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BikerGear filed suit against FedEx, accusing FedEx of fraudulently marking up the weights of packages shipped by BikerGear and overcharging BikerGear for Canadian customers, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 13708(b), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ICCTA claim on the pleadings, and the district court's grant of summary judgment for FedEx and dismissal of BikerGear's substantive RICO claims. The court held that (1) Section 13708 of the ICCTA requires shipping documents to truthfully disclose the charges that a motor carrier in fact assesses, and prohibits a motor carrier from stating it will charge one amount when in reality it charges another; and (2) where, as here, the RICO persons and the RICO enterprise were corporate parents and wholly‐owned subsidiaries that "operate within a unified corporate structure" and were "guided by a single corporate consciousness," the mere fact of separate incorporation, without more, did not satisfy RICO's distinctness requirement under Section 1962(c). View "U1IT4Less Inc. v. FedEx Corp." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of this defamation action as to the out-of-state defendants, holding that Connecticut General Statute 52‐59b—which provides for long‐arm jurisdiction over certain out‐of‐state defendants except in defamation actions—does not violate plaintiff's First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's defamation claim based on the "as much as $500 million" statement under the New York Civil Rights Law 74, but held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim based on the "repeatedly tried to extort" statement. Therefore, the court reversed in part the dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the Bloomberg Defendants and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friedman v. Bloomberg L.P." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence that he had body-packed narcotics into Vermont. The court held that police were not under an obligation to release defendant after x-rays taken pursuant to a search warrant did not reveal evidence that he was body-packing; suppression was not an appropriate remedy in this case for failure to comply with the 48‐hour rule established by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), because such failure was not the cause of the officers' discovery that defendant was, in fact, body‐packing narcotics; and applying the framework established in McLaughlin, the evidence adduced by defendant did not reveal that the police unreasonably delayed his Gerstein hearing. View "United States v. Pabon" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence of 180 months in prison after he was convicted of assaulting a federal officer. In light of Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which held that the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline—a second basis for finding a crime of violence—was not unconstitutional, the court held that New York first‐degree robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause and the court need not address defendant's argument based on the force clause. The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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A Chinese construction company and seven of its employees challenged the district court's order denying their motion to quash subpoenas requiring the employees to appear before a grand jury. The Second Circuit affirmed the order, holding that the 2009 Bilateral Agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) incorporates a 2003 Diplomatic Note that imposes a registration requirement on construction personnel. In this case, the Executive Branch reasonably interpreted the relevant agreements as requiring construction personnel to register with the State Department before receiving immunity and because that condition was not satisfied here, the employees were not entitled to diplomatic immunity. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Returnable December 16, 2015" on Justia Law

Posted in: International Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's prior decision in this False Claims Act (FCA) case in light of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings because Escobar set out a materiality standard for FCA claims that has not been applied in this case. On remand, the district court must determine, in the first instance, whether relators have adequately alleged the materiality of defendants' alleged misrepresentations. View "United States v. Wells Fargo & Co." on Justia Law

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LIAAC petitioned for review of the Board's order determining that LIAAC violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by promulgating an unlawful confidentiality agreement and by terminating an employee for his refusal to sign the unlawful confidentiality agreement. The Second Circuit enforced the order and held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) when it terminates an employee for refusing to sign an unlawful employment document. The court disposed of the remaining issues on appeal in a summary order. View "NLRB v. Long Island Ass'n for AIDS Care, Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioner challenged the denial of his habeas corpus relief in regard to his state convictions for criminal impersonation and forgery. The Second Circuit held that four of the criminal impersonation convictions must be vacated under Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), but that five of them were reliably supported by the evidence; the criminal impersonation statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the criminal forgery statute, as interpreted by the trial court and the court of appeals, was so clearly overbroad as to be facially unconstitutional notwithstanding AEDPA deference; and thus the court narrowed the statute to save it, and granted the habeas petition as to some (but not all) of the forgery convictions. View "Golb v. Attorney General of the State of New York" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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Plaintiff, a former West Point cadet who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a fellow cadet, filed suit against the United States and others, pleading four causes of action, including a claim against Lieutenant General Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on the basis of their alleged violation of equal protection rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination as to the viability of the Bivens claim and joined the DC Circuit and the Fourth Circuit in holding that no Bivens remedy was available in this case. The court explained that the Supreme Court has made clear that it is for Congress to determine whether affording a money damages remedy is appropriate for a claim of the sort that plaintiff asserted. The court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the equal protection claim. View "Doe v. Hagenbeck" on Justia Law

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Defendants Brian Gill, David Gill, and Samuel Waco McIntosh appealed from their conviction of committing and conspiring to commit a drug-related murder. Brian and David also appealed their convictions for conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the defect in the superseding indictment did not amount to plain error, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, there was sufficient record evidence to support the convictions, and the claim of perjury was unsubstantiated. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law