Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of EPA's final rule promulgated under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, establishing requirements for cooling water intake structures at existing facilities, as well as a biological opinion jointly issued by the Services at the close of formal Endangered Species Act consultation on the rule. The court held that the final rule and the biological opinion were based on reasonable interpretations of the applicable statutes and sufficiently supported the factual record. The court also held that EPA gave adequate notice of its rulemaking. The court considered petitioners' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit. View "Cooling Water Intake Structure Coal. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal because his prior state conviction for sale of marijuana in the third degree constituted an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court held that New York Penal Law 221.45 was not punishable as a federal felony by the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, NYPL 221.45 explicitly extends to the distribution of less than an ounce of marijuana without remuneration, and was thus punishable as a federal misdemeanor. Therefore, petitioner's crime of conviction was not categorically an aggravated felony. View "Hylton v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action brought by plaintiff against Midland, alleging that they violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The court held that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Midland, because there were no genuine questions of fact as to whether a Midland employee purposefully overwhelmed him with harassing questions or misled him with her questions in violation of section 1692e of the FDCPA. Summary judgment was also properly granted as to plaintiff's claim that Midland violated section 1692e(8), which required debt collectors to communicate that a disputed debt was disputed. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning plaintiff's attorney for misleading the court during the initial status conference, plaintiff for disregarding a protective order, and both plaintiff and the law firm for needlessly multiplying proceedings. View "Huebner v. Midland Credit Management" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. This case, in which oral argument was heard, was held in abeyance pending decision first in United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2017), then in United States v. Morales, 709 F. App'x 93 (2d Cir. 2018). The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. The court also held that the district court's calculation of defendant's base offense level was not erroneous where the New York offense of robbery in the second degree constituted a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines before August 1, 2016. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for prostituting two minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591, and for employing a minor in the creation of a sexually explicit video, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251. The court held that section 1591 was not unconstitutionally vague and rejected defendant's overbreadth challenge; the statutory language in section 1591 requires that the defendant know or recklessly disregard the fact that a minor was younger than 18 years old; and it did not mandate, to support the increased punishment in subsection (b), that the government prove that a defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that a minor was under the age of fourteen.  The court rejected defendant's venue challenge to his conviction under section 2251 where the jury was entitled to find that venue for prosecution lay in the Eastern District of New York. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Leopard Marine sought a declaratory judgment that a maritime lien held by Easy Street, a Cypriot fuel supply company, has been extinguished by laches. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to decline to abstain on grounds of international comity and issued a declaration that laches barred exercise of the lien. The court held that the federal courts have jurisdiction to declare a maritime lien unenforceable, even where the vessel was not present in the district, so long as its owner consents to adjudication of rights in the lien. In this case, the court held that abstention on the basis of international comity was not required and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that laches barred exercise of the lien. View "Leopard Marine & Trading, Ltd. v. Easy Street Ltd." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the order of the district court to the extent it denied petitioner's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court held that petitioner's claim did not rely on the rule announced in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that New York third‐degree robbery was a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because his sentence was clearly enhanced pursuant to the force clause of the ACCA. View "Massey v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed a petition seeking leave to subpoena the defendant law firm, Shell's United States counsel, for documents belonging to a foreign company, Royal Dutch Shell. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to grant a 28 U.S.C. 1782 petition where the documents sought from a foreign company's U.S. counsel would be unreachable in a foreign country. The court cautioned in Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997), that an order compelling American counsel to deliver documents that would not be discoverable abroad, and that are in counsel's hands solely because they were sent to the United States for the purpose of American litigation, as in this case, would jeopardize the policy of promoting open communications between lawyers and their clients. View "Kiobel v. Cravath, Swain & Moore, LLP" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Defendant Emmons and Wallace's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the corresponding entry of judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on his claims against defendants for tortious interference with contract under New York law. The court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to have found at least two elements of plaintiffs claims where the jury's intent finding that defendants purposefully targeted particular contracts was wholly without support, and there was no evidence that anyone stopped performing under a specific contract because of anything said or done by defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendants. View "Conte v. Emmons" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) pursuant to the act of state doctrine.The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) where Argentina asserted control over its stake in YPF via expropriation; Argentina incurred a separate commercial obligation under the bylaws to make a tender offer for the remainder of YPFʹs outstanding shares; and Peterson claimed it was injured by repudiation of that commercial obligation. Therefore, the repudiation was an act separate and apart from Argentinaʹs expropriation of Repsolʹs shares, and Peterson's action against Argentina fell within the direct-effects clause of the FSIA. Petersenʹs claims against YPF also fell within the direct‐effect clause of the FSIAʹs commercial activity exception. The court declined to reach the portion of this appeal challenging the district court's ruling on defendants' act of state defense. View "Petersen Energia Inversora, SAU v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law