Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence of mandatory life in prison and remanded for resentencing. The court held that defendant's prior conviction for sodomy in the second degree under New York law did not qualify as a "prior sex conviction" under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e). The court applied the categorical approach and held that the New York statute under which defendant was convicted sweeps more broadly than its federal equivalent. View "United States v. Kroll" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a class action alleging violations of federal securities laws by Cigna and its officers. Plaintiffs alleged that certain of defendants' statements were materially misleading, constituting fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.The court held that the statements were not materially misleading, because they were tentative and generic, emphasizing the complex and evolving regulatory environment Cigna faced. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that a reasonable investor would view these statements as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available. In this case, the statements at issue in Cigna's Code of Ethics were a textbook example of puffery, and a reasonable investor would not rely on the 2013 and 2014 Form 10-K statements as representations of satisfactory compliance. View "Singh v. Cigna Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). The court also held that the IJ's reliance on the forfeiture order was appropriate, and the IJ did not commit clear error in finding that the government established that petitioner laundered more than $10,000 by clear and convincing evidence. View "Barikyan v. Barr" on Justia Law

A landlord may be liable under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) for failing to take prompt action to address a racially hostile housing environment created by one tenant targeting another, where the landlord knew of the discriminatory conduct and had the power to correct it. The Second Circuit adhered to the FHA's broad language and remedial scope, holding that the FHA reaches conduct that, as here, would constitute discrimination in the enjoyment of residence in a dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that dwelling after acquisition. Furthermore, HUD's 2016 Final Rule, HUD's other implementing regulations, and the views expressed in its amicus brief only reinforce the court's textual interpretation that a landlord may be liable under the FHA for failing to intervene in tenant-on-tenant racial harassment of which it knew or reasonably should have known and had the power to address.In this case, plaintiff alleged that defendants had actual knowledge of the tenant's criminal racial harassment of plaintiff but, because it involved race, intentionally allowed it to continue even though defendants had the power to end it. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the FHA and analogous New York State law, as well as his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The panel remanded for further proceedings. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's second amended complaint, alleging claims under the Commodities Exchange Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Sherman Act, and New York law related to alleged manipulation of the platinum futures market. At issue in this appeal were the Commodities Exchange Act claims.The court held that the Commodities Exchange Act claims accrued when plaintiff discovered her injury in 2008, not when she discovered the manipulation scheme she alleged or the identity of defendants. Therefore, the claims were time-barred because the limitations period on those claims expired in 2010, well before she filed her lawsuit. View "Levy v. BASF Metals, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to three counts of federal bank robbery. The court held that federal bank robbery by intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) was a crime of violence under the 2015 version of the Career Offender Guidelines, USSG 4B1.1–2, because it was specifically enumerated in the commentary clause and conformed to the definition of generic robbery. The court also held that New York third‐degree robbery in violation of New York Penal Law 160.05 was a crime of violence under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court appropriately applied the 2015 (pre-amendment) Career Offender Guidelines' sentencing enhancement in this case. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

The trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC alleged that Madoff Securities transferred property to foreign entities that subsequently transferred it to other foreign entities, including the hundreds of appellees. The trustee claimed that the Madoff Securities' transfers were avoidable as fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(A), and sought to recover the property from appellees under section 550(a)(2). The district court dismissed the actions based on the presumption against extraterritoriality and international comity principles.The Second Circuit vacated and held that neither the presumption against extraterritoriality nor international comity principles barred recovery. In this case, the focus of section 550(a) was on debtor's fraudulent transfer of property to the initial transferee, and these actions involved domestic applications of the Bankruptcy Code because section 550(a) focused on regulating domestic conduct. Therefore, the lower courts erred by dismissing these actions under the presumption against extraterritoriality. The court also held that the district court erroneously dismissed these actions on international comity grounds where the United States' interest in applying its law to these disputes outweighed the interest of any foreign state and prescriptive comity posed no bar to recovery. View "In re: Picard" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although the court agreed with the district court that the state courts properly rejected petitioner's Brady claim, the court held that the state courts unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding when it rejected petitioner's fair trial claim. In this case, there was more than a reasonable likelihood that the government's knowing offer of perjured testimony influenced the jury. View "Fernandez v. Capra" on Justia Law

Chunn was sleeping in the Amtrak waiting area in Pennsylvania Station when he was roused by Amtrak Police Officer Coleman. An altercation ensued and Chunn was arrested for disorderly conduct, trespassing, and resisting arrest. During a search incident to this arrest, officers discovered $10,400 cash in Chunn’s pocket, confiscated the cash. After an investigation by Amtrak’s Criminal Investigation Division and an Amtrak officer assigned to the Amtrak‐DEA joint task force, the DEA decided to seize the money for possible forfeiture as proceeds of drug sales. Amtrak transferred the cash to the DEA and gave Chunn a receipt. Chunn sued Amtrak and Amtrak officers, alleging that Amtrak’s transfer of his property without first offering him an opportunity to contest the transfer violated his due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and amounted to conversion under New York law. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied Chunn’s motion to amend his complaint to add as a defendant the Amtrak officer responsible for turning over Chunn’s property to the DEA. Due process is afforded by the required post‐deprivation procedures and Chunn was not unlawfully deprived of his property. View "Chunn v. Amtrak" on Justia Law

Ceara, a state inmate who claims that he was assaulted by a prison corrections officer, filed a pro se complaint raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming “John Doe” as the officer who allegedly assaulted him but also described and named that officer as “Officer Deagan.” After the statute of limitations had expired, Ceara amended his complaint to correctly name “C.O. Deagan” as “Officer Joseph Deacon.” The district court dismissed on the ground that an amended complaint identifying a defendant to replace a “John Doe” placeholder does not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. Ceara’s complaint was not a true John Doe complaint; his amendment to correct a misspelling related back under 15 Rule 15(c)(1)(C). View "Ceara v. Deacon" on Justia Law