Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the denial of his habeas corpus relief in regard to his state convictions for criminal impersonation and forgery. The Second Circuit held that four of the criminal impersonation convictions must be vacated under Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), but that five of them were reliably supported by the evidence; the criminal impersonation statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the criminal forgery statute, as interpreted by the trial court and the court of appeals, was so clearly overbroad as to be facially unconstitutional notwithstanding AEDPA deference; and thus the court narrowed the statute to save it, and granted the habeas petition as to some (but not all) of the forgery convictions. View "Golb v. Attorney General of the State of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former West Point cadet who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by a fellow cadet, filed suit against the United States and others, pleading four causes of action, including a claim against Lieutenant General Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), on the basis of their alleged violation of equal protection rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's determination as to the viability of the Bivens claim and joined the DC Circuit and the Fourth Circuit in holding that no Bivens remedy was available in this case. The court explained that the Supreme Court has made clear that it is for Congress to determine whether affording a money damages remedy is appropriate for a claim of the sort that plaintiff asserted. The court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the equal protection claim. View "Doe v. Hagenbeck" on Justia Law

Defendants Brian Gill, David Gill, and Samuel Waco McIntosh appealed from their conviction of committing and conspiring to commit a drug-related murder. Brian and David also appealed their convictions for conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of cocaine base. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the defect in the superseding indictment did not amount to plain error, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, there was sufficient record evidence to support the convictions, and the claim of perjury was unsubstantiated. View "United States v. Gill" on Justia Law

Discovery sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 is for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal where the applicant is a crime victim authorized to submit the discovery to the foreign tribunal, but is not making a claim for damages therein. The Second Circuit also held that an applicant that lawfully has obtained discovery under Section 1782 as to one foreign proceeding may use that discovery in other foreign proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting petitioners' application for discovery in aid of foreign litigation under Section 1782. View "Bouvier v. Adelson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's 46 month sentence after pleading guilty to illegally attempting to reenter the United States after having been deported. Because the sentencing court did not explain the reasoning behind the sentence imposed, or expressly adopt the PSR in open court, and because the factual findings in the PSR were not, by themselves, clearly adequate to support the sentence, the court concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the sentencing judge therefore erred in calculating the Guidelines range. Because the court vacated defendant's sentence as procedurally unreasonable, the court need not address defendant's alternate argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Genao" on Justia Law

New York's intestacy law, as it existed in 2013 at the time of the agency's final determination, did not permit children conceived posthumously to inherit via intestacy. In this case, plaintiff had conceived twins via in vitro fertilization eleven years after her husband, the donor spouse, died. Plaintiff filed applications for child's survivors' benefits, based on her husband's earnings history, with the Social Security Administration. The Second Circuit held that, under the applicable provisions of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) in effect at and prior to the time of the agency's final decision, the twins were not entitled to inherit from the decedent in intestacy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of benefits. View "MacNeil v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the Carpenters' Union and various construction companies and construction managers. The clauses effectively barred subcontracting of construction work with non-Carpenter affiliates. Ironworkers alleged that the Carpenters have used these subcontracting clauses to expand the scope of work assigned to the Carpenters Union to include work traditionally assigned to the Ironworkers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Carpenters. The Second Circuit held that the Carpenters have met the requirements of the construction industry proviso of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, but that, on this record, there were factual disputes that precluded a decision on whether the conduct fell within the non‐statutory exemption to antitrust liability. The court explained, to demonstrate that the disputed subcontracting practices were sheltered by the non‐statutory exemption (and thus to defeat the Ironworkers' antitrust claim completely), the Carpenters must show that these practices furthered legitimate aims of collective bargaining, in a way that was not unduly restrictive of market competition. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the Sherman Act claim; affirmed as to the unfair labor practices claim; and remanded. View "Conn. Ironworkers Employers Assoc. v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two counts of securities fraud in connection with an insider trading scheme. After defendant's conviction, the Second Circuit issued a decision in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), which elaborated on the Supreme Court's ruling in Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983), concerning liability for a "tippee" who trades on confidential information obtained from an insider, or a "tipper." While defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), which rejected certain aspects of Newman's holding. The court held that the logic of Salman abrogated Newman's "meaningfully close personal relationship" requirement and that the district court's jury instruction was not obviously erroneous. The court also held that any instructional error would not have affected defendant's substantial rights because the government presented overwhelming evidence that at least one tipper received a financial benefit from providing confidential information to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Martoma" on Justia Law

Oyster Bay's ordinance regulating the roadside solicitation of employment violates the First Amendment. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting injunctive relief to two entities that work to advance the interest of day laborers in the area. As a preliminary matter, the court held that plaintiffs had standing. On the merits, the court held that the ordinance restricted speech based on content and was subject to the First Amendment. Applying the Central Hudson test, the court held that the ordinance was a content-based restriction on commercial speech that was not narrowly drawn because it broadly impacted protected speech and only narrowly addressed the Town's stated interest. The ordinance did not require any connection between the prohibited speech—solicitation of employment—and the asserted interest—traffic and pedestrian safety. The court also held that arguments as to severability were waived where, as here, a party failed to raise the issue. View "Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Oyster Bay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Section 502(c)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(c)(1)(B), alleging that defendants failed to timely comply with her request for documents relating to her healthcare benefit plan. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim as time-barred. Because ERISA does not specify a statute of limitations for Section 502(c)(1) claims, the courts apply the state statute of limitations that is the nearest analogue. The court held that the most analogous statute of limitations in Connecticut was the one-year statute of limitations for actions to recover civil forfeitures. Applying the one-year limitation, the court held that plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Brown v. Rawlings Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law