Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AEI filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that Lincoln was barred from challenging the validity of a life insurance policy because the two‐year contestability period had lapsed. The district court granted AEI's motion for summary judgment. The Second Circuit held that the contract did not contain a choice-of-law provision and thus New York conflict-of-law rules governed the dispute. The court held that, because those rules instructed the courts to look to the "center of gravity" of the events at issue to determine which state's substantive law applied, and the center of gravity in this case was New York, New York's substantive law applied. In this case, applying New York's substantive incontestability law barred Lincolnʹs challenges to the policy. View "AEI Life, LLC v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits and held that differentiating between two classes of legal permanent residents—those who seek a waiver from within the United States and those who seek a waiver at the border—in the 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) waiver process does not violate equal protection. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude and constituting an aggravated felony. In this opinion, the court held that the agency's interpretation of the waiver provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily distinguishing between aliens who seek a waiver of inadmissibility while within the United States from those entering the United States at its borders. View "Seepersad v. Sessions" on Justia Law

ICA insures workers compensation claims. The Underwriters provide ICA with reinsurance under treaties, which require that disputes be adjudicated by a three-member arbitration panel: one party-appointed arbitrator for each party, and the neutral umpire. Each party bears the expense of its own arbitrator and is permitted to engage in ex parte discussion with its party-appointed arbitrators during discovery. Underwriters declined ICA's request for coverage. ICA demanded arbitration and appointed Campos as its arbitrator. At the organizational meeting, each arbitrator was asked to disclose pre-existing or concurrent relationships with a party. Campos disclaimed any appreciable link to ICA. Before the conclusion of the arbitration, Campos let pass several opportunities for additional disclosures. The district court subsequently found that Campos’s relationships with ICA’s representatives were considerably more extensive than disclosed. The district court vacated the panel's award of damages under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The Second Circuit vacated, holding that a party seeking to vacate an award must sustain a higher burden to prove evident partiality on the part of an arbitrator who is appointed by a party and who is expected to espouse the perspective of the appointing party. The district court weighed the conduct of ICA’s party-appointed arbitrator under the standard governing neutral arbitrators. An undisclosed relationship between a party and its party-appointed arbitrator constitutes evident partiality, such that vacatur is appropriate, if the relationship violates the contractual requirement of disinterestedness or prejudicially affects the award. View "Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds of London v. Insurance Company of the Americas" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs. The court certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals and received two answers to those questions. The state court answered that no particularized inquiry was necessary to determine whether public benefit corporations should be treated like the State for purposes of capacity. The state court also held that a claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice. Therefore, the court held that the BPCA, like any other state entity, may challenge the constitutionality of Jimmy Nolan’s Law only if it qualifies for one of the "narrow" exceptions to the capacity-to-sue rule. In this case, no such exception applied. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of a musical group called "Sly Slick & Wicked," filed suit alleging that Dynatone and others collected royalties from the sampling of their song, "Sho' Nuff" in 2013 and that plaintiffs were entitled to those royalty payments. The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that a repudiation of plaintiffs' claims with respect to the original terms constituted a repudiation of the renewal terms. In this case, plaintiffs did not have reasonable notice that defendants had filed a registration in the capacity of employer for hire. Therefore, the registration did not constitute effective repudiation, triggering an obligation for plaintiffs to bring suit. Accordingly, the court vacated this portion of the judgment. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law accounting claim for failure to allege a fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings as to plaintiffs' renewal term copyright claims. View "Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit set aside defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that the government did not waive arguments based on the former "residual clause" of USSG 4B1.2(a)(2); the generic definition of "manslaughter" included the unlawful killing of another human being recklessly; manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law 125.20(1), was narrower than the generic definition of "manslaughter"; and the district court erred when it found that defendant's prior conviction for manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law 125.20(1), did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under Application Note 1 of the commentary to Section 4B1.2 of the November 1, 2015 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for a writ of error coram nobis where petitioner sought vacatur of his prior conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, as well as 21 counts of mail fraud, based on his conduct in the rare-coins business. Petitioner contended that newly discovered evidence would undermine the reliability of expert testimony submitted against him at trial. The court held that, given the strength of evidence of defendant's fraudulent activity in support of his sale of coins, the issue he raised as to the government expert's method of valuation did not show circumstances compelling grant of the writ to achieve justice. View "Du Purton v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit remanded the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court failed to state whether it had made the requisite initial determination that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction. The court found that the record suggested that the district court erred either by failing to determine defendant's eligibility or by miscalculating the revised Guidelines range, which prejudiced defendant. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit remanded the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court failed to state whether it had made the requisite initial determination that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction. The court found that the record suggested that the district court erred either by failing to determine defendant's eligibility or by miscalculating the revised Guidelines range, which prejudiced defendant. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Forcing someone to withdraw money from an ATM and then stealing the money has a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. The court held that defendant's robbery fell within the scope of the Hobbs Act because he targeted the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law