Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Xin “Chris” Gu, a protégé of Qing Ming “Allen” Yu, was shot and killed. Yu, angered by Gu's departure from his company and subsequent competition, conspired with Zhe Zhang and others to murder Gu. Yu promised Zhang business connections in exchange for his participation in the murder. Zhang, along with other conspirators, planned and executed the murder, with Zhang acting as the getaway driver. Both Yu and Zhang were charged with conspiracy to commit murder for hire and murder for hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted both defendants on both counts and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of an agreement involving pecuniary value, a mid-trial change in the government's theory, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and an erroneous interpretation of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 1958(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the promise of business connections constituted something of pecuniary value, thus supporting the jury's finding of guilt. The court found no basis in precedent for the defendants' claim of a due-process right against surprise by the government's theory. The court also determined that the withheld evidence was not material and did not prejudice the defendants. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that section 1958(a) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the convictions and life sentences of both defendants. View "United States v. Zhang" on Justia Law

Ms. Shela Linton participated in a sit-in protest at the Vermont statehouse on January 8, 2015, against the governor's perceived lack of support for universal healthcare. When the statehouse closed at 8 p.m., law enforcement warned the demonstrators to leave or face arrest. Linton and others remained, linking arms and singing. During her arrest, Sergeant Jacob Zorn used a "rear wristlock" pain compliance technique, causing Linton to cry out in pain and suffer permanent injuries to her left wrist and shoulder. Linton later alleged that she was diagnosed with PTSD, depression, and anxiety due to the incident.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont granted summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Zorn, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that no clearly established law put Zorn on notice that his actions might violate Linton's Fourth Amendment rights. Linton appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its interpretation of relevant case law and failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the case Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford clearly established that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques on a passively resisting protestor constitutes excessive force. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the degree of Linton's resistance and the appropriateness of Zorn's use of force. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Linton v. Zorn" on Justia Law

Neysha Cruz, on behalf of her son O.F., filed a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Cruz rejected the DOE's education plan for O.F., who has multiple disabilities, and sought reimbursement for his private school tuition. Cruz argued that the DOE's placement of O.F. in a twelve-student classroom violated a New York regulation requiring students with highly intensive management needs to be placed in classes of six or fewer students. The DOE acknowledged the regulation but argued that another regulation allowing a maximum of twelve students for those with severe multiple disabilities also applied, giving them discretion in class size placement.An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) initially found that the DOE offered O.F. a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) but that the recommended school could not implement the IEP due to scheduling issues. The IHO ordered partial reimbursement for private tuition. The State Review Officer (SRO) reversed the IHO's finding on the school's ability to implement the IEP and concluded that the DOE provided a FAPE, thus denying reimbursement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the SRO's decision, agreeing that the DOE could choose between the two class size regulations. Cruz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit found that the case hinged on interpreting New York's education regulations and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The court sought clarification on whether the DOE must satisfy both class size regulations or if it can choose between them when both apply to a student. The Second Circuit retained jurisdiction pending the state court's response. View "Cruz v. Banks" on Justia Law

Darrell Robinson was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), after law enforcement officers found six firearms in his vehicle during a search. Robinson pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court also imposed a special condition of supervised release that allowed for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of a condition of supervision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) without modification and imposed the special search condition as recommended in the PSR. Robinson did not object to the PSR or the special condition during sentencing but later moved to correct the judgment, arguing that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. The district court denied the motion, finding that it had met its obligation by referencing the PSR.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Robinson’s appeal, where he argued that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced, was procedurally unreasonable, and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that the district court’s reference to the PSR was sufficient to impose the special condition, and the need for the condition was self-evident given Robinson’s extensive criminal history and dishonesty with law enforcement. The court also held that the condition, which required reasonable suspicion, did not violate Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights due to his diminished expectation of privacy while on supervised release.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the special condition of supervised release allowing for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case involves Salifou Conde, who was convicted of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit both frauds. The fraudulent activities were related to the theft of rent assistance checks from New York City's Human Resources Administration (HRA). These checks, intended for qualifying individuals' landlords, were often returned as undeliverable and subsequently misappropriated by Conde and his co-conspirators. The fraudulent checks were deposited into various bank accounts, including Conde's, and used to pay for services such as cable and internet.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Conde was found guilty on all counts following a jury trial. He was sentenced to 55 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. The evidence against him included bank records, ATM surveillance footage, and an electronically generated record from a telecommunication company showing payments for services linked to the fraudulent bank accounts.Conde appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the telecommunication company's record was improperly admitted as a self-authenticating business record, violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The appellate court reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion and found no error. The court held that the record was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(11) as a business record, and its admission did not violate Conde's confrontation rights. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Conde" on Justia Law

