Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to address the Sentencing Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine and that a supervised release condition permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion lacked adequate on-the-record justification.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Lawrence within the Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, rejecting the parties' proposal to treat the crack cocaine as powder cocaine, which would have resulted in a lower sentencing range. The court emphasized Lawrence's criminal history and the need for him to change his life trajectory. The court also adopted the search condition from the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), which included a detailed discussion of Lawrence's background and offense conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Lawrence's arguments. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses differently and did not need to address the parties' policy arguments. The appellate court also found that the district court reasonably imposed the search condition, justified by the PSR's recommendations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Lawrence's sentence and conditions of supervised release were procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

A group of landlords and property owners in New York's Hudson Valley region challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 amendments to New York's rent stabilization law. These amendments, known as the Vacancy Provisions, allow municipalities to impose civil penalties on landlords who do not cooperate with vacancy surveys and to presume zero vacancies for nonresponsive landlords. The landlords argued that these provisions authorize warrantless searches of their records without an opportunity to challenge the searches' scope, violating the Fourth Amendment, and that they prevent landlords from contesting vacancy calculations, violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. The landlords appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Vacancy Provisions are facially valid under the Fourth Amendment because landlords have adequate pre-compliance review available under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court also found that the searches authorized by the Vacancy Provisions are not unreasonable in every situation, given the ample notice and minimal penalties involved. Additionally, the court held that the Vacancy Provisions do not violate procedural due process because landlords can contest vacancy calculations at public hearings before rent stabilization is adopted and through Article 78 after adoption. View "Hudson Shore v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Lawrence Ray was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for multiple crimes, including racketeering conspiracy, extortion, sex trafficking, forced labor, money laundering, tax evasion, and committing a violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise. These convictions stemmed from Ray's operation of a criminal enterprise that targeted young adults, primarily his daughter's college roommates, for indoctrination and exploitation, including sex trafficking and forced labor in Pinehurst, North Carolina.The district court sentenced Ray to 720 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. Ray appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the unconstitutionality of the racketeering statutes, improper admission of expert testimony, and the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Ray's appeal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Ray's convictions, including the existence of an enterprise, the commission of violent crimes to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise, and the coercion of victims into sex trafficking and forced labor. The court also rejected Ray's constitutional challenge to the racketeering statutes, noting that such challenges have been consistently rejected in the past.Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Hughes, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who provided general background on coercive control tactics without directly linking her testimony to Ray or his victims. The court also found that the district court properly balanced the probative value of the testimony against its potential prejudicial effect.Finally, the court concluded that Ray's 720-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the gravity of his crimes and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and just punishment. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

