Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant after government emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic required non-essential businesses in New York City to close. The tenant, operating a retail clothing store in Manhattan, stopped paying rent, arguing that the lease excused rent payments when government actions prevented it from operating its business. The landlord disagreed, terminated the lease for nonpayment, and sought damages for breach of contract. The tenant vacated the premises and counterclaimed, alleging the landlord wrongfully terminated the lease and wrongfully kept two payments made after termination.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the government’s orders did not constitute a “taking” under the lease because the tenant was not fully deprived of the use or occupancy of the premises. The district court also rejected the tenant’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the notice-and-cure provision applied and that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative. The court awarded damages to the landlord, though the landlord cross-appealed, asserting the award was insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court misinterpreted the lease’s takings provision, which excused the tenant from paying rent when it was unable to operate its business due to government orders. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment for the landlord on its breach of contract claim and concluded the tenant was entitled to summary judgment on both its own breach of contract counterclaim and its claim that the landlord improperly terminated the lease. The court further vacated the judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The landlord’s cross-appeal on damages was dismissed as moot. View "Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC" on Justia Law

A group of branded gasoline retailers, known as the Old Jericho Plaintiffs, operated gas stations and accepted Visa and Mastercard payment cards during a specified period. Following a long-running federal antitrust class action alleging that Visa and Mastercard imposed unlawfully high interchange fees, a $5.6 billion settlement was reached in 2019 with a class defined as all entities accepting Visa- or Mastercard-branded cards in the United States from January 1, 2004, to January 24, 2019. The Old Jericho Plaintiffs did not opt out of this settlement. However, after the opt-out period ended, they filed a separate class action asserting state-law antitrust claims for damages based on the same alleged conduct, contending that their suppliers were the direct payors of the fees and thus should be the proper class members.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were members of the original settlement class and that the settlement agreement barred their new claims. The district court found the term “accepted” in the settlement ambiguous but, after reviewing extrinsic evidence—such as contracts and how transactions were conducted—concluded that the retailers themselves, not their suppliers, “accepted” payment cards within the meaning of the agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that its prior decision in Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. did not require class membership to be determined solely by identifying the “direct payor.” The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual determination that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were intended to be class members. Additionally, it held that the claims brought by these plaintiffs were validly released in the settlement because they rested on the same factual predicate as the released claims and the plaintiffs had been adequately represented. View "In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Two Vermont residents who worked as delivery drivers for a baked goods company sued the company, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because they were not paid overtime despite regularly working more than 40 hours per week. The company classified them as independent contractors, not employees, and both the drivers and the company are located in different states: the drivers in Vermont, and the company is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The drivers brought the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, both on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated delivery drivers.After the case was filed, the plaintiffs asked the district court to allow notification of potential collective action members not just in Vermont, but also in Connecticut and New York. The company objected, arguing that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state drivers. The district court disagreed, concluding that it did have personal jurisdiction over the company regarding claims by non-Vermont drivers, and permitted notification to potential plaintiffs in all three states. The district court then certified the personal jurisdiction issue for interlocutory appeal and stayed its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that, unless Congress has provided otherwise (which it has not in the FLSA), a federal district court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant for out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims is limited by the same rules that bind state courts. Because there was no showing that the claims by Connecticut and New York drivers arose out of the company's contacts with Vermont, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over those claims. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution LLC" on Justia Law

A volunteer firefighter with a fire district in New York suffered a serious foot injury while aboard the district’s firefighting vessel responding to a reported boat fire on the Hudson River. He was injured when he tried to prevent a collision between his vessel and a police boat. After the accident, he received compensation under New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, which provides workers’ compensation-like benefits for volunteers injured in the line of duty. Despite receiving these benefits, he filed claims in federal court against the fire district, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness under federal maritime law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the fire district, finding that the firefighter was not entitled to bring claims under the Jones Act or under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, and that the exclusive remedy provision of New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law barred his general maritime law negligence claim. The firefighter appealed, contesting the denial of his Sieracki unseaworthiness and general maritime negligence claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the firefighter was not entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness extended to so-called "Sieracki seamen." It also concluded that New York’s exclusive remedy provision could not bar his federal negligence claim under general maritime law, given the significant federal interest in uniform maritime remedies. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the firefighter met the requirements for Sieracki seaman status and to allow his general maritime negligence claim to proceed. View "In re Complaint of Verplanck Fire District" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Brazil who entered the United States without inspection around 2005 and has lived in the country since then was arrested in 2025 by immigration authorities while driving to work. He had a pending asylum application since 2016, had been granted work authorization, owned a home, operated a small business, and had no criminal history. Following his arrest, the government initiated removal proceedings against him and detained him, asserting that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) while his removal proceedings were pending.The United States Department of Homeland Security placed him in removal proceedings in immigration court, where an immigration judge concluded that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for release on bond under § 1226(a). The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, arguing that his detention should be governed by § 1226(a), which allows for release on bond. The district court agreed, ordered the government to provide a bond hearing or release him, and, after a bond hearing was held, he was released because the immigration judge found he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the petitioner’s detention was governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention) or § 1226(a) (discretionary detention with bond eligibility). The Second Circuit held that § 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens like the petitioner—those present in the United States after entering without inspection and not apprehended at or near the border. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus, concluding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply in these circumstances, and that the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. View "Cunha v. Freden" on Justia Law