Mirsad Kandic, a legal permanent resident of the United States, relocated to Syria in 2013 to serve as a foreign fighter for ISIS. He later moved to Turkey, where he became a recruiter and emir for ISIS media, using social media to spread propaganda and assist recruits. Kandic also ran an online weapons market, smuggled money into Syria, created false passports, and provided intelligence to ISIS leadership. He recruited Jake Bilardi, an Australian teenager, who later became a suicide bomber, resulting in over 30 deaths. Kandic was arrested in Sarajevo in 2017 and extradited to the Eastern District of New York.A grand jury indicted Kandic on six counts, including conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS and substantive violations of providing material support. The district court denied Kandic's motion to dismiss the conspiracy count, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. The jury also found that the conspiracy resulted in the death of Jake Bilardi and other individuals. Kandic was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment and four concurrent terms of 20 years' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Kandic argued that the conspiracy count was impermissibly duplicitous, the remaining counts were multiplicitous, and the district court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that the conspiracy count was not impermissibly duplicitous because the jury was properly instructed on unanimity and the special verdict sheet ensured a unanimous verdict. The court also found that the remaining counts were not multiplicitous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the hearsay evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "U.S. v. Kandic" on Justia Law

Hamilton Reserve Bank, the beneficial owner of $250,490,000 in Sri Lankan government bonds, sued the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after Sri Lanka defaulted on the bonds. Over a year later, Jesse Guzman, Ultimate Concrete LLC, and Intercoastal Finance Ltd. sought to intervene, claiming Hamilton defrauded them by using their deposited funds to purchase the bonds and then refusing to allow them to withdraw their money.The district court denied the motion to intervene, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the intervenors' claims. The court found that the claims did not derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact" with Hamilton's breach of contract claim against Sri Lanka, as required for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court applied the correct "common nucleus of operative fact" standard for evaluating supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(a). The court concluded that the intervenors' claims, which involved a banking dispute with Hamilton, did not share substantial factual overlap with Hamilton's breach of contract claim against Sri Lanka. Therefore, the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction over the intervenors' claims and denied their motion to intervene. View "Hamilton Reserve Bank v. Sri Lanka" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Alexander Arguedas pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to charges of racketeering conspiracy, narcotics conspiracy, and using and carrying firearms in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 390 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $300. The court also imposed mandatory, standard, and special conditions of supervised release. Arguedas appealed, and his appellate counsel moved to be relieved and for the appointment of substitute counsel, submitting a brief in accordance with Anders v. California.The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on an appeal waiver in the plea agreement or, alternatively, for summary affirmance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Anders brief was incomplete because it did not address Arguedas’s conditions of supervised release, which fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. The court held that such a deficiency in an Anders brief is not necessarily fatal if it is harmless. The court concluded that there were no non-frivolous issues with respect to the mandatory, standard, and five of the seven special conditions of supervised release, making the deficiency harmless in those respects.However, the court identified potential non-frivolous issues regarding two special conditions concerning financial disclosure and new lines of credit. As a result, the court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing to address these conditions. The court directed appellate counsel to determine whether Arguedas wishes to appeal these conditions and to discuss any non-frivolous issues they might raise. The government was also directed to respond to the supplemental briefing. View "United States v. Arguedas" on Justia Law

Natasha Knox, a Black woman of Jamaican descent, worked as a customer service attendant at three Clean Rite laundromats in the Bronx from December 2018 until her termination in April 2019. She alleged that her supervisors, Cecilia Ashmeade and Kenneth Ferris, made derogatory comments about her race and national origin, and that Clean Rite failed to accommodate her disability following a thumb injury. Knox also claimed she was not paid for extra shifts worked at other locations and was wrongfully terminated after reimbursing herself for taxi fare from the cash register, which she claimed was permitted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Clean Rite, dismissing Knox’s claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination, hostile work environment, refusal to accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that Knox had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claims. Knox’s motion to strike the defendants’ answer and request for default judgment against Ashmeade and Ferris, who had failed to appear, was denied as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that Knox had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on all her claims. The court noted that evidence such as Knox’s testimony and sworn affidavit could lead a reasonable jury to find in her favor. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims. The claims against Ashmeade and Ferris were reinstated for the district court to reconsider Knox’s motion to strike their answer and for default judgment. View "Knox v. CRC Management Co." on Justia Law

Isaac Poole, while on supervised release for prior drug offenses, tested positive for cocaine, and probation officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in his home. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to eight months of imprisonment followed by ninety-six months of supervised release. As a condition of his supervised release, the court required Poole to submit to suspicionless searches by probation officers or law enforcement officers assisting them. Poole appealed this condition, arguing it was unsupported by the record and involved a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York initially handled Poole's case. After his release from prison, Poole began his supervised release in Syracuse, New York. Following a positive drug test and the discovery of drugs and paraphernalia in his home, the court modified his supervised release conditions to include suspicionless searches. Poole admitted to possessing and using illegal drugs, leading to the revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of the new conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the suspicionless search condition. The court found that Poole's pattern of illegal drug activity, including while on supervised release, justified the condition. The court concluded that the condition served the purposes of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, and enabled probation officers to fulfill their statutory duties. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the suspicionless search condition as both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Poole" on Justia Law