alters its prior conclusion in NBC that section 1782(a) does not extend to private international commercial arbitrations. Furthermore, the arbitration at issue here is a non-covered, private, international commercial arbitration. View "In re: Application and Petition of Hanwei Guo" on Justia Law

Objector, a member of a class of past purchasers of pasta, argued that the district court erred in certifying plaintiffs as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class when the district court approved their settlement with Barilla. Plaintiffs and Barilla seek to preserve the settlement.The Second Circuit held that past purchasers of a product—like the purchasers of Barilla pasta in this case—are not eligible for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The court explained that the district court erred in certifying plaintiffs as a Rule 23(b)(2) class because not all class members stand to benefit from injunctive relief, the kind of relief the settlement primarily provides. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order granting class settlement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Berni v. Barilla S.p.A." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant was convicted of raping another member of his platoon in violation of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, after he was discharged from military service, he was designated as a Level Two sex offender.The court held that 34 U.S.C. 20911(5)(A)(iv)'s delegation to the Secretary of Defense to designate which military offenses constitute "sex offenses" under the statute does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. The court also held that the Secretary of Defense did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act in designating military offenses as sex offenses under SORNA. View "United States v. Mingo" on Justia Law

In petition No. 18-834, petitioner contends principally that the BIA erred (a) in rejecting his challenge to the IJ's ruling that he failed to carry his burden of showing his procedurally regular admission to the United States, (b) in rejecting his contention that he was denied due process by the IJ's evidentiary rulings minimizing or curtailing evidence to show his procedurally regular admission, and (c) in denying his motion to reopen the proceeding to present newly discovered evidence. In petition No. 19-737, petitioner contends that the BIA erred in rejecting his contention that intervening legal authority requires the conclusion that criminal possession of stolen property was not a crime involving moral turpitude at the time of his conviction.The Second Circuit denied so much of Petition No 18-834 as contends that petitioner was denied due process. The court dismissed the remainder of that petition for lack of jurisdiction. In regard to Petition No. 19-737, the court held that there was no error in the Board's determination that petitioner's conviction for criminal possession of stolen property was a crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the Board did not err by rejecting petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings based on petitioner's claim of an intervening change in the law. Therefore, the court denied the petition in No. 19-737. View "Ottey v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims of deliberate indifference by prison officials to his medical conditions while he was incarcerated in a New York state prison. At the time of trial, plaintiff was on parole and asked the district court to order the New York Board of Parole to allow him to attend his trial in Buffalo and for the district court to pay for his travel.The Second Circuit held that although a parolee has no constitutional right to attend his own civil trial, a district court does have the authority to compel a parolee's attendance by issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(5). The court explained that plaintiff did not seek such a writ from the district court and the relief he did request differed significantly from that provided by the writ. Therefore, the court reviewed only for plain error and held that the district court did not plainly err in not issuing the writ. The court also held that, even if plaintiff's request were construed as a petition for the writ, the court would still affirm because plaintiff did not not demonstrate that issuing the writ would be "necessary" as required by section 2241(c)(5). Furthermore, even if the district court should have issued the writ, the court held that the failure to do so was harmless because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had been physically present. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Davidson v. Desai" on Justia Law