Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed the district court's judgment for plaintiffs, finding copyright infringement. Defendants created an Internet platform designed to enable the lawful resale, under the first sale doctrine, of lawfully purchased digital music files, and had hosted resales of such files on the platform.The Second Circuit held that defendants infringed plaintiffs' exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. 106(1) to reproduce their copyrighted works. In this case, the operation of ReDigi version 1.0 in effectuating a resale resulted in the making of at least one unauthorized reproduction. Such unauthorized reproduction violated the right holder's exclusive reproduction rights under section 106(1) and was not excused as fair use. The court declined to make a decision as to whether ReDigi also infringed plaintiffs' exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. 106(3) to distribute their works. View "Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc." on Justia Law

Consumers who purchased Cheez‐It crackers labeled "whole grain" or "made with whole grain," filed a class action complaint against Kellogg, alleging that the whole grain labels were false and misleading in violation of New York and California consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The Second Circuit vacated, holding that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint because, under the proper standards for reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the whole grain labels would lead a reasonable consumer to believe, incorrectly, that the grain in whole grain Cheez‐Its was wholly or predominantly whole grain. In this case, the whole grain claims failed to communicate that the quantity of enriched white flour exceeded the quantity of whole grain. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mantikas v. Kellogg Company" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when they were coerced by New York City officials into signing settlement agreements waiving various constitutional rights in order to avoid eviction from their businesses and residences. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the settlement agreements were "so-ordered" by judges in the state-court system.The court held that the district court's Rooker-Feldman ruling was erroneous because plaintiffs' alleged injuries were merely ratified by the state-court judgments rather than caused by them. In this case, plaintiffs were attempting to remedy an alleged injury caused when, prior to any judicial action, they were coerced to settle, not an injury that flowed from a state-court judgment. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Cho v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Guided by its recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), the Second Circuit concluded that the phrase "controlled substance" as used in the 2014 Guidelines' definition of "felony drug trafficking offense" refers exclusively to those substances controlled under federal law. The court also held that the Arizona statute that defendant was convicted of was broader than corresponding federal law because it included substances not listed by the federal Controlled Substances Act. In this case, defendant's Arizona conviction did not qualify as a felony trafficking offense under USSG 2L1.2. Therefore, the district court procedurally erred in sentencing defendant. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their action against fiduciaries of IBM's employee stock option plan (ESOP), claiming that defendants violated their duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to manage the ESOP's assets prudently. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment against plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs plausibly pleaded a duty‐of‐prudence claim even under the stricter "could not have concluded" test used by the district court. In this case, a prudent fiduciary in the Plan defendants' position could not have concluded that corrective disclosure would do more harm than good. View "Jander v. International" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Fund's claims against the DOE for delinquent withdrawal liability payments under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Agreements Act (MPPAA). The court held that the DOE had no obligation to contribute to the Fund under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) nor its transportation contracts that would render it an employer for the purposes of the MPPAA. Furthermore, the Fund did not adequately plead that the DOE and each of the Contractors were a single employer, and thus the DOE was not bound by the contractors' CBAs as a single employer. Finally, the DOE had no obligation to contribute under 29 U.S.C. 1392(a)(1) and (a)(2). View "Division 1181 A.T.U -- New York Employees Pension Fund v. City of New York Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Defendant, a police officer, tased a student at the American School for the Deaf after giving the student warnings that he would be tased if he did not follow the officer's instructions. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that, given the undisputed facts, his conduct complied with clearly established law. In this case, the student was a threat to himself and others, and the officer had a reasonable basis to believe that his instructions and warnings were being conveyed to the student by faculty and the student was ignoring them. View "Muschette v. Gionfriddo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial after defendant was convicted of importing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. The court held that the Government's pre-trial disclosure violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A). In this case, the Government's disclosure during an initial inspection misled the defense into forgoing a pretrial motion to suppress the statement. Furthermore, defendant suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the violation. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Vinas" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights after he filed a report that a fellow sergeant in the Sheriff's Department had misused a digital repository of criminal justice information, and infringed his right to intimate familial association with his sister.The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that it was clearly established law that defendant's speech constituted a matter of public concern. The court also held that defendant failed to allege any facts that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that defendants intentionally interfered with defendant's relationship with his sister. View "Gorman v. Rensselaer County" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 240 month sentence after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. The court held that, although defendant's plea agreement contained an appellate waiver, the plea agreement was not supported by consideration and the court declined to enforce it to bar defendant's appeal. On the merits, the court held that the district court did not commit procedural error when it refused to apply a 3‐level reduction under USSG 2X1.1(b)(2) for a conspiracy that ripened into a substantially completed offense or came close enough to fruition. Furthermore, defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor along with other sentencing factors. View "United States v. Lutchman" on Justia Law