Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for wire fraud, Title 18 securities fraud, conversion of U.S. property, and conspiracy, arising from the misappropriation of confidential information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The federal wire fraud, securities fraud, and conversion statutes, are codified at 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1348, and 641, respectively.The court held that confidential government information may constitute "property" for purposes of the wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud statutes. The court also held that the "personal-benefit" test announced in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), does not apply to those Title 18 fraud statutes. Finally, the panel found no prejudicial error with respect to the remaining issues presented on appeal. View "United States v. Blaszczak" on Justia Law

BBVA appealed the district court's judgment entered following the Second Circuit's mandate in Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 729 Fed. App'x 106 (2d Cir. 2018). The judgment rendered final several of its previous orders requiring BBVA to turn over funds to petitioners from a blocked electronic fund transfer originated by the Cuban Import‐Export Corporation, an instrumentality of the Republic of Cuba. The turnover orders rested on the district court's grant of full faith and credit to default judgments that petitioners secured against Cuba in the Florida state courts. The Florida state courts had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The court reversed the judgment, vacated the turnover orders, and remanded with instructions, holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). In this case, petitioners failed to show under 28 U.S.C. 1605A either that (1) Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism "as a result" of the pre‐1982 acts underlying their judgments or that (2) the acts underlying their judgments occurred after 1982. Therefore, without either showing, the state-sponsored terrorism exception did not permit the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Cuba's assets under section 201(a) of TRIA. View "Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A." on Justia Law

Personal jurisdiction exists whenever an individual, charged with a crime over which the Federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, is brought before that court. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of obstruction of Government administration for making false statements to the IRS. The court held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over defendant where the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case: an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. In this case, the indictment charged defendant and defendant was present before the district court. Therefore, the judgment was valid. View "United States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the substantive reasonableness of defendant's sentence for conspiring to provide material support to ISIS and attempting to murder a federal agent in the name of ISIS.The Second Circuit held that defendant's sentence of 17 years' imprisonment—which constitutes an 80% reduction from his recommended Guidelines range of 85 years—was substantively unreasonable in light of his exceptionally serious conduct involving a domestic terrorist attack against law enforcement in the name of ISIS; where a district court has accepted a defendant's guilty plea and his allocution to the elements of each charged offense, it cannot make findings of fact during sentencing that contradict or otherwise minimize the conduct described at defendant's plea hearing; where a sentencing court opts to compare the relative culpability of co‐defendants, it cannot selectively rely on a factor when it serves a mitigating function in one case, but then subsequently ignore the same factor when it serves an aggravating function in the other case; a defendant's legally‐required compliance with institutional regulations during his term of pre‐trial and pre‐sentencing detention is not a substantially mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing; and, at defendant's resentencing, the district court shall accord substantially greater weight to the specified 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Mumuni" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment sentencing defendant to two months in prison for attempting to export defense articles without a license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The court held that the challenged statute and regulations were constitutionally applied to defendant; defendant lacked Article III standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge; and defendant's other facial First Amendment challenges were without merit. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging that the terms of their employee retirement benefits plan violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In a prior appeal, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the plan violated the statue and remanded to the district court for consideration of the appropriate relief. On remand, defendants moved on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), contending that the relief requested by plaintiffs was unavailable as a matter of law. The district court agreed and granted defendants' motion.The court held that section 502(a)(3) authorizes district courts to grant equitable relief ‐‐ including reformation ‐‐ to remedy violations of subsection I of ERISA, even in the absence of mistake, fraud, or other conduct traditionally considered to be inequitable. Furthermore, the district court is authorized to grant plaintiffs' proposed remedy of enforcement of the reformed plan under section 502(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP" on Justia Law

Defendants Campo and Flores appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy to import five or more kilograms of cocaine into the United States. According to Campo, who from an early age was raised by Cilia Flores, the First Lady of Venezuela, and sometimes referred to her as his mother, defendants sought to raise $20 million in drug proceeds in order to fund Cilia Flores's 2015 campaign for a position in the Venezuelan National Assembly.The Second Circuit rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary errors; held that the evidence at trial was ample to permit the jury to find that defendants, if they lacked actual knowledge, deliberately avoided learning--or forming a belief--that their cocaine was to be bound for the United States; defendants' challenges to the instruction on conscious avoidance were without merit; and defendants' challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence of predisposition was without merit where, upon mention that the drugs would be sold in the United States, there was no semblance of any reluctance or hesitation by these defendants, who had spent the previous two months attempting to get partners for their plans to fly cocaine to other countries. Finally, the court rejected challenges to the district court's application of a two-step adjustment for defendants' roles in the conspiracy as supervisors or leaders of criminal activity under USSG 3B1.1(c), and a two-step enhancement for use of a private aircraft for importation under USSG 2D1.1(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging four amendments to the Village of Pomona's zoning law as violations of federal and New York law. The district court dismissed Tartikov's complaint in part and later resolved certain claims in defendants' favor. The remaining claims concluded with a verdict in favor of Tartikov. Defendants appealed the final judgment and Tartikov appealed the earlier orders dismissing certain claims.The Second Circuit held that Tartikov lacked Article III standing to pursue its free exercise, free speech,and free association claims under the federal and New York constitutions, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) substantial burden and exclusion and limits claims, Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims, and common law claims related to the Berenson doctrine claims. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment with respect to those claims, remanding for instructions for dismissal. In regard to the remaining claims that went to trial, the court reversed the district court's judgment to the extent the claims invoke two of the challenged laws and affirmed insofar as the claims invoked the remaining two. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the as-applied challenges and challenges to the RLUIPA equal terms and total exclusion provisions. View "Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona" on Justia Law

Representatives of certain unsecured creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor Tribune Company appealed the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss their state law, constructive fraudulent conveyance claims brought against Tribune's former shareholders. The district court held that appellants lacked statutory standing under the Bankruptcy Code.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of appellants' state law, constructive fraudulent conveyance claims on preemption grounds rather than standing grounds. The court held that appellants were not barred by the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision from bringing claims while avoidance proceedings against the same transfers brought by a party exercising the powers of a bankruptcy trustee on an intentional fraud theory are ongoing, because appellants have been freed from its restrictions by orders of the bankruptcy court and by debtors' confirmed reorganization plan. However, the court held that appellants' claims were preempted by section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, because this section shields certain transactions from a bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers, including, inter alia, transfers by or to a financial institution in connection with a securities contract, except through an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim. View "In re: Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation" on Justia Law

There is no error in applying the career offender enhancement under USSG 4B1.1, to a defendant convicted of racketeering conspiracy based on underlying predicate acts of racketeering that qualify as crimes of violence under USSG 4B1.2.The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and held that, even assuming defendant preserved his argument that the 2016 Guidelines should have been used, the district court did not err in concluding that defendant's conviction for federal racketeering conspiracy based on the predicate acts of racketeering is a crime of violence under section 4B1.1 of the 2016 Guidelines. Furthermore, the court held that defendant's prior New York state robbery convictions are clearly crimes of violence under the 2015 Guidelines. The court disposed of the consolidated appeals of defendant's co-defendants in a separate summary order. View "United States v. Canteen" on Justia Law