Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Selim Zherka, a convicted felon, challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Zherka argued that because his felony was nonviolent, Congress could not deprive him of his Second Amendment right to bear arms. He also claimed a due process right to an individualized assessment of dangerousness before being deprived of this right. Zherka sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him and an injunction preventing the government from enforcing it against him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Zherka’s claims. The court held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to him and that he had no right to a hearing before the application of a categorical prohibition. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s assurance in District of Columbia v. Heller that longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful. The court also rejected Zherka’s due process claim, citing Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, which held that procedural due process does not require a hearing to prove or disprove facts irrelevant under the challenged statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Second Amendment does not prohibit Congress from disarming convicted felons, including those convicted of nonviolent felonies. The court found that there is a historical tradition of legislative disarmament of classes of people perceived as dangerous, which supports the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The court also concluded that Zherka had no procedural due process right to an individualized assessment of dangerousness before being disarmed under the statute. View "Zherka v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant met a sixteen-year-old runaway in the Bronx and, along with two associates, lured her to their apartment. There, they gave her drug-laced alcohol, sexually assaulted her, and began prostituting her over a period of three weeks. The group took explicit photos, posted online advertisements, arranged clients, and used violence and threats to control the victim. Although the victim initially claimed to be eighteen, the defendant and his associates became suspicious of her age and eventually learned she was sixteen, but continued the operation. The defendant left the group after being injured in a shooting, but remained in contact with his co-conspirators. The victim was eventually rescued by law enforcement, and the defendant was arrested after several months as a fugitive.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. The government charged the defendant with sex trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking a minor, and conspiracy to use interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The defendant moved for acquittal on the sex trafficking count, arguing that the government failed to prove he knew the victim was underage, and objected to the jury instructions, claiming the relevant statutory language was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), which allows conviction for sex trafficking a minor if the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also found no error in the district court’s use of a general verdict form rather than a special verdict form. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

Mary Doe, a social worker proceeding under a pseudonym, challenged New York’s Reproductive Health Act (RHA), arguing it violated constitutional rights. Doe sought to represent a class of viable fetuses, claiming the RHA’s decriminalization of abortion and elimination of fetal homicide laws harmed them. She also sought to amend her complaint post-judgment to include a specific fetus, "Baby Nicholas," alleging he faced harm due to the RHA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Doe’s claims for lack of standing, denying her motion to be appointed as "next friend" to the fetuses, citing her lack of a significant relationship with them. The court also denied her post-judgment motion to amend the complaint, finding it futile as Baby Nicholas lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the district court erred in requiring a significant relationship for next friend appointments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). However, it affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s claims on the grounds that she failed to identify or describe any specific member of the viable fetus class, thus failing to establish a live case or controversy under Article III.Regarding the post-judgment motion, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial, concluding that Baby Nicholas lacked standing. The court found that the alleged risks to Baby Nicholas were not imminent and traceable to the RHA, as required for standing. The potential harm from a third party was not sufficiently connected to the RHA’s provisions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, maintaining the dismissal of Doe’s claims and denying the motion to amend the complaint. View "Doe v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Dharwinder Singh, a citizen of India, petitioned for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh claimed he faced persecution in India due to his political opinion and provided testimony about attacks he suffered in 2013. However, his statements during a border interview in the United States contradicted his hearing testimony, leading to an adverse credibility determination by the IJ.The IJ found Singh not credible because his hearing testimony about being attacked in August and November 2013 conflicted with his statement to a border patrol agent that he left India in April 2013. Singh explained that he lied during the border interview on the advice of his smuggler. The IJ did not find this explanation convincing and determined that Singh's willingness to lie undermined his credibility. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the REAL ID Act's totality-of-the-circumstances standard applied, rather than the Ramsameachire factors previously used to evaluate the reliability of border interviews.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court agreed that the REAL ID Act displaced the Ramsameachire factors and established a presumption that border interviews are proper to consider in adverse credibility determinations. The court found that the IJ and BIA properly assessed the reliability of Singh's border interview under the totality of the circumstances and that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the court denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mansoor Hamoud Hadwan, a natural-born U.S. citizen, has been stranded in Yemen for twelve years. In 2013, he visited the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, to apply for immigration paperwork for his children. During this visit, embassy staff retained his Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) and U.S. passport. Nine months later, the U.S. Department of State formally revoked both documents, alleging they were fraudulently obtained. Hadwan was unable to attend his hearing challenging the revocation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the State Department's decision to revoke Hadwan's documents. The court found that Hadwan had waived most of his arguments by not presenting them at the agency hearing, which he was not permitted to attend. The court also found that the State Department's hearing process did not violate due process requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the State Department erred in two ways. First, the decision to uphold the revocation was arbitrary and capricious, violating the Administrative Procedure Act, because it failed to consider material, undisputed facts about Hadwan’s English literacy, which raised doubts about the reliability of his alleged confession statement. Second, the State Department violated Hadwan’s constitutional due process rights by revoking his documents without providing him an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. The court reversed the district court's judgment and the State Department's decision, ordering the State Department to return Hadwan’s CRBA and expired passport so he may reapply for a new passport if he chooses. View "Hadwan v. US Dep't of State" on Justia Law

Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to address the Sentencing Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine and that a supervised release condition permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion lacked adequate on-the-record justification.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Lawrence within the Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, rejecting the parties' proposal to treat the crack cocaine as powder cocaine, which would have resulted in a lower sentencing range. The court emphasized Lawrence's criminal history and the need for him to change his life trajectory. The court also adopted the search condition from the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), which included a detailed discussion of Lawrence's background and offense conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Lawrence's arguments. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses differently and did not need to address the parties' policy arguments. The appellate court also found that the district court reasonably imposed the search condition, justified by the PSR's recommendations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Lawrence's sentence and conditions of supervised release were procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

A group of landlords and property owners in New York's Hudson Valley region challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 amendments to New York's rent stabilization law. These amendments, known as the Vacancy Provisions, allow municipalities to impose civil penalties on landlords who do not cooperate with vacancy surveys and to presume zero vacancies for nonresponsive landlords. The landlords argued that these provisions authorize warrantless searches of their records without an opportunity to challenge the searches' scope, violating the Fourth Amendment, and that they prevent landlords from contesting vacancy calculations, violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. The landlords appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Vacancy Provisions are facially valid under the Fourth Amendment because landlords have adequate pre-compliance review available under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court also found that the searches authorized by the Vacancy Provisions are not unreasonable in every situation, given the ample notice and minimal penalties involved. Additionally, the court held that the Vacancy Provisions do not violate procedural due process because landlords can contest vacancy calculations at public hearings before rent stabilization is adopted and through Article 78 after adoption. View "Hudson Shore v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Lawrence Ray was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for multiple crimes, including racketeering conspiracy, extortion, sex trafficking, forced labor, money laundering, tax evasion, and committing a violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise. These convictions stemmed from Ray's operation of a criminal enterprise that targeted young adults, primarily his daughter's college roommates, for indoctrination and exploitation, including sex trafficking and forced labor in Pinehurst, North Carolina.The district court sentenced Ray to 720 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. Ray appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the unconstitutionality of the racketeering statutes, improper admission of expert testimony, and the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Ray's appeal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Ray's convictions, including the existence of an enterprise, the commission of violent crimes to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise, and the coercion of victims into sex trafficking and forced labor. The court also rejected Ray's constitutional challenge to the racketeering statutes, noting that such challenges have been consistently rejected in the past.Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Hughes, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who provided general background on coercive control tactics without directly linking her testimony to Ray or his victims. The court also found that the district court properly balanced the probative value of the testimony against its potential prejudicial effect.Finally, the court concluded that Ray's 720-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the gravity of his crimes and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and just punishment. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

Defendants Gary Denkberg and Sean Novis were involved in a mass-mailing fraud scheme from 2004 to 2016, sending fake prize notices to consumers, leading them to believe they had won large cash prizes. Victims were instructed to pay a small processing fee to claim their prizes, but instead received a "sweepstakes report" with publicly available information. The scheme generated approximately $80 million from over three million transactions. Despite complaints and a 2012 cease-and-desist agreement with the USPS, Defendants continued their fraudulent activities using new shell companies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted Denkberg and Novis of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, use of fictitious names, and aiding and abetting mail fraud. The jury acquitted Denkberg on some counts but found both defendants guilty on the remaining charges. Denkberg was sentenced to 66 months in prison, while Novis received 90 months. Both were also ordered to pay significant fines and forfeitures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including evidence of fraudulent intent and material misrepresentations. The court found that the District Court's supplemental jury instructions were not in error and that the admitted testimony and letters from state attorneys general were not hearsay. The court also determined that the admission of the letters did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from introducing certain evidence due to a failure to comply with a protective order. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Novis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Khalilah Suluki alleged that her mother, Khadijah Suluki, committed identity theft by opening several credit card accounts in her name without permission, including an account with Credit One Bank, N.A. Upon discovering the alleged fraud, Suluki disputed the account with Credit One and the three major national credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Credit One investigated the dispute multiple times and concluded that the account was legitimate and belonged to Suluki. Suluki filed suit, claiming that Credit One violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into her dispute.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Credit One. The court concluded that, regardless of the reasonableness of Credit One's investigation, no reasonable investigation required by the statute would have yielded a different result. The court also found that Suluki did not present any triable issues of fact regarding whether Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA to be liable for damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the accuracy of the information reported and the reasonableness of Credit One's investigations. However, it concluded that no reasonable investigation would have led Credit One to determine that the account was fraudulent or that the information was unverifiable. The court also determined that Suluki could not recover damages because she did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Credit One willfully or negligently violated the FCRA. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA" on Justia Law