Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit held that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and denied qualified immunity to defendants for the week of administratively imposed post‐release supervision (PRS) after plaintiff's determinate sentences had expired.In regard to the period of PRS that plaintiff served from her initial release from prison on October 5, 2007, until her determinate sentences expired on November 27, 2008, the court held that there were material issues of fact as to whether that period of PRS was more onerous than the period of conditional release she would have been subjected to without PRS and consequently whether she was deprived of a liberty interest during that period. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal, remanding for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Fischer" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of paying and conspiring to pay bribes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, 666, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and gratuities to United Nations officials and of related money laundering. Defendant's charges stemmed from his sustained effort to bribe two U.N. officials to designate one of his properties as the permanent site of an annual U.N. convention.The court held that the word "organization" as used in section 666, and defined by 1 U.S.C. 1 and 18 U.S.C. 18, applies to all non‐government legal persons, including public international organizations such as the U.N. The court also held that the "official act" quid pro quo for bribery as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1), defined by id. section 201(a)(3), and explained in McDonnell v. United States, does not delimit bribery as proscribed by section 666 and the FCPA. Thus, the district court did not err in failing to charge the McDonnell standard for the FCPA crimes of conviction. Insofar as the district court nevertheless charged an "official act" quid pro quo for the section 666 crimes, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, and the jury did not misconstrue the "corruptly" element of section 666 and the FCPA and the "obtaining or retaining business" element of the FCPA. View "United States v. Ng Lap Seng" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims or representatives of victims in terrorist attacks in Amman, Jordan, filed suit alleging that defendants aided and abetted the attackers, in violation of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act by providing banking services to Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi Arabiaʹs largest commercial bank, which was thought by some to have ties to al‐Qaeda in Iraq, the terrorist organization responsible for the November 9 attacks.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiffs' civil aiding and abetting claim failed because plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that HSBC was generally aware of its role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that it provided the assistance, and that HSBC knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation. View "Siegel v. HSBC North America Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the parties' dispute over plaintiffs' "Velocity" trademark for clothing and activewear. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err by determining that defendants' infringement was willful and by awarding plaintiffs the gross profits derived by defendants' infringement; the district court did not err by amending the judgment to remove the trebled portion of the profits award; and the court clarified that, under its precedent in George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992), a plaintiff prosecuting a trademark infringement claim need not in every case demonstrate actual consumer confusion to be entitled to an award of an infringer's profits.However, the court vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest to plaintiffs and its determination that this was an "exceptional" case under the Lanham Act. While this appeal was pending, the court held that the standard for determining an "exceptional" case under the Patent Act applies also to cases brought under the Lanham Act. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to apply Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014). View "4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. New York & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified the following questions to the New York State Court of Appeals: (1) whether New York law recognizes ʺcross‐jurisdictional class action tolling,ʺ i.e., tolling of a New York statute of limitations by the pendency of a class action in another jurisdiction; and (2) whether, under New York law, a non‐merits dismissal of class certification can terminate class action tolling, and if so, whether the Orders at issue did so. View "Chavez v. Occidental Chemical Corp." on Justia Law

Where a collective bargaining agreement contains unambiguous language vesting welfare benefits, the agreement's general durational clause does not prevent those benefits from vesting. The Second Circuit held that the effects bargaining agreement (EBA) unambiguously vested medical coverage for retirees who retired prior to the expiration of the EBA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of union retirees who retired prior to the expiration of the EBA and their surviving spouses, and its order permanently enjoining Honeywell from terminating medical coverage for those union retirees and their surviving spouses.The court held that the EBA was ambiguous as to whether medical coverage for union retirees who retired after the EBA expired and their surviving spouses vested. Nonetheless, the court held that the Post‐Expiration Plaintiffs have presented a sufficiently serious question as to the merits and satisfied the remaining requirements for a preliminary injunction to issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining Honeywell from terminating the Post‐Expiration Plaintiffs' medical benefits and remanded for further proceedings View "Kelly v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of Sarah Palin's defamation complaint against The New York Times for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court erred in relying on facts outside the pleadings to dismiss the complaint.The court also held that Palin's Proposed Amended Complaint plausibly stated a claim for defamation and may proceed to full discovery. In this case, a jury could plausibly find that The Times editor knew before publishing the editorial that it was false to claim that Palin or her political action committee were connected to the Loughner shooting that injured Representative Gabby Giffords; certain aspects of the drafting and publication process of the editorial at The Times permitted an inference of actual malice; and a reasonable reader could view the challenged statements as factual, namely that Palin, through her political action committee, was directly linked to the Loughner shooting. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Palin v. The New York Times Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for money laundering and conducting transactions in property criminally derived through bribery in the Republic of Guinea. The court held that McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), does not apply to Articles 192 and 194 of Guinea's Penal Code, and therefore defendant's claim that the jury instructions were improper because they did not include the definition of "official act" relative to a bribery conviction necessarily failed.The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of a quid pro quo exchange necessary for defendant's conviction and that he committed an "official act" as defined in McDonnell. Finally, the court held that defendant's remaining evidentiary challenges failed and his other arguments were without merit. View "United States v. Thiam" on Justia Law

Intervenors, financial institutions that held junior notes issued by trust defendant Soloso, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, the senior noteholder of Lansuppe. Intervenors also appealed the district court's denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of their cross-claims.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 does not provide a private right of action. However, the court agreed with the district court that Lansuppe has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment ordering distribution of Soloso's assets according to the terms of the indenture and that Intervenors' cross‐claims failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order distributing the assets of the trust according to the terms of the trust's governing indenture. View "Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, while on board a stateless vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq.The Second Circuit dismissed the indictment, because the government failed to demonstrate, as required by section 70504, that the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. In this case, the indictment should have been dismissed upon the government's failure to demonstrate at the pretrial hearing that the vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Furthermore, the error was not cured by defendants' subsequent defective guilty pleas. Accordingly, the court vacated the convictions. View "United States v. Prado" on Justia Law