Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of claims alleging that his employer, the City, retaliated against him after he filed a discrimination complaint, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. The Second Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. 1983 provided the sole cause of action against state actors alleged to have violated section 1981. The court construed defendant's claims as section 1983 claims and held that he failed to allege a policy or custom of misconduct, as was necessary to assert liability against a municipality. The court also held that defendant could not avoid Title VII's exhaustion requirement by asserting retaliation for filing a claim of discrimination that he failed to pursue. However, in regard to claims that plaintiff properly exhausted, he has adequately alleged retaliation following both of his EEOC complaints. Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal of those claims. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Duplan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of claims alleging that his employer, the City, retaliated against him after he filed a discrimination complaint, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. The Second Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. 1983 provided the sole cause of action against state actors alleged to have violated section 1981. The court construed defendant's claims as section 1983 claims and held that he failed to allege a policy or custom of misconduct, as was necessary to assert liability against a municipality. The court also held that defendant could not avoid Title VII's exhaustion requirement by asserting retaliation for filing a claim of discrimination that he failed to pursue. However, in regard to claims that plaintiff properly exhausted, he has adequately alleged retaliation following both of his EEOC complaints. Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal of those claims. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Duplan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to violate and one count of violating, attempting to violate, and aiding and abetting the violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2), (c). The court held that the AECA did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the executive; the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the conduct required to find "willfulness" and "conscious avoidance"; the district court did not violate defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment and the Court Interpreters Act (CIA), 28 U.S.C. 1827–28, to waive the assistance of an interpreter; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that defendant be provided the assistance of a court‐appointed Mandarin interpreter throughout trial. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to violate and one count of violating, attempting to violate, and aiding and abetting the violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2), (c). The court held that the AECA did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the executive; the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the conduct required to find "willfulness" and "conscious avoidance"; the district court did not violate defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment and the Court Interpreters Act (CIA), 28 U.S.C. 1827–28, to waive the assistance of an interpreter; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring that defendant be provided the assistance of a court‐appointed Mandarin interpreter throughout trial. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court lawfully denied defendant's motion for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses under the Hyde Amendment of 1997. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that the standard of review applicable to the appeal of a district court's denial of a defendant's application for attorney's fees and other litigation expenses pursuant to the Hyde Amendment was abuse of discretion. The court adopted the reasoning by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 905–06 (5th Cir. 2000). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's application and concluding that the position of the United States was not vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, since no controlling precedent foreclosed the government's theory of prosecution and some language in the court's case law arguably supported it, and since defendant's other arguments against the government's case, including those not expressly addressed above were meritless. View "United States v. Larson" on Justia Law

Larson was involved with—and later convicted of crimes related to—the organization of fraudulent tax shelters. The IRS then required organizers/promoters to register tax shelters not later than the day of the first offering for sale, 26 U.S.C. 6111(a). Organizers/promoters who failed to register were subject to a penalty of the greater of one percent of the aggregate amount invested in the tax shelter, or $500. Eight years after the IRS notified Larson that he was under investigation, it informed him that it considered him an organizer with a duty to register and was subject to penalties of $160,232,0261 for failure to do so. The IRS Office of Appeals reduced the penalties to $67,661,349, stating that Larson would need to pay the remaining penalty and file a Claim for Refund if he wanted to contest the assessment. Larson paid $1,432,735 and filed his Refund Claim. The IRS rejected Larson’s claim for failure to pay the entire amount. Larson filed suit. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that because Larson had not paid the assessed penalties in full, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court agreed, concluding that application of the full-payment rule did not violate Larson’s due process rights. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the full‐payment rule applies to Larson’s section 6707 penalties and that his tax refund, due process, Administrative Procedure Act, and Eighth Amendment claims were properly dismissed. View "Larson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing of the original panel decision in United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2017). Petitioner argued that the original panel erroneously ruled that his statute-of-limitations defense had been waived for failure to assert it at or before his trial and claimed that he had in fact raised the defense prior to trial by joining in pretrial motions asserted by a codefendant. The court held that the codefendant's motion that petitioner purported to join asserted a statute-of-limitations defense that relied on the personal conduct of that codefendant, did not mention the conduct of petitioner, did not assert the principles on which petitioner sought to rely, and asserted premises disavowed by petitioner in his appeal. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the parties' dispute over adjudicating rights associated with The Sloppy Tuna, a restaurant in Montauk, NY. On appeal, Montauk challenged the district court's dismissal of its Lanham Act claims and motion for preliminary injunction under the first-filed rule. Montauk also challenged the district court's order to pay costs, including attorneys' fees, that Associates incurred in responding to a previous action Montauk brought against Associates in Georgia state court that Montauk voluntarily dismissed. The Second Circuit held that, because New York law allowed for derivative representation on the facts presented, the district court correctly rejected Montauk's request to hold Associates in default. Nonetheless, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the complaint and preliminary injunction motion in favor of a first-filed federal Georgia action because the Georgia suit was transferred to the Eastern District of New York, so the reasoning behind the first-filed ruling no longer applied. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), including attorneys' fees, incurred by Associates in the Georgia state action. View "Montauk U.S.A., LLC v. 148 South Emerson Associates LLC" on Justia Law

Corsair obtained a $5,443,171.33 judgment against the defendants. Corsair learned that one of the defendants had a contract with National Resources, entitling the defendant to a payment of more than $3,000,000 and obtained a writ of execution.  Corsair engaged Connecticut State Marshall Pesiri, who successfully served the writ. National Resources ignored it, relinquishing $2,308,504 to Corsair only after Corsair instituted and won a subsequent turnover action. Perisi sued, seeking a statutory commission. The Second Circuit concluded that Connecticut state law was insufficiently developed for the court to answer the question raised on appeal. The court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court responded that Marshal Pesiri was entitled to a 15 percent fee under CONN. GEN. STAT. 52‐8 261(a)(F). It does not matter that the writ was ignored and that the monies that were the subject of the writ were procured only after the judgment creditor, not the marshal, pursued further enforcement proceedings in the courts. The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s fee award in the amount of $346,275.60. View "Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri" on Justia Law

Corsair obtained a $5,443,171.33 judgment against the defendants. Corsair learned that one of the defendants had a contract with National Resources, entitling the defendant to a payment of more than $3,000,000 and obtained a writ of execution.  Corsair engaged Connecticut State Marshall Pesiri, who successfully served the writ. National Resources ignored it, relinquishing $2,308,504 to Corsair only after Corsair instituted and won a subsequent turnover action. Perisi sued, seeking a statutory commission. The Second Circuit concluded that Connecticut state law was insufficiently developed for the court to answer the question raised on appeal. The court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court responded that Marshal Pesiri was entitled to a 15 percent fee under CONN. GEN. STAT. 52‐8 261(a)(F). It does not matter that the writ was ignored and that the monies that were the subject of the writ were procured only after the judgment creditor, not the marshal, pursued further enforcement proceedings in the courts. The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s fee award in the amount of $346,275.60. View "Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Pesiri" on Justia Law