Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in an action brought by laundromat workers against their employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The day before the final pretrial conference and one week prior to the first day of trial, the district court sua sponte, and without notice to the parties or any opportunity to be heard, issued an order revoking its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, vacating the trial, and dismissing the case. The court held that the district court committed three errors where it acted sua sponte without affording the parties notice and an opportunity; it impugned, on the record, plaintiffs' counsel's motives without affording any notice about this assessment of counsel's conduct or any opportunity to explain himself; and its analysis of the factors considered under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c) for determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was inadequate. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lopez Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss two counts of an indictment charging him with federal-program embezzlement. Defendant, a former New York State Senator, allegedly embezzled funds from escrow accounts that he oversaw in his capacity as a referee for foreclosure actions. The court agreed with the government that the district court erred by concluding pretrial, as a matter of law, that defendant necessarily formed the fraudulent intent required for the charged embezzlements -- and thus completed those embezzlements -- once he failed to remit the funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court made a premature factual determination regarding the time at which defendant, if guilty, formed the requisite fraudulent intent. The court reinstated the two federal-program embezzlement counts and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Sampson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice and making false statements to federal agents. Defendant, a former New York State Senator, was convicted of crimes related to his efforts to use his position in the Senate to provide a local businessman with special favors. Defendant provided the businessman with these favors in exchange for a loan that was given to defendant to reimburse funds that he had embezzled, but that he could not repay.The court held that United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991), barred the government from prosecuting an individual under 18 U.S.C. 1503(a) for intimidating and threatening witnesses or corruptly persuading witnesses to recant their testimony. However, these cases did not bar the government from prosecuting an individual under section 1503(a) for an inchoate endeavor to witness tamper. The court also held that the district court did effectively instruct the jury on whether defendant willfully caused an obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. 2; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for making a false statement; the district court district court did not abuse its discretion—or violate the Confrontation Clause—in either of defendant's challenged evidentiary rulings; and defendant's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Sampson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging that defendants conspired to boycott Anderson and drive it out of business, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court reviewed the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances and under the "tends to exclude" standard under Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986), and held that the district court correctly ruled that Anderson failed to offer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendants entered into such an unlawful agreement. In this case, defendants refused to pay Anderson's proposed delivery surcharge and found other wholesalers to deliver their magazines. The court also held that the district court correctly ruled that defendants did not suffer an antitrust injury and thus lacked antitrust standing to pursue counterclaims. View "Anderson News, LLC v. American Media, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his right to due process had been violated when fabricated evidence was used against him in a state criminal proceeding and alleging a claim of malicious prosecution. The claims stemmed from the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in the City of Troy, New York, where several individuals associated with the Democratic and Working Families Parties forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots in order to affect the outcome of that primary. Plaintiff approved the forged applications but claimed he did know that they had been falsified. Plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury but subsequently acquitted.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that plaintiff's due process claim was time-barred because it was filed beyond the applicable limitations period. The court also held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity on plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. View "McDonough v. Smith" on Justia Law

NCUA, an independent federal agency responsible for regulating and insuring federal credit unions, liquidated five corporate credit unions and succeeded to ownership of their assets, including residential mortgage-backed securities trusts (RMBS Trusts). NCUA subsequently brought common law and statutory claims against the trustees of the RMBS Trusts. The district court twice dismissed the derivative claims and subsequently denied NCUA's motion for leave to supplement its Second Amended Complaint (SAC).The Second Circuit followed the plain language of the contracts under which NCUA transferred the RMBS Trust certificates, and held that the district court correctly found that NCUA lacked derivative standing to bring claims based on those certificates. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied NCUA's motion for leave to supplement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Credit Union Administration Board v. US Bank National Association" on Justia Law

Marcel filed suit against Lucky Brand under the Lanham Act for infringing on Marcel's "Get Lucky" trademark through its use of "Lucky" on its merchandise. Marcel also alleged that Lucky Brand did so in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the parties. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Marcel released its claims through a 2003 settlement agreement that resolved an earlier substantially similar litigation between the parties. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that res judicata precluded Lucky Brand from raising its release defense in this case. The court held that under certain conditions parties may be barred by claim preclusion from litigating defenses that they could have asserted in an earlier action, and that the conditions here warranted application of that defense preclusion principle. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Marcel Fashions Group, Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence for theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641. The Second Circuit held that defendant did not waive her right of appeal; the district court was not permitted to order restitution for property stolen outside the limitation period because defendant did not consent to pay such restitution; and violations of section 641 did not constitute continuing offenses, rendering her liable for restitution for funds embezzled outside the limitation period. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for determination of the proper restitution amount within the limitation period. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Best execution claims alleging misrepresentations or omissions relating to: (1) a broker's receipt of "kickbacks" from trading venues; and (2) the execution of trades so as to take advantage of such arrangements, satisfy the third element of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), by alleging securities claims based on fraudulent conduct.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action alleging that defendant violated its duty of best execution. The court held that the claims were precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). In this case, plaintiff filed a covered class action based on state law claims involving covered securities; the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that defendant made material misrepresentations and omissions that were designed to induce clients to execute non‐directed, standing limit orders with defendant even though it allegedly had no intention of fulfilling its purported fiduciary obligations; and defendant's alleged fraudulent conduct arose in connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities. View "Rayner v. E*TRADE Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Vermont's campaign finance law, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2901 et seq., which imposes additional restrictions on candidates who choose to receive public campaign finance grants, did not violate the First Amendment. Former and prospective candidates for public office in Vermont and a political party filed suit challenging provisions that prohibit publicly financed candidates from accepting contributions or making expenditures beyond the amount of the grants and announcing their candidacies or raising or expending substantial funds before a certain date.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the candidates' claims for failure to state a claim and held that, because candidates may freely choose either to accept public campaign funds and the limitations thereon or to engage in unlimited private fundraising, those limitations did not violate First Amendment rights. The court also found that the candidates were not entitled to a fee award because they could not be considered prevailing parties. View "Corren v. Donovan" on Justia Law