The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This appeal arose from a multitude of lawsuits filed by Connecticut homeowners whose basements walls were likely constructed with defective concrete manufactured by the now‐defunct J.J. Mottes Company. The court held that the "collapse" provision in the Allstate homeowner's insurance policy in this case did not afford coverage for basement walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but that have not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as required by the policy. Therefore, the horizontal and vertical cracking in plaintiffs' basement walls did not constitute a covered "collapse" under the policy and Allstate did not breach its contract by denying coverage for plaintiffs' claim. View "Valls v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the tax court's denial of her petition seeking a refund of her overpayment of 2012 income taxes. Although the Commissioner did not dispute that petitioner was overpaid or the amount of overpayment, the Commissioner argued -- and the tax court agreed -- that the tax court lacked jurisdiction to order a refund or credit of the overpayment. The Second Circuit agreed with petitioner's interpretation of the look back period in 26 U.S.C. 6512(b)(3) and held that "third year after the due date (with extensions)" refers in this case to the third year after the return due date, plus a six‐month extension period. The court held that "(with extensions)" has the same effect as does the similar language that existed in 26 U.S.C. 6511(b)(2)(A) at the time of section 6512(b)(3)'s amendment‐‐that is, the language expands the tax court's jurisdiction to order refunds and credits. Therefore the notice of deficiency in this case, mailed 26 months after the due date, was mailed during the third year and thus the tax court had jurisdiction to look back three years, which would reach the due date and allow petitioner to recover her overpayment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for petitioner. View "Borenstein v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Standing alone, a general disclaimer (still less a general merger clause) is not sufficient as a matter of law to preclude reasonable reliance on material factual misrepresentations, even by a sophisticated investor. FIH appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing federal securities law claims against defendants. The district court concluded as a matter of law that FIH could not have reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations, because such reliance was precluded by a general merger clause in Foundation's agreement, incorporated by reference into the subscription agreements by which FIH had invested in Foundation. However, the Second Circuit held that the merger clause did not as a matter of law preclude FIH's reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. The court also held that the district court did not err nor abuse its discretion in excluding as untimely an expert report. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "FIH, LLC v. Foundation Capital Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant Lyle and Van Praagh's conviction for charges related to the distribution of methamphetamine. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; the challenged searches and seizures did not violate the Fourth Amendment; the admission of Lyle's statements did not violate the Fifth Amendment; and Van Praagh's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Lyle" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and in part for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs' claims arose from their dissatisfaction with the outcome of divorce proceedings in Israel and subsequent efforts by their ex‐wives, with the assistance of the charitable organizations, to collect child support from them. The court held that the district court properly dismissed all claims against the Israeli Officials for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, as foreign government officials acting in their official capacity, they were entitled to immunity. With respect to the remaining defendants, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the domestic injury requirement of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring Plaintiffs Eliahu and Weisskopf from filing future related actions against defendants without its permission. In this case, the court considered the anti-filing injunction factors such as Eliahu and Weisskopf's history of vexatious litigation, their improper motives for pursuing the litigation, and the expense to defendants and burden on the courts. Furthermore, the court saw no reason to grant Eliahu and Weisskopf the latitude usually granted to pro se litigants, and concluded that other sanctions against them would be inadequate. View "Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Israel" on Justia Law

In this multi-district litigation, plaintiffs brought a series of products liability actions against the makers of Eliquis for injuries they or their decedents suffered while taking the drug. In the multi-district litigation, the district court denied motions to remand many of the actions to state court and then dismissed 64 suits. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2) was no barrier to the removal of the transferred actions at issue. The court held that a home‐state defendant may in limited circumstances remove actions filed in state court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, was authorized by the text of Section 1441(b)(2), and was neither absurd nor fundamentally unfair. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims as preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. In this case, plaintiffs' claims consisted of conclusory and vague allegations and did not plausibly allege the existence of newly acquired information. Therefore, plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to state a claim that was not preempted. View "Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting attorneys' fees and costs to defendants under section 505 of the Copyright Act and section 35(a) of the Lanham Act. These provisions authorized the district court to award fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. The court held that defendants met the definition of "prevailing party" under both fee-shifting provisions. Although defendants did not obtain a dismissal on the the Copyright and Lanham Acts claims, defendants have fulfilled their primary objective by obtaining dismissal of the complaint on collateral estoppel grounds. View "Manhattan Review, LLC v. Yun" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting MetLife a preliminary injunction barring defendant from arbitrating his claims before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The court held that the district court did not err in holding that the question of whether MetLife was obligated to arbitrate the dispute was to be decided by the court, rather than the arbitrator. Furthermore, the district court did not err by holding that MetLife was not required by the FINRA arbitration code to arbitrate claims arising out of events that occurred long after MetLife's withdrawal from FINRA's predecessor, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The court held that the arbitration code did not apply to a dispute based on events that occurred years after the parties had severed their connections with the NASD. In this case, the court found nothing in the Code that clearly and unmistakably evidenced a contractual intent to confer resolution of arbitrability on the arbitrators for a claim such as defendant's, which was based on facts long subsequent to the parties' involvement in the NASD. View "Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bucsek" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendants' convictions for marriage fraud and immigration fraud. The court held that the trial judge's ex parte meeting with the jurors and his instruction about assessing the credibility of a testifying defendant were sufficiently sharp departures from the law of this circuit as to undermine the court's confidence in the fairness of the trial. In this case, during the course of the trial, the judge met with jurors ex parte to discuss the jurors' concerns about two defendants' out-of-court behavior. The judge also instructed the jurors that they could consider defendants' self-interest in the outcome of the case when analyzing their trial testimony. View "United States v. Mehta" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, alleging malicious prosecution based on defendants falsely charging him with violating a condition of his probation. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that there was probable cause that plaintiff violated his condition of his probation. In this case, defendants' determination that plaintiff's interaction with a law enforcement officer was reportable, such that his failure to report violated a condition of his probation, was objectively reasonable, not having been clearly established as incorrect in state law by the identification of a stricter questioning requirement. The court refrained from deciding whether plaintiff failed to overcome a presumption of probable cause that arose from the facts underlying his subsequently vacated conviction. View "Dettelis v. Sharbaugh" on Justia Law