Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of respondents' motion to compel reciprocal discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782. Respondents contend that they should have been awarded reciprocal discovery given their involvement and interest not only in the foreign proceeding that formed the basis of movant's section 1782 discovery request but also in another foreign proceeding.In light of the district court's broad discretion under section 1782, the court held that a district court need not consider procedural parity with respect to all possible foreign proceedings when determining whether to grant reciprocal discovery. Therefore, the court declined to read into section 1782 the obligation urged by respondents to consider all pending litigation. View "Sampedro v. Silver Point Capital, L.P." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment adjudicating the validity of defendants' trademark registrations relating to the "SULKA" mark.The court held that, before a court may entertain an action for declaratory relief in the context of trademarks, the plaintiff must allege that he has taken some action showing that he has both the "definite intent and apparent ability to commence use of the marks on the product." In this case, the court held that defendant's allegations are too vague to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The court explained that the only allegation that does relate to the U.S. market is plaintiff's application to register the mark in the United States. However, while his allegation is certainly relevant to the matter of intent, it has little bearing on plaintiff's ability to transition his business to the United States and there were significant reasons for the district court to be skeptical that he was, in fact, prepared to enter the U.S. market. View "Saleh v. Sulka Trading Ltd." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's award of $64 million to Utica. In this case, the jury found that the Fireman's Fund breached its obligations under reinsurance contracts issued to Utica. The court agreed with Fireman's Fund that the reinsurance contracts, by their terms, demonstrate as a matter of law that Fireman's Fund did not owe to Utica the obligations allegedly breached. The court explained that the umbrella policies unambiguously define their attachment point by reference to the underlying limits of liability "as stated in the Schedule[s]." Therefore, where the losses in question did not exceed the limits stated for bodily injury in the Schedules, Fireman's Fund had no obligation under the reinsurance contracts to pay for those losses. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denials of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Second Circuit found no error in the BIA's rejection of petitioner's untimely asylum claim and its denial of withholding or CAT protection insofar as petitioner professes fear of persecution and torture from former police supervisors. However, insofar as petitioner seeks withholding and CAT protection based on feared persecution and torture from gangs, the court held that the record does not permit it to determine whether the agency considered all relevant evidence and applied the correct legal standard. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, affirming in part and vacating in part the BIA's decision. View "Scarlett v. Barr" on Justia Law

Holloway sought reduction of his 168-month prison sentence and 10-year term of supervised release under Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court applied the framework of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), including U.S.S.G. 1B1.10. Because Holloway was sentenced as a career offender, the district court concluded that his Guidelines range after application of the First Step Act was equivalent to his original Guidelines range, so that Holloway was ineligible for a reduction of his term of imprisonment. The district court did not address supervised release. While his appeal was pending, Holloway completed his prison term and was released from custody.The Second Circuit vacated, holding that Holloway’s appeal was not mooted by his release. Holloway remains eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release and was eligible for relief under the plain language of the Act: The court had previously sentenced him for an offense covered by the Act, and Holloway was not otherwise barred from relief under the Act’s limitations; 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), rather than section 3582(c)(2), provides the correct framework for consideration of a motion for a reduction of a term of imprisonment under the First Step Act; so U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 does not prevent a district court from considering a First Step Act motion made by a defendant whose new Sentencing Guidelines range is equivalent to his original range. View "United States v. Holloway" on Justia Law

Vaughn sued Phoenix House, a drug treatment facility, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL), alleging that he was not paid for work he performed while a patient there. Following a remand, the complaint was dismissed for a second time. The Second Circuit affirmed. The section 1983 claim was untimely. Vaughn was not an employee of Phoenix House within the meaning of the FLSA. The court analyzed the “Glatt” factors, used for assessing unpaid internships, to apply the “primary beneficiary test.” Although Vaughn was not compensated for his work duties, Vaughn received significant benefits from staying at Phoenix House. He was permitted to receive rehabilitation treatment there in lieu of a jail sentence and was provided with food, a place to live, therapy, vocational training, and jobs that kept him busy and off drugs. View "Vaughn v. Phoenix House New York, Inc." on Justia Law

A conviction for retaliating against a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1513 does not require that the Government prove that defendant had knowledge of the federal nature of the proceeding. The Second Circuit rejected defendant's arguments to the contrary and affirmed his conviction for retaliating against a witness. The court remanded for revision of the provision of the sentence relating to the substance abuse treatment condition of supervised release; instructed the district court to consider on remand whether the court's forthcoming order in United States v. Traficante, No. 18-1962 (2d Cir., submitted Oct. 25, 2019) requires modification of the risk notification provision of supervised release; and granted the parties leave to reinstate this appeal to permit review of the district court's decision on remand as to the risk notification provision. View "United States v. Cotto" on Justia Law

Where a district court offers no explanation for its sentence, and where neither the adopted presentence report nor the statement of reasons adequately demonstrates the court's reasoning, the court has committed plain error in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c).The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court held that the district court failed to state its reasons for sentencing defendant as required under section 3553(c); the error is clear or obvious; and the error affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rosa" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for using explosives, conspiring to murder U.S. nationals, conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction, conspiring to bomb a U.S. government facility, and providing material support to terrorists.The court held that a district court does not abuse its discretion where it denies a defense counsel with the appropriate security clearance access to motions filed by the Government ex parte pursuant to section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA); a custodial interrogation that takes place overseas over a period of several weeks and involves the display of hundreds of photographs as part of a foreign country's counterterrorism investigation is not unduly suggestive, thereby rendering inadmissible an out-of-court photo identification of the defendant; and a district court does not abuse its discretion when it limits the cross-examination of a fingerprint examiner to preclude references to a fingerprint misidentification in a wholly unrelated case. Under the circumstances in this case, the court held that the district court did not err in adjudicating the Government's CIPA motions ex parte and in camera, admitting the out-of-court photo identification of defendant, and limiting the cross-examination of the Government's fingerprint examiner. View "United States v. Al Farekh" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, defendant argued that the government failed to prove that the protective order to which he was subject—the basis for the charged false statement on the Form 4473—meets the requirements of an order defined in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).The court held that there was insufficient evidence that defendant had been issued a protective order "after a hearing" in which he had "an opportunity to participate," as required by section 922(g)(8)(A), and thus no rational trier of fact could find that when defendant submitted an application to purchase a firearm he violated section 922(a)(6) by knowingly lying about whether he was subject to such an order. View "United States v. Bramer" on Justia Law