Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction on five counts of drug and gun related offenses. The court held that the district court correctly determined that there was no unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the undisputed evidence showed that defendant expressly consented to the officers entering his apartment and the consent implicitly extended to the police dog; given that the officers and dog were lawfully in the apartment, defendant had no legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in airborne particles bearing odors; and thus the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.The court also held that defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to equal protection and trial by a jury was not violated where any procedural error in dismissing Juror No. 8 was harmless. In this case, given the district court's permissible finding that Juror No. 8 was unable to read or write, the conclusion that he was not qualified to serve as a juror was correct. Furthermore, had Juror No. 8 been fully vetted during voir dire, leading to his timely disqualification, the jury would have included just one black juror, as it eventually did. View "United States v. Iverson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment after defendant pleaded guilty to tax evasion and to corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of the internal revenue laws. Defendant, the founder of an investment management firm, was sentenced to pay restitution of $37 million, serve a 70‐month term of imprisonment, and pay a $10 million fine. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in calculating the fine range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines; defendant was given adequate opportunity to inform the district court of his financial condition and ability to pay a fine; and imposing a $10 million fine was within the district court’s discretion. Defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending this appeal was moot. View "United States v. Zukerman" on Justia Law

OBC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Excelled in a trademark dispute over use of the brand-name ROGUE on t-shirts. The Second Circuit held that Excelled failed to show entitlement to summary judgment dismissing OBC's trademark infringement counterclaims. In this case, Excelled failed to meet its burden of proving that OBC's delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and caused prejudice to Excelled. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Excelled, dismissing OBC's counterclaims, alleging trademark infringement, false designation, and unfair competition.The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Excelled on its infringement claims and the district court's denial of OBC's motion for summary judgment dismissing these claims. The court also reversed the award of injunctive relief and damages and fees against OBC. Finally, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Excelled on OBC's trademark cancellation counterclaim because the district court erroneously relied on determinations of disputed facts about the continuity of Excelled's sales that usurped the province of the jury. View "Excelled Sheepskin & Leather Coat Corp. v. Oregon Brewing" on Justia Law

When a debt collector misreports a debt obligation to a consumer that she no longer owes, and requests payment on that debt, the consumer plausibly alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f, notwithstanding the fact that the debt collector advised the consumer of her right to dispute the debt as required by section 1692g, and that the consumer did not exercise that right.     The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when defendant used false representations and unfair practices in seeking payment on an already settled debt. The court held that plaintiff alleged plausible FDCPA claims. In this case, the inclusion of section 1692g notice did not prevent plaintiff from plausibly pleading that, on a least sophisticated consumer standard, defendant's debt communication was misleading and unfair. The court explained that the FDCPA was a strict liability statute, and a consumer was not required to plead mens rea to state plausible FDCPA claims. Instead, a debt collector's intent was relevant as an element of the affirmative defense afforded by section 1692k(c). View "Vangorden v. Second Round, LP" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's two pretrial orders suppressing wiretap evidence and GPS data. The court held that the untainted portions of the First Wiretap Affidavit made ample showings to support the authorizing judge's determinations of both probable cause and necessity, and the inclusion of the omitted information as to Previous Authorizations would not have diminished those showings; the district court clearly erred in finding that the mistakes by the wiretap applicant were intentional rather than inadvertent; and the district court failed to apply the test established by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), where such evidence should not be suppressed because the mistakes were not material.The court also held that the GPS monitoring of defendant was permissible because it was reasonably related to his parole officers' duties; defendant, as a parolee who chose to be placed on GPS monitoring rather than be charged with parole violations and possibly returned to prison, and who acknowledged that the monitoring would occur 24 hours a day, seven days a week, until the end of his period of supervision, had no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by such monitoring; and thus the GPS generated data should not have been suppressed. View "United States v. Lambus" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioners' motions to suppress evidence relating to their immigration status obtained by law enforcement agents during a nighttime search of their residence. The court held that petitioners made a sufficient showing of an egregious constitutional violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing and those facts could support a basis for excluding the evidence. In this case, petitioners presented substantial evidence that the search was improperly based on race; petitioners have raised fair questions as to whether a warrant existed and, if so, whether the search exceeded its scope; and petitioners presented sufficient evidence that, if credited, would show the agents engaged in severe conduct. View "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of New York City Police Officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in an action alleging violation of protestors' constitutional rights when Officers fully detained them during a protest outside the Sheraton Hotel where President Obama was attending a fundraising dinner. The court held that there were material disputes of fact that did not allow the district court to conclude as a matter of law that the protesters' two‐hour detention was permissible under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Nonetheless, the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity where the district court erred in concluding that the Officers' subjective intent in temporarily detaining the protesters was relevant to whether the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that reasonable officers could have believed that the approximately two‐hour detention of the protesters in response to concerns for the President's security was justified in light of then established law. Finally, because the Officers could have reasonably believed the temporary detention was lawful, they were also entitled to qualified immunity on the protesters' First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "Berg v. N.Y.C. Police Commissoner" on Justia Law

Johnson & Johnson appealed the district court's certification of a class of consumers who purchased baby products in an action alleging that the company violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), as well as other state consumer protection laws, when it labeled its baby products as "natural" when they were not. The Second Circuit held that, although plaintiff had Article III standing, it was not clear on the record whether the district court undertook the requisite analysis of the material differences in the state laws at issue before concluding that their similarities predominated over their differences. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of certification and remanded for further proceedings. View "Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., in connection with their attempt to initiate foreclosure proceedings on his home. The court held that, although the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims on the ground that the enforcement of a security interest through foreclosure proceedings was not debt collection for purposes of the Act, defendant failed to plausibly allege that defendants violated the FDCPA. The court held that the mortgage foreclosure, at least under the circumstances here, constituted debt collection under the Act. However, the court also held that defendantsʹ identification of Green Tree as the creditor was not deceptive as to the nature or legal status of plaintiffʹs debt, nor would it have prevented the least sophisticated consumer from responding to or disputing the action. Finally, plaintiff's 15 U.S.C. 1692g claim was properly dismissed because the Certificate of Merit fell within section 1692g(d)ʹs pleading exclusion, and was therefore not an initial communication, because defendants were legally obligated to file this document with the foreclosure complaint. View "Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law

A "controlled substance" for purposes of USSG 4B1.2(b) referred exclusively to substances controlled by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). USSG 2K2.1 adopts the definition of a "controlled substance offense" in section 4B1.2(b). The Second Circuit held that defendant's prior drug conviction under New York Penal Law 220.31 did not qualify as a predicate controlled substance offense. Because defendant's prior state conviction was for violating an indivisible statute, the categorical approach applies, and because the state statute of conviction criminalizes the sale of a substance not criminalized under federal law, the state statute does not categorically match the federal crime. Therefore, defendant's prior New York state drug conviction did not subject him to a heightened base offense under USSG 2K2.1(a). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law