Defendants Gary Denkberg and Sean Novis were involved in a mass-mailing fraud scheme from 2004 to 2016, sending fake prize notices to consumers, leading them to believe they had won large cash prizes. Victims were instructed to pay a small processing fee to claim their prizes, but instead received a "sweepstakes report" with publicly available information. The scheme generated approximately $80 million from over three million transactions. Despite complaints and a 2012 cease-and-desist agreement with the USPS, Defendants continued their fraudulent activities using new shell companies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted Denkberg and Novis of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, use of fictitious names, and aiding and abetting mail fraud. The jury acquitted Denkberg on some counts but found both defendants guilty on the remaining charges. Denkberg was sentenced to 66 months in prison, while Novis received 90 months. Both were also ordered to pay significant fines and forfeitures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including evidence of fraudulent intent and material misrepresentations. The court found that the District Court's supplemental jury instructions were not in error and that the admitted testimony and letters from state attorneys general were not hearsay. The court also determined that the admission of the letters did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from introducing certain evidence due to a failure to comply with a protective order. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Novis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Khalilah Suluki alleged that her mother, Khadijah Suluki, committed identity theft by opening several credit card accounts in her name without permission, including an account with Credit One Bank, N.A. Upon discovering the alleged fraud, Suluki disputed the account with Credit One and the three major national credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Credit One investigated the dispute multiple times and concluded that the account was legitimate and belonged to Suluki. Suluki filed suit, claiming that Credit One violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into her dispute.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Credit One. The court concluded that, regardless of the reasonableness of Credit One's investigation, no reasonable investigation required by the statute would have yielded a different result. The court also found that Suluki did not present any triable issues of fact regarding whether Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA to be liable for damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accuracy of the information reported and the reasonableness of Credit One's investigations. However, it concluded that no reasonable investigation would have led Credit One to determine that the account was fraudulent or that the information was unverifiable. The court also determined that Suluki could not recover damages because she did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Roth, a shareholder of Estée Lauder Companies Inc. and Altice USA, Inc., filed suits alleging that controlling shareholders of these companies engaged in transactions that violated Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Roth claimed that the controlling shareholders sold shares of the companies while the companies repurchased their own shares, and sought to pair these transactions to impose liability for short-swing profits.In the Southern District of New York, Roth's complaint against LAL Family Corporation and LAL Family Partners L.P. was dismissed. The court held that issuer repurchases cannot be paired with insiders' sales of outstanding shares to create Section 16(b) liability. Similarly, in the Eastern District of New York, Roth's complaint against Patrick Drahi and other defendants was dismissed. The court relied in part on the analysis from the Southern District of New York, concluding that Roth's legal theory was invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the cases and affirmed the judgments of dismissal. The court held that Section 16(b) does not impose liability for pairing sales by controlling shareholders with share repurchases by corporations they control. The court reasoned that under applicable state law, repurchased shares are transformed into treasury shares, which are different in kind from outstanding shares and cannot be paired. Therefore, Roth's theory of liability was rejected, and the judgments dismissing his complaints were affirmed. View "Roth v. LAL Family Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, filed a lawsuit against Defendant Amilus Inc. for willful copyright infringement. Romanova alleged that Amilus published her photograph on its website without authorization. Despite being served, Amilus did not respond or appear in court. Romanova moved for a default judgment, but the district court ordered Amilus to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After receiving no response from Amilus, the court then ordered Romanova to show cause why the use of her photograph did not constitute fair use. The district court ultimately dismissed Romanova’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that Amilus’s use of the photograph was fair use.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Romanova’s claim, finding that the fair use defense was clearly established on the face of the complaint. The court reasoned that Amilus’s publication of the photograph communicated a different message than the original, which justified the fair use defense. Romanova appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in its substantive finding of fair use and in raising the defense sua sponte for a non-appearing defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the district court misunderstood the fair use doctrine, particularly the requirement for a transformative purpose and justification for copying. The appellate court held that Amilus’s use of the photograph did not communicate a different message and lacked any valid justification for copying. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to enter a default judgment in favor of Romanova. View "Romanova v. Amilus Inc." on Justia Law

Klaudio Sterkaj was charged with transporting aliens within the United States after being stopped by the New York State Police while driving two Albanian citizens who had entered the U.S. illegally. He waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the charge. The government recommended a sentence of 6 to 12 months, while the U.S. Probation Office suggested 0 to 6 months. However, the District Court imposed a 24-month sentence, citing Sterkaj's refusal to cooperate with the government as a factor.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York adopted the Probation Office's findings but varied upward from the recommended sentence due to Sterkaj's lack of cooperation. Sterkaj's counsel objected to the sentence as being outside the guidelines, preserving the argument for appeal. Sterkaj then appealed the sentence, arguing that the District Court committed procedural error by considering his refusal to cooperate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's decision to increase Sterkaj's sentence based on his refusal to cooperate was procedurally unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that under United States v. Stratton, a district court may not increase a defendant's sentence due to their refusal to cooperate. The Court rejected the government's argument that intervening Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on Stratton, maintaining that Stratton remains binding precedent.The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence component of Sterkaj's judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing by a different judge to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Sterkaj" on Justia Law

Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that members of a rival political party attacked him twice due to his political activities and that a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail him, and threw him out of the police station when he tried to report the attacks.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Singh-Kar’s application, finding that his testimony regarding a single incident of police misconduct was insufficient to establish that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The IJ also found inconsistencies between Singh-Kar’s application and his testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Singh-Kar’s evidence was insufficient. The BIA also noted that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that Singh-Kar’s testimony about a single incident of police misconduct and general country conditions evidence did not compel a different result. The court also found that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the Second Circuit denied Singh-Kar’s petition for review. View "Singh-Kar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law