Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Unions representing Nassau County employees filed suit against NIFA after it instituted a year-long wage freeze for all county employees. The unions alleged that the wage freeze, because it was a legislative act that was not reasonable and necessary to achieve NIFA's purported goal of fiscal soundness, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court held that NIFA's implementation of the wage freeze was administrative, rather than legislative, and granted summary judgment for defendants.The Second Circuit held that NIFA's wage freeze did not violate the Contracts Clause and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court assumed without deciding that NIFA's imposition of the wage freeze was legislative in nature, and held that the wage freeze was a reasonable and necessary means to achieve NIFA's asserted end of ensuring the continued fiscal health of the county. View "Sullivan v. Nassau County Interim Finance Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Visions of America filed suit against Scholastic, alleging copyright infringement on 89 photographs plaintiff had authored. The district court determined that Scholastic had infringed six of the photographs and dismissed the remaining claims.The DC Circuit held that the district court properly recited the elements of a copyright infringement claim and placed the burden of proof on plaintiff to demonstrate that Scholastic's use of his images was outside the scope of the license; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014), did not abrogate this Circuit's adoption of the "discovery rule" for copyright infringement claim accrual in Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014); the Copyright Act limits damages to the three years prior to when a copyright infringement action is filed; and the registration of a compilation of photographs under 17 U.S.C. 409 by an applicant who holds the rights to the component works is valid and effectively registers the underlying individual photos, even if the compilation does not list the individual authors of the individual photos. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Sohm v. Scholastic Inc." on Justia Law

The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act's (FDCA) broad preemption clause, 21 U.S.C. 379s, bars plaintiffs from seeking to impose additional or different labeling requirements through their state-law claims, especially when Congress and the FDA already have provided for specific labeling requirements. Plaintiffs filed suit against L’Oréal, alleging common law claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, as well as claims under eight state consumer protection statutes. Plaintiffs believed they were being deceived into buying more product, because a portion of each of the liquid cosmetics they purchased could not be extracted.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiffs' state law claims at issue are preempted by the FDCA. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that their injuries resulted from the fact that the labels of the various L’Oréal products omitted certain critical information—specifically, that the creams could not be fully dispensed from their respective containers. Plaintiffs also admit that the packages comply with federal labeling requirements. The court explained that, if plaintiffs were permitted to move forward with their claims, they would be using state law to impose labeling requirements on top of those already mandated in the FDCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. View "Critcher v. L'Oreal USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed this interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. At issue is whether a party to a litigation may immediately appeal a non-final disclosure order adverse to his psychotherapist-patient privilege.The court held that the availability of a post-judgment appeal, along with various other potential avenues for review, suffices to protect the litigant's rights and ensures the vitality of the privilege. Therefore, the court held that this non-final order falls within neither the collateral order doctrine nor the exception to finality created by Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). View "Rosner v. United States" on Justia Law

After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment.Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate. View "United States v. Mladen" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision vacating the bankruptcy court's determination concerning whether General Motors assumed liability, through a judicial admission, for claims like appellant's. Appellant filed a wrongful death lawsuit against New GM after his wife was involved in an accident that left her incapacitated. She was driving a 2004 Pontiac Grand Am, a vehicle manufactured by Old GM, which allegedly had a faulty ignition switch.The Second Circuit held that for a statement to constitute a judicial admission, it must be intentional, clear, and unambiguous. In this case, the court held that the inadvertent inclusion of language from an outdated, non-operative version of a sale agreement was not intentional, clear, and unambiguous, and thus was not a judicial admission. Therefore, General Motors was not bound by the language. View "In re Motors Liquidation Co. (Pillars)" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.1 because defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in USSG 4B1.2(b). The court also held that the district court did not substantively err in sentencing defendant, because it properly considered his criminal history and accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed a $200 mandatory special assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3013, as well as a $10,000 assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3014.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and his sentence was substantively reasonable. The court held that the text of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. 3014, taken as a whole and in its context, is straightforwardly meant to be applied on a per-offender, not a per-count, basis. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the special assessment on a per-count, rather than per-offender, basis. Finally, the court held that the computer monitoring condition in question was reasonably related to the nature of defendant's offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Haverkamp" on Justia Law

Washington National petitioned the district court under section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce two arbitration summonses requiring two non-parties to the arbitration, respondents, to testify at a hearing and to produce certain documents.The Second Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties to the petition. The court also held that the district court was not required to consider respondents' challenges to the petition in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of both motions on the merits. View "Washington National Insurance Co. v. OBEX Group LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder through use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during a murder-for-hire conspiracy. Defendant owned Czar Entertainment, a music management company that represented hip-hop, rap and R&B artists such as Jayceon Taylor, also known as "The Game." Taylor was a member of G-Unit, a rap group run by Curtis Jackson, also known as "50 Cent." Defendant's crimes stemmed from a rivalry with Violator Records, the company that managed G-Unit.The court rejected defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective because he conceded that defendant paid for the victim to be shot, even though he told counsel not to make this concession. The court held that defendant failed to show that this was objectively unreasonable or that he would have been found not guilty had a different argument been advanced. In this case, there was ample evidence supporting counsel's strategy to concede that defendant ordered a shooting where, among other things, the government's key witness, who participated in the conspiracy and lured the victim to be shot, testified that defendant agreed to pay the shooter. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting prior bad-act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). View "United States v. Rosemond" on Justia Law