Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment entered in the stipulated total amount of $100,000,000 following a jury verdict holding that the bank was liable under the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333, for injuries sustained by plaintiffs or their relatives during terrorist attacks in Israel conducted by Hamas. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed on the "international terrorism" element of the ATA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. The court noted that its determination makes it unnecessary for it to decide whether any of the bank's other challenges warrant such relief because the parties have entered into a settlement agreement that forgoes retrial on vacatur and remand in lieu of a specified total money payment to the bellwether plaintiffs. View "Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC" on Justia Law

The public access TV channels in Manhattan are public forums and MCAC's employees were sufficiently alleged to be state actors taking action barred by the First Amendment to prevent dismissal of the claims against MCAC and its employees, but not against the City. In this case, the Second Circuit held that public access channels, authorized by Congress to be "the video equivalent of the speaker's soapbox" and operating under the municipal authority given to MNN in this case, are public forums, and, in the circumstances of this case, MNN and its employees are subject to First Amendment restrictions. In regard to municipal liability, the court held that the complaint did not allege actions by the City that suffice to make it liable for plaintiffs' federal claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a valid claim against the City, reversed as to MCAC and its employees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp." on Justia Law

The public access TV channels in Manhattan are public forums and MCAC's employees were sufficiently alleged to be state actors taking action barred by the First Amendment to prevent dismissal of the claims against MCAC and its employees, but not against the City. In this case, the Second Circuit held that public access channels, authorized by Congress to be "the video equivalent of the speaker's soapbox" and operating under the municipal authority given to MNN in this case, are public forums, and, in the circumstances of this case, MNN and its employees are subject to First Amendment restrictions. In regard to municipal liability, the court held that the complaint did not allege actions by the City that suffice to make it liable for plaintiffs' federal claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a valid claim against the City, reversed as to MCAC and its employees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of the Rensselaer County Jail, filed suit alleging violations of their right to privacy in health information under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030. The district court dismissed all CFAA claims and granted summary judgment to defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CFAA claims, because plaintiffs failed to plead damages. The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the right to privacy in medical records claims, holding that even individuals with non-stigmatizing medical conditions have a right to privacy in their medical records, even if their interest in privacy might be less. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hancock v. County of Rensselaer" on Justia Law

SPV, the assignee of Optimal Strategic, filed suit against UBS and its affiliated entities and individuals (collectively, Access), alleging that UBS and Access aided and abetted the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff by sponsoring and providing support for two European-based feeder funds. The district court subsequently denied SPV's motion to remand the matter to state court and then granted separate motions to dismiss the complaint. The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this appeal; this litigation was "related to" the Madoff/BLMIS bankruptcies; the USB defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the United States to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction; the connections between the USB Defendants, SPV's claims, and its chosen New York forum were too tenuous to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction; and the court rejected SPV's two different theories of proximate cause. View "SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint sua sponte on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff filed the present case after the dismissal of his first case, alleging nearly identical claims with a single additional claim that defendants terminated his employment in retaliation for filing the first case. The court held that the termination claim could have been raised in the prior action and was, and that res judicata precluded plaintiff from asserting the claim in this subsequent action. In this case, the termination claim was reasonably related to the original administrative charge so the exhaustion requirement would not have foreclosed raising the claim added in the first case. Nonetheless, the court also held that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies did not disturb the court's holding that the termination claim was barred by res judicata. View "Soules v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of DC-Rendite's motion for a maritime attachment and garnishment under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. In this classic quasi in rem proceeding, the court held that DC-Rendite's complaint and affidavit did not allege sufficient allegations that identifiable property of defendants, tangible or intangible, was in the hands of garnishees. Even assuming that defendants and garnishees were somehow affiliates or subsidiaries of the same group, it did not follow that there was a specific entitlement of one of the defendants to a debt owed by a garnishee. View "DS-Rendite v. Essar Capital Americas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Stony Brook under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging discrimination and retaliation when he was terminated from his employment as an electrician. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff was an employee of Stony Brook. The court held, according to precedent, that a trial court did not commit error by submitting the question of whether plaintiff was defendant's employee to the jury, whether by general verdict or by special question. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred when it instructed the jury to use the factors in Cmty. for Creative Non‐Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989), to determine whether plaintiff was a Stony Brook employee. The court held that the evidence presented disputed issues of fact regarding several of the Reid factors, and the balancing of those factors and others that pointed both in favor of and against employee status also presented a disputed issue requiring resolution by the fact‐finder. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Knight v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook" on Justia Law

ePRO filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the imposition of discovery sanctions. The Second Circuit found no error in the district court's factual findings and concluded that the monetary sanctions it awarded properly compensated Klipsch for the corrective discovery efforts it undertook with court permission in response to ePRO's misconduct. The court held that discovery sanctions should be commensurate with the costs unnecessarily created by the sanctionable behavior. The court held that a monetary sanction in the amount of the cost of discovery efforts that appeared to be reasonable to undertake ex ante did not become impermissibly punitive simply because those efforts did not ultimately uncover more significant spoliation and fraud, or increase the likely damages in the underlying case. View "Klipsch Group, Inc. v. ePRO E-Commerce Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for five counts of drug-related charges. The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed with prejudice the indictment on all related charges against defendant, holding that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by his nearly seven years of pretrial detention. The court noted that the pretrial detention experienced by defendant appeared to be the longest ever experienced by a defendant in a speedy trial case in the Second Circuit. View "United States v. Tigano" on Justia Law