Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, filed a lawsuit against Defendant Amilus Inc. for willful copyright infringement. Romanova alleged that Amilus published her photograph on its website without authorization. Despite being served, Amilus did not respond or appear in court. Romanova moved for a default judgment, but the district court ordered Amilus to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After receiving no response from Amilus, the court then ordered Romanova to show cause why the use of her photograph did not constitute fair use. The district court ultimately dismissed Romanova’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that Amilus’s use of the photograph was fair use.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Romanova’s claim, finding that the fair use defense was clearly established on the face of the complaint. The court reasoned that Amilus’s publication of the photograph communicated a different message than the original, which justified the fair use defense. Romanova appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in its substantive finding of fair use and in raising the defense sua sponte for a non-appearing defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the district court misunderstood the fair use doctrine, particularly the requirement for a transformative purpose and justification for copying. The appellate court held that Amilus’s use of the photograph did not communicate a different message and lacked any valid justification for copying. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to enter a default judgment in favor of Romanova. View "Romanova v. Amilus Inc." on Justia Law

Klaudio Sterkaj was charged with transporting aliens within the United States after being stopped by the New York State Police while driving two Albanian citizens who had entered the U.S. illegally. He waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the charge. The government recommended a sentence of 6 to 12 months, while the U.S. Probation Office suggested 0 to 6 months. However, the District Court imposed a 24-month sentence, citing Sterkaj's refusal to cooperate with the government as a factor.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York adopted the Probation Office's findings but varied upward from the recommended sentence due to Sterkaj's lack of cooperation. Sterkaj's counsel objected to the sentence as being outside the guidelines, preserving the argument for appeal. Sterkaj then appealed the sentence, arguing that the District Court committed procedural error by considering his refusal to cooperate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's decision to increase Sterkaj's sentence based on his refusal to cooperate was procedurally unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that under United States v. Stratton, a district court may not increase a defendant's sentence due to their refusal to cooperate. The Court rejected the government's argument that intervening Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on Stratton, maintaining that Stratton remains binding precedent.The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence component of Sterkaj's judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing by a different judge to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Sterkaj" on Justia Law

Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that members of a rival political party attacked him twice due to his political activities and that a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail him, and threw him out of the police station when he tried to report the attacks.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Singh-Kar’s application, finding that his testimony regarding a single incident of police misconduct was insufficient to establish that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The IJ also found inconsistencies between Singh-Kar’s application and his testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Singh-Kar’s evidence was insufficient. The BIA also noted that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that Singh-Kar’s testimony about a single incident of police misconduct and general country conditions evidence did not compel a different result. The court also found that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the Second Circuit denied Singh-Kar’s petition for review. View "Singh-Kar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Josue Ortiz, claimed that Detective Mark Stambach fabricated and coerced a confession from him regarding a double homicide in 2004. Ortiz, who suffered from severe mental illness, was subsequently charged and convicted based on this false confession. In 2012, a reinvestigation revealed Ortiz's innocence, leading to the conviction of three other individuals for the murders. Ortiz's conviction was vacated, and he was released in 2014 after over a decade of wrongful imprisonment. A jury found Detective Stambach liable for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and violating Ortiz’s right against self-incrimination, awarding Ortiz $5 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied Detective Stambach’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur. Stambach argued that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find in favor of Ortiz on any of the claims and that the damages awarded were excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings on all three causes of action. The court noted that the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstantial evidence that Detective Stambach fabricated the confession and acted in bad faith. The court also found that the jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages was justified based on the evidence presented at trial. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the jury’s verdict and the damages awarded to Ortiz. View "Ortiz v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

Debtor-Appellant Julia Soussis filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, proposed a repayment plan, and made $362,100 in pre-confirmation payments to the standing trustee. Before the court could confirm the plan, Soussis requested the dismissal of her case. The standing trustee returned most of the payments but retained $20,592 as his percentage fee. Soussis moved for disgorgement of this fee, arguing that the trustee should return all pre-confirmation payments if no plan is confirmed.The Bankruptcy Court denied Soussis’s motion, concluding that the trustee was entitled to keep the percentage fee regardless of plan confirmation. The District Court affirmed this decision, agreeing with the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a standing trustee cannot keep any percentage fee collected from the debtor’s pre-confirmation payments if no plan is confirmed. The court interpreted Section 1326(a)(2) of title 11, which directs the trustee to return the “payments . . . proposed by the plan” if no plan is confirmed. The court reasoned that since the percentage fee is collected from these payments, it must also be returned. The court noted that Congress explicitly allowed for the deduction of the trustee’s fee in Chapter 11 (Subchapter V) and Chapter 12 bankruptcies but did not include similar language for Chapter 13 plans.The Second Circuit concluded that the trustee may collect the percentage fee from pre-confirmation payments but must return it if no plan is confirmed. The court reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re: Soussis" on Justia Law

The case involves insurance policies issued by certain surplus lines insurers at Lloyd’s, London, which contain identical arbitration clauses. The insured parties, 3131 Veterans Blvd LLC and Mpire Properties LLC, attempted to sue the insurers in Louisiana state court. The insurers then sued in New York federal court to enforce the arbitration clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The insured parties argued that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable under Louisiana law, which prohibits such clauses in insurance contracts, and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) allows state insurance laws to reverse preempt federal legislation and non-self-executing treaty provisions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the insured parties, holding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts and that the FAA and the New York Convention were reverse-preempted under the MFA, based on the Second Circuit’s previous decision in Stephens v. American International Insurance (Stephens I).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that its reasoning in Stephens I had been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which established a different test for determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing. Applying the Medellín test, the court found that Article II Section 3 of the New York Convention is self-executing. As a result, the court abrogated Stephens I to the extent that it held that Article II Section 3 is not self-executing, reversed the district court decisions, and remanded the matters for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, v. 3131 Veterans Blvd LLC" on Justia Law

A Turkish graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, was lawfully residing in Massachusetts on a student visa when she was arrested by plainclothes officers without warning on March 25, 2025. She was transported across state lines and eventually detained in Louisiana. Her counsel, unaware of her location, filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts, alleging her arrest was based on an op-ed she co-authored. The petition was transferred to the District of Vermont after it was revealed she had been in Vermont during transit.The District of Vermont set a schedule for a bail hearing and to resolve the constitutional claims in the habeas petition. The court ordered the government to transfer Öztürk from Louisiana to Vermont to aid in these proceedings. The government appealed this order, seeking an emergency stay of the transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the government failed to justify a stay. It determined that the District of Vermont was the proper venue for the habeas petition since Öztürk was in Vermont when the petition was filed. The court also found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Öztürk’s detention challenge. Additionally, the court held that the government did not demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay and that the balance of equities favored Öztürk.The Second Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, denied the request for a writ of mandamus, and vacated the administrative stay. The court ordered the government to comply with the district court’s transfer order within one week. View "Öztürk v. Hyde" on Justia Law

Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law