Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

by
The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. The court held that the REAL ID Act was ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In this case, although the IJ determined that petitioner was credible, petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence. View "Wei Sun v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum. The BIA interpreted the corroboration provision of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005), as not requiring an IJ to give a petitioner specific notice of the evidence needed to meet his burden of proof, or to grant a continuance before ruling to give a petitioner an opportunity to gather corroborating evidence. The court held that the REAL ID Act was ambiguous on this point, and that the BIA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In this case, although the IJ determined that petitioner was credible, petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof because of an absence of corroborating evidence. View "Wei Sun v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of NASL's motion for a preliminary injunction seeking a Division II designation pending the resolution of its antitrust case against USSF. Applying the heightened standard applicable to mandatory preliminary injunctions, the court held that NASL failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on the merits of its antitrust claim against USSF under 15 U.S.C. 1. In this case, even assuming that NASL's allegations showed a conspiracy, NASL failed to show that the agreement at issue was an unreasonable restraint on competition under section 1. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings on the merits of NASL's claims. View "North American Soccer League, LLC v. United States Soccer Federation, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Schwab filed suit seeking to recover for harm allegedly resulting from a conspiracy among major banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The district court dismissed Schwab's state law claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed both federal and certain state-law claims for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit vacated portions of the district court's judgment that dismissed Schwab's state-law claims concerning products sold in California for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissed Schwab's Securities Exchange Act claims premised on misrepresentations and omissions that induced the purchase of floating-rate instruments on or after April 27, 2008; and dismissed Schwab's unjust enrichment claims against counterparties or a wrongdoer's affiliates as time-barred. The court affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking
by
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that the district court correctly determined that defendant was ineligible for a sentence reduction, where there was no change to the bottom-line, final range that was the basis for defendant's sentence because of the operation of another guideline -- the grouping rules provided in USSG 3D1.4. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that USSG 1B1.10(b)(1) unambiguously did not support defendant's interpretation, and thus the rule of lenity did not apply. View "United States v. Carosella" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
DRK, a purported assignee of photographers' rights to sue for infringement, filed suit seeking statutory damages from Wiley, a licensee, for exceeding its licensed use of certain photographs as to which DRK non‐exclusively represents the photographers. The Second Circuit invoked its precedent in Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment, Co., 697 7 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982), and held that as a matter of law the Copyright Act did not permit prosecution of infringement suits by assignees of the bare right to sue that were not and have never been a legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright. In this case, the court held that DRK was not and has never been the holder of an exclusive right in the photographs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo" on Justia Law

by
21 U.S.C. 853(n) proceedings are civil and thus governed by the time limits in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which are jurisdictional because they implement the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2107. The clock starts to run at the issuance of the first order and does not reset at the issuance of the second order. In this case, the Second Circuit held that appellants did not file their notice of appeal within sixty days of the district court's order, as required by Rule 4(a). Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Ohle" on Justia Law

by
Citizens United filed suit challenging the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General's office that required non-profit organizations to disclose their donors on a yearly basis. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims, except the due process claim, for failure to state a claim. The court found that the mere requirement on a tax‐exempt organization to disclose its donor list to a state's authority charged with regulating non‐profits did not impermissibly chill speech or assembly rights. Furthermore, it did not operate as a prior restraint on non‐profits' solicitation of donations. Finally, the court reversed the dismissal of the due process claim for lack of ripeness and remanded so that the claim could be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a valid claim. View "Citizens United v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law

by
In the underlying case, employees of SAIC, the lead contractor on New York's CityTime project, were convicted of conspiring to obtain bribes and kickbacks from one of SAIC's subcontractors. Federal, the insurer of SAIC, petitioned for mandamus relief to challenge the district court's denial of its application for restitution under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The Second Circuit denied the petition and held that, assuming Federal could overcome various procedural obstacles, its petition would nonetheless fail on the merits because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that SAIC's own criminal conduct precluded it—and, by extension, Federal—from obtaining restitution. The court vacated the district court's order summarily dismissing Federal's petition in an SAIC employee's forfeiture proceedings, holding that the district court failed to make adequate factual findings regarding whether SAIC's allegedly unclean hands should bar it from obtaining an equitable remedy, and if such a remedy remained available, whether the property was traceable to bribes and kickbacks actually obtained at SAIC's expense. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Federal Insurance Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
by
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment entered in the stipulated total amount of $100,000,000 following a jury verdict holding that the bank was liable under the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333, for injuries sustained by plaintiffs or their relatives during terrorist attacks in Israel conducted by Hamas. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed on the "international terrorism" element of the ATA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. The court noted that its determination makes it unnecessary for it to decide whether any of the bank's other challenges warrant such relief because the parties have entered into a settlement agreement that forgoes retrial on vacatur and remand in lieu of a specified total money payment to the bellwether plaintiffs. View "Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC" on Justia Law