Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner's prior Connecticut state convictions for first and second degree robbery categorically qualify as violent felonies under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In Shabazz v. United States, 912 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019), the court held that Connecticut's simple robbery statute qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause. The court explained that the statutes under which petitioner was convicted require that he have committed simple robbery. The court found petitioner's remaining arguments were without merit. View "Estremera v. United States" on Justia Law

It is proper only to consider a defendant's financial eligibility for new counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. The Second Circuit granted Defendant Nunez's motion for in forma pauperis (IFP) status and a motion to withdraw as counsel and appointment for new counsel under the CJA. The court held that Nunez has established that he was financial eligible for CJA counsel, and was no threshold showing of the merits of the appeal was required to obtain IFP and CJA counsel in direct criminal appeals. View "United States v. Kosic (Nunez)" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs' action stemming from a Qatari hacking scheme. The court agreed with the district court's holding that defendant had diplomatic immunity from suit under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In this case, plaintiff failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing that the commercial activity exception to diplomatic immunity applied by presenting evidence to support their allegations that defendant engaged in such activity. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to request jurisdictional discovery as directed by the district court, and amendment would be futile because plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint did not cure the original complaint's jurisdictional deficiencies. View "Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Benomar" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against her employer for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime provisions, the employer made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) and plaintiff accepted. Before the judgment was entered, the district court sua sponte ordered the parties to submit the settlement agreement to the court for a fairness review and judicial approval, which the district court believed was required under the Second Circuit's decision in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015).The court held, however, that judicial approval was not required of Rule 68(a) offers of judgment settling FLSA claims. The court considered amici's other arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's order, remanding with instructions. View "Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Restaurant, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim by a state prisoner that state corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm, which resulted in an assault to the prisoner by another prisoner. The court held that the district court incorrectly stated the summary judgment standard applicable to plaintiff's claim and that factual issues precluded entry of summary judgment for the officers. In this case, the district court failed to view the evidence of the threat "in the light most favorable" to plaintiff, and there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendants failed to take reasonable steps to avoid harm to plaintiff and to protect him from harm. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lewis v. Swicki" on Justia Law

The Second Court clarified that, to establish a prima facie pay discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff need not first establish an Equal Pay Act violation—that is, that she performed equal work but received unequal pay. Rather, all Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove is that her employer discriminated against her with respect to her compensation because of her sex. The court adopted the framework applicable to Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 whistleblower retaliation claims to Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act whistleblower retaliation claims.In this case, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants paid her less than they would have if she were a man, retaliated against her when she raised concerns about her disparate pay and possible Consumer Product Safety Act violations, and fired her because she was pregnant. The district court held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for each of her claims.The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for plaintiff's Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII claims, but insufficient evidence to support her Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act whistleblower retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that a landlord may be liable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for intentionally discriminating against a tenant who complains about a racially hostile housing environment that is created by and leads to the arrest and conviction of another tenant. In this case, the landlord allegedly refused to take any action to address what it knew to be a racially hostile housing environment created by one tenant targeting another, even though the landlord had acted against other tenants to redress prior, non‐race related issues. In holding that a landlord may be liable in those limited circumstances, the court adhered to the FHA's broad language and remedial scope. The court also held that post-acquisition claims that arise from intentional discrimination are cognizable under section 3604 of the FHA. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the FHA and analogous New York State law, as well as his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 82. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction under New York Penal Law 110.00, 130.45 for attempted oral or anal sexual conduct with a person under the age of fifteen constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, and was therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court explained that petitioner's conviction under the New York statute did not encompass more conduct than the generic definition and could not realistically result in an individual's conviction for conduct made with a less than knowing mens rea. View "Acevedo v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, and wire fraud, as well as postjudgment orders. The Second Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury convictions; the district court did not err in giving the jury a "no ultimate harm" instruction; the district court did not plainly err in charging the jury on the elements of bank fraud; the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a modified Allen charge to the jury; but the district court abused its discretion in ordering a restitution amount of over $18 million to be paid to the USDA because defendants did not proximately cause financial losses equating to that amount. Accordingly, the court reversed the restitution orders, vacated the conviction to the extent that they ordered defendants to pay restitution, and otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Calderon" on Justia Law

On expedited interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court's order denying President Trump's motion for a preliminary injunction preventing compliance with subpoenas seeking his financial records and denying President Trump's motion for a stay pending appeal. Specifically at issue was the lawfulness of three subpoenas issued by the House Committee on Financial Services and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to two banks, Deutsche Bank AG and Capital One Financial Corporation, seeking financial records of President Trump, members of his family, and the Trump Organization (collectively, "appellants"), and financial records from the Trump Organization and affiliated entities.The court held that those seeking to preliminarily enjoin compliance with subpoenas issued by congressional committees exercising their constitutional and duly authorized power to subpoena documents in aid of both regulatory oversight and consideration of potential legislation must satisfy the more rigorous likelihood‐of‐success standard. In this case, although appellants have established irreparable injury, the court held that appellants have not shown a likelihood of success on any of their statutory and constitutional claims. The court also held that the balance of the hardships and equities did not decidedly tip in favor of appellants, and the public interest in vindicating the committees’ constitutional authority was clear and substantial.Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order in substantial part to the extent that it denied a preliminary injunction and ordered prompt compliance with the subpoenas, except that the case is remanded to a limited extent for implementation of the procedure set forth in this opinion concerning the nondisclosure of sensitive personal information and a limited opportunity for appellants to object to disclosure of other specific documents within the coverage of those paragraphs of the subpoenas listed in this opinion. The court dismissed as moot the appeal from the order to the extent that it denied a stay pending appeal. View "Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG" on Justia Law