Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that LBD used Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems (ATDSs) in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). In this case, plaintiff received hundreds of unsolicited text messages from LBD over the course of more than a year and a half.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to LBD, holding that LBD's systems qualified as ATDSs. The court held that LBD's systems met both statutory requirements by having both the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and the capacity to dial such numbers. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a class, filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that Credit Control, in an effort to collect the outstanding debt on plaintiff's Kohl's private label credit card account, sent him a letter that did not list the "creditor to whom the debt is owed," in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692g. Plaintiff also alleged that Credit Control's letter constituted a false or misleading representation, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e. The district court granted summary judgment on the pleadings to Credit Control.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that Credit Control disclosed the "name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed" by listing Kohl's, the servicer of the account, as the "client." Because the district court then relied on this erroneous finding in further holding that the letter did not constitute a false or misleading representation, the court did not reach the question of whether the letter violated Section 1692e. Accordingly, the court reversed as the Section 1692g claim and vacated as to the Section 1692e claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Bryan v. Credit Control, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for overtime pay under the New York Labor Law's (NYLL) overtime-pay provision.The court held that, although the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs were ineligible for overtime pay at a rate of one and one-half times their regular wage, the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs were ineligible for any overtime pay under the NYLL. The court explained that a plain reading of the NYLL's overtime-pay provision demonstrates that employees subject to certain exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the Motor Carrier Exemption, must be paid overtime at a rate of one and one-half times the minimum wage. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hayward v. IBI Armored Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit witness tampering related to the death of one individual, conspiracy to commit tampering by planning to murder of another individual, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.The court held that the district court's erroneous jury instructions did not rise to the level of reversible plain error; assuming that the district court committed evidentiary error by admitting hearsay declarations under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), the error was harmless; there was no error in admitting a summary chart under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, and had there been error, it was harmless; the district court did not err in determining that it was required to sentence defendant to the statutory minimum of life imprisonment; and defendant's remaining challenges to his sentence were without merit. View "United States v. Mack" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the SEC's finding that petitioner violated section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder, and that he aided and abetted his employer's violations of its books and records requirements under the Exchange Act and associated regulations. This case stemmed from a series of trades that petitioner executed to avoid Barclays's aged-inventory policy.The court held that the Commission's actions were proper and the evidence was sufficient to support the Commission's findings. In this case, petitioner forfeited his constitutional challenge by not raising it during the administrative proceedings; the SEC's cooperation agreement did not violate petitioner's right to due process; the ALJ did not engage in impermissible fact-finding; there was sufficient evidence supporting the Commission's findings; and the Commission did not improperly sanction petitioner. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Gonnella v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Jasmin appealed the district court's grant of Trina's petition to confirm an arbitration award entered in its favor and denial of Jasmin and JRC's motion to vacate the award. The district court relied on an agency and direct benefits theory of estoppel to find that Jasmin was bound by the arbitration clause.The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment as to Jasmin, holding that the district court erred when it determined that Jasmin was bound as a principal to the contract under agency theory. The court was not persuaded that JRC acted as Jasmin's agent in executing the contract or that, in the alternative, Jasmin was bound to the arbitration clause under a direct benefits theory of estoppel. In this case, the commercial contract containing the arbitration clause was governed by New York law and signed by Trina and JRC, not Jasmin. The court explained that Jasmin was not a party to the contract and thus could not enforce any rights or duties under the contract. The court remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment dismissing the case as to Jasmin. View "Trina Solar US, Inc. v. Jasmin Solar Pty Ltd." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Sherman Act, RICO Act, and common-law claims against defendants for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs are a group of investment funds and defendants are a collection of financial institutions. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a scheme to fix the benchmark interest rates used to price financial derivatives in the Yen currency market.The court held that plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, because plaintiffs plausibly alleged that defendants' conduct caused them to suffer economic injury. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that they entered into financial agreements on unfavorable terms because defendants manipulated benchmark rates in their own favor. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Class plaintiffs are seven named plaintiffs representing six putative classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs also filed suit on behalf of themselves and 516 individuals who opted in to a conditionally certified collective action (the "collective plaintiffs") under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Class plaintiffs alleged that Chipotle misclassified them as exempt employees in violation of the labor laws in six states, and collective plaintiffs alleged that Chipotle misclassified them as exempt employees in violation of the FLSA.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying class certification on the basis of a lack of predominance and superiority. While reasonable minds could disagree, on the record before the court, it could not say that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous or that its conclusion was outside the range of permissible decisions.However, the court vacated the district court's order decertifying the collective action, holding that the district court committed legal error by improperly analogizing the standard for maintaining a collective action under the FLSA to Rule 23 procedure, and relying on that improper analogy in concluding that named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs are not "similarly situated." In this case, the district court committed legal error in employing the "sliding scale" analogy to Rule 23 as it improperly conflated section 216(b) with Rule 23 and that rule's more stringent requirements. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the EPA properly invoked the deliberative process privilege and Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to withhold a portion of its OMEGA computer program when responding to plaintiffs' FOIA request. The OMEGA model is an EPA computer program used to forecast the likely responses of automakers to proposed EPA greenhouse gas emissions standards. In this case, the record shows that to the extent the full OMEGA model reflects any subjective agency views, it does so in the input files, not the core model. Therefore, the core model is not deliberative and thus does not fall within the scope of the privilege and FOIA Exemption 5. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied defendant's motion to stay issuance of the judgment mandate pending his filing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Defendant was convicted of two counts each of honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion, and one count of money laundering. The court held that defendant presented no substantial questions raising either a reasonable probability that four justices will vote to grant certiorari, or a fair prospect that five justices will vote to reverse this court's judgment. The court also held that defendant failed to show good cause for issuing the stay. View "United States v. Silver" on Justia Law