A New York state prisoner, convicted of several serious offenses and serving a life sentence without parole, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied his petition on the merits and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The petitioner missed the deadline to appeal that denial and subsequently moved for an extension of time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), arguing that his attorney’s staff absences and communication issues with the petitioner constituted “excusable neglect.” The district court denied this motion, finding the reasons provided were, at most, ordinary attorney error, and again denied a certificate of appealability.The petitioner then appealed the district court’s denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The government argued, and the court agreed, that before the appeal could proceed, the petitioner was required to obtain a certificate of appealability because the order denying his extension motion was a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The petitioner challenged this requirement, but the Second Circuit concluded that its prior precedent remained binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbison v. Bell did not remove the certificate requirement for orders that conclude the habeas proceeding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a certificate of appealability is required to appeal the denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion in this context, and it declined to issue such a certificate because no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the district court abused its discretion. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Griffin v. LaManna" on Justia Law

Adidas America, Inc. brought a lawsuit against Thom Browne, Inc., alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition, based on Thom Browne’s use of certain stripe motifs on its apparel. Adidas’s claims focused on Thom Browne’s Four-Bar Signature and Grosgrain designs, which adidas argued infringed on its well-known Three-Stripe Mark, particularly in a new line of activewear. At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence, including testimony from sixteen witnesses and more than four hundred exhibits, and ultimately found Thom Browne not liable on all counts.Subsequently, during related litigation in the United Kingdom, adidas discovered that Thom Browne had failed to disclose several relevant emails during discovery in the U.S. action. These emails contained internal discussions among Thom Browne employees acknowledging the potential for confusion between Thom Browne’s stripe designs and adidas’s mark. Adidas moved in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for relief from the final judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (misconduct), arguing that the emails warranted a new trial. The district court denied the motion, finding that the emails probably would not have changed the verdict and that Thom Browne’s discovery violation was, at most, negligent rather than intentional misconduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Second Circuit held that adidas failed to demonstrate that the newly discovered emails probably would have altered the outcome at trial, as required under Rule 60(b)(2). The court further held that “misconduct” under Rule 60(b)(3) does not include merely negligent discovery violations; only intentional or reckless conduct could justify such relief. Therefore, adidas was not entitled to a new trial. View "Adidas America, Inc. v. Thom Browne, Inc." on Justia Law

A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines.The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of trustees managing an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), some issued as notes under indenture agreements and others as trust certificates. The trustees alleged that companies servicing the underlying mortgages mismanaged the loans, acted in self-interest, and failed to protect investors’ interests, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The investments included three classes of notes and three classes of trust certificates, each backed by pools of residential mortgages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the underlying mortgages constituted plan assets under ERISA. The district court ruled that only the RMBSs themselves, not the mortgages behind them, were plan assets as defined by the Department of Labor’s regulation. Consequently, it granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the servicers did not owe ERISA fiduciary duties regarding the mortgages, and denied the trustees’ cross-motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the notes issued under indenture agreements were not equity interests and did not confer plan asset status on the underlying mortgages. However, it found that the trust certificates were beneficial interests in the trusts and thus qualified as equity interests under the Department of Labor’s regulation. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part (regarding the notes), vacated in part (regarding the trust certificates), and remanded for further proceedings, including determination of whether the servicers acted as fiduciaries with respect to the trust certificates. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in December 2017, detonated a homemade pipe bomb in a crowded pedestrian tunnel connecting the Times Square subway station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. The defendant, motivated by propaganda from a foreign terrorist organization, constructed the device using materials from his workplace and filled it with metal screws to act as shrapnel. On the morning of the attack, he strapped the bomb to his body, rode the subway into Manhattan, and triggered the device during rush hour, injuring himself and several bystanders. The attack caused both physical and psychological harm to victims and created a significant risk to public safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. After a jury convicted the defendant on six counts—including providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, committing a terrorist attack on mass transportation, and using a destructive device during a crime of violence—the court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and imposed sentences including multiple life terms plus an additional thirty years. The defendant appealed his convictions on three counts and challenged the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, as the defendant acted independently and not under the direction or control of that organization. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction on that count. The court affirmed the convictions for committing a terrorist attack against mass transportation and for using a destructive device during a crime of violence, finding the evidence sufficient and any possible legal errors harmless. The court also upheld the reasonableness of the sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "United States of America v. Ullah" on Justia Law