Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

President Trump engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by utilizing Twitter's blocking function to limit certain users' access to his social media account, which is otherwise open to the public at large, because he disagrees with their speech. The First Amendment does not permit a public official who utilizes a social media account for all manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise‐open online dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.In this case, the government concedes that individual plaintiffs were blocked from President Trump's Twitter account after they criticized the President or his policies, and that they were blocked as a result of their criticism. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and entry of a declaratory judgment that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the account because of their expressed political views violates the First Amendment. View "Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump" on Justia Law

The four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(4) may be applied based on images of sexual activity that would cause the depicted minor to experience mental, but not physical, pain. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on the question of the four-level enhancement but remanded to the district court for further consideration of defendant's special condition of supervised release that broadly prohibits him from having contact with minors without pre-approval from the Probation Office. In this case, the district court plainly erred by adequately justifying its imposition of the special condition. View "United States v. Bleau" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of securities fraud and wire fraud, finding no errors in the district court's jury instructions, admission of lay testimony, and calculation of loss.The court also held that, as a matter of law, forfeiture is not limited to the amount of funds acquired through illegal transactions in an insider‐trading scheme; rather, forfeiture may extend to appreciation of those funds. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's forfeiture calculation and order. Finally, Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018), was decided after defendant's sentence and addressed the categories of fees recoverable under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. Therefore, the court held that a limited remand to recalculate the restitution was appropriate. View "United States v. Afriyie" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum and related relief based on the IJ's finding that petitioner was not credible. The court held that the asserted inconsistencies between the details of his encounter with police following his attack and the severity of his father's injuries after an assault did not amount to inconsistent statements at all. Furthermore, petitioner's inconsistent statements regarding the dates when he received medical treatment after he was assaulted -- on its own -- did not justify an adverse credibility finding. In any event, remand to the agency would not be futile. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of removal and remanded. View "Gurung v. Barr" on Justia Law

Intervenors appealed the district court's order denying their respective motions to unseal filings in a defamation suit. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order and held that the district court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. Nevertheless, the court recognized the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. Therefore, the court clarified the legal tools that district courts should use in safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. The court remanded for the district court to conduct a particularized review of the remaining sealed materials. View "Brown v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting in part and denying in part Pangea's motion for a writ of execution upon the proceeds from the sale of a property previously owned by a divorced couple. Pangea, a judgment creditor of husband, claimed that the district court erred in declining to award it the entirety of the proceeds, arguing that its interest in the property took priority over the interest awarded to wife in a divorce judgment.The court certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that wife's interest vested upon entry of the divorce judgment and did not render her a judgment creditor of husband. The state court held that legal rights to specific marital property vest upon the judgment of divorce and the dissolution of a marriage involving the division of marital assets does not render one ex‐spouse the creditor of another. Rather, the judgment of divorce was, as the Federal District Court explained, a final settling of accounts' between marital partners with an equitable interest in all marital property. Therefore, C.P.L.R. 5203(a), by its plain terms, has no application here, and Pangea can claim no priority. The court held that this holding was binding and dispositive of the case. View "Pangea Capital Management, LLC v. Lakian" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order committing defendant to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d) for psychiatric treatment and evaluation. Defendant alleged that the district court's order violated his due process rights because a forensic psychologist stated that his disorder was degenerative and would not significantly improve with treatment.The court held that, under 18 U.S.C. 4241 et seq., commitment to assess future competency is mandatory, and only the district court, and not a forensic psychologist, can determine whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such a decision, the court held that defendant's commitment to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and further evaluation was reasonably related to determining whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the court held that the district court constitutionally applied section 4241(d)'s commitment procedures to defendant. View "United States v. Brennan" on Justia Law

The plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act unambiguously permits an applicant to raise multiple claims in her asylum application, even if the changed circumstance relates only to one proffered basis for asylum. The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The court held that petitioner demonstrated the existence of changed circumstances permitting her late filing, and the IJ and BIA were obligated to consider her entire application. Accordingly, the court remanded to the BIA for the limited purpose of granting the application for asylum. View "Yan Yang v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Attending's motion to compel arbitration in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL).The court held that the arbitration clause mandated arbitration of the relevant claims and did not deny due process to Attending's employees. In this case, the union agreed to mandatory arbitration in the collective bargaining agreement on behalf of its members and the arbitration agreement here clearly and unmistakably encompassed the FLSA and NYLL claims. Furthermore, the challenged portion of the arbitration clause, which simply specified with whom arbitration will be conducted in accordance with established Supreme Court precedent, did not violate due process. View "Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In an action alleging that her employer and union engaged in disability-based discrimination under New York state law, plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment denying her motion to remand to state court.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion for remand because all of her claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. In this case, plaintiff's claims against the hospital defendants and the union were preempted because they were substantially dependent upon analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were meritless. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint. View "Whitehurst v. United Healthcare Workers East" on Justia Law