In 1997, defendant was convicted in the present case of a drug conspiracy (Barinas I). In 2016, defendant was extradited to the United States and convicted on new narcotics trafficking charges (Barinas II). The district court found that defendant had violated his supervised release by failing to report to Probation, leaving the district in which he was to be supervised without permission, and committing the crime of which he was convicted in Barinas II. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant lacked prudential standing to raise a rule-of-specialty challenge and that his claim that his supervised-release term ended prior to his Barinas II crime lacked merit because that term was tolled while he was a fugitive. View "United States v. Barinas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183‐84 (2017), a federal court's inherent authority to sanction a litigant for bad‐faith conduct by ordering it to pay the other side's legal fees. The Court held that such an order is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith. This appeal stemmed from a suit against T-Mobile for property damage to a building T-Mobile had leased space on the roof of for cell tower equipment. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's order of sanctions because it was in serious tension with the Court's holding and because the district court was mislead by defendants' submissions in awarding such severe sanctions. View "Virginia Properties, LLC v. T-Mobile Northeast LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York the following question: Whether an entity engaged in the “bail business,” as defined in NYIL 6801(a)(1), may retain its “premium or compensation,” as described in NYIL 6804(a), where a bond posted pursuant to NYCPL 520.20 is denied at a bail-sufficiency hearing conducted pursuant to NYCPL 520.30, and the criminal defendant that is the subject of the bond is never admitted to bail. The Court of Appeals answered in the negative and its conclusion was determinative of this appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Gevorkyan v. Judelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chorches and Fabula filed a qui taim suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., against AMR, alleging that AMR made false statements and submitted false Medicare and Medicaid claims. Plaintiff Fabula also alleged a retaliation claim. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the claims and held that Chorches has pled the submission of false claims with sufficient particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), as applied in the qui tam context, and that Fabula's refusal to falsify a patient report, under the circumstances of this case, qualified as protected activity. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fabula v. American Medical Response, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the BIA's dismissal of his appeal challenging the IJ's conclusion that he was a non-citizen convicted of drug offenses that made him inadmissible to the United States. Petitioner also challenged the denial of his motion to reopen the proceedings. The Second Circuit denied the consolidated petitions for review, holding that the BIA correctly concluded that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, overruled the Fleuti doctrine. In this case, the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner was properly treated as seeking admission when he arrived in the United States in 2015. The court also held that the stop-time rule prevented petitioner from accruing seven years of continuous residency in the United States. View "Heredia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition. Petitioner argued that trial counsel failed to provide constitutionally effective assistance when they conceded before trial that child sexual abuse charges were timely under the applicable statute of limitations. In this case, trial counsel submitted a sworn affidavit in which they justified the decision to forgo a statute of limitations defense. Counsel considered the defense tenuous and believed it would clutter the motion to dismiss and distract from the motion's other strong points. The court held that the decision was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The court affirmed the balance of the order in a summary order filed contemporaneously with this opinion. View "Weingarten v. United States" on Justia Law

The duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act does not necessarily preempt the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) for claims of discrimination filed by a union member against a labor organization when the labor organization is acting in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative (as distinguished from when it is acting in its capacity as an employer). The Second Circuit held that the Act's duty of representation does not preempt the NYSHRL either on the basis of field preemption or as a general matter on the basis of conflict preemption. Accordingly, the court reversed the declaratory judgment of the district court and denied Local's cross-appeal for injunctive relief. View "Figueroa v. Foster" on Justia Law

Tannerite appealed the district court's dismissal of its defamation suit against NBC. The Second Circuit held that federal pleading standards, when applied to New York law, require a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim to allege facts demonstrating that the defendant made a false statement. In this case, Tannerite's complaint failed to allege that NBC made false statements regarding Tannerite exploding rifle targets. View "Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Group" on Justia Law

Defendants, the City of New York and NYPD officers, filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings. At issue was whether the NYPD officers were entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and whether the court should exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims against defendants. The court held that, because the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing governmental administration, 19 N.Y. Penal Law 195.05, and refusing to comply with a lawful order to disperse, N.Y. Penal Law 240.20(6), they were entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the federal and state false arrest and imprisonment claims, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Kass v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant argued that he was seized when a police officer in a squad car, who had been alerted to a man lurking with a gun, shined a spotlight on defendant and asked questions to which he responded. The court held that its precedent in United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007), was controlling. In this case, defendant never submitted to police authority and therefore he was never seized. View "United States v. Huertas" on Justia Law