Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rashawn Wynn pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, based on his involvement with the 110 Gang, a violent drug-trafficking group in Syracuse, New York. Wynn admitted to participating in the gang’s drug trafficking operations and personally selling 42.2 grams of crack cocaine. The Probation Office calculated his advisory sentencing range as 92 to 115 months of imprisonment. Wynn requested a mitigating role adjustment, arguing he was a minor participant, but the district court denied this request and sentenced him to 92 months in prison.Wynn appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court had not adequately addressed factors that might support a mitigating role adjustment. On remand, the district court provided a more detailed explanation but again denied the adjustment and reimposed the 92-month sentence. Wynn appealed once more, arguing that the district court erred in denying the adjustment and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Wynn was not substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal enterprise. The court also found that Wynn’s 92-month sentence was substantively reasonable given his criminal conduct and history. The court noted that Wynn had a long-standing involvement with the 110 Gang and had benefited from the gang’s criminal activities. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Betim Kaziu was convicted for his involvement in a plan to join and aid foreign terrorist organizations. He and his friend traveled to Cairo, Egypt, intending to join a terrorist group and fight jihad. After his friend returned to the U.S., Kaziu continued to Kosovo to formulate a plot to kill Americans but was arrested before he could act. He was convicted on four counts, including conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and conspiracy to use a firearm. He was sentenced to 27 years in prison.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially sentenced Kaziu to 27 years. Kaziu later filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that two of his convictions were unlawful based on new Supreme Court precedent. The district court vacated his conviction on Count Four and reduced his sentence on Count One by two years, from 27 to 25 years, without a full in-person resentencing proceeding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court exceeded its discretion by not conducting a full de novo resentencing. The appellate court noted two key factors: the resentencing judge was not the original sentencing judge, and Kaziu presented plausible allegations of changed circumstances, including his reform during imprisonment. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full de novo resentencing, ensuring that Kaziu would receive the full procedural protections of a standard sentencing. View "Kaziu v. United States" on Justia Law

Laura Henry filed a lawsuit against Olakunle Oluwole and their former employer, Bristol Hospital, alleging that Oluwole had sexually assaulted her. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Oluwole was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident, which he claimed prevented him from receiving timely notice of the action. Oluwole did not initially appear in court, leading the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut to enter a default judgment against him. Five years later, Oluwole appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, but the district court denied his motion. The case against Bristol proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict that Henry had failed to prove that Oluwole sexually assaulted, assaulted, or battered her. Following the jury verdict, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but left it in place for other claims.The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut initially entered a default judgment against Oluwole due to his failure to appear. After Oluwole eventually appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, the district court denied his motion, finding his default willful and that setting it aside would prejudice Henry. The jury trial against Bristol resulted in a verdict in favor of Bristol, finding no proof of sexual assault, assault, or battery by Oluwole. Consequently, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but maintained it for other claims, including false imprisonment and emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying Oluwole’s motions to set aside the default judgment. The appellate court held that the district court should have set aside the default judgment based on the factors established in Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the entire default judgment should have been vacated following the jury verdict, as maintaining it was inconsistent with the jury’s findings, pursuant to the principle in Frow v. De La Vega. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Oluwole. View "Henry v. Oluwole" on Justia Law

Emilee Carpenter, a wedding photographer, filed a preenforcement challenge against New York’s public accommodations laws, which prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Carpenter argued that these laws violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by compelling her to provide photography services for same-sex weddings, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the laws against her.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed all of Carpenter’s claims. The court found that Carpenter had not sufficiently pled that the public accommodations laws violated her rights to free speech, free association, free exercise of religion, or the Establishment Clause. The court also rejected her claims that the laws were unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Consequently, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the appellate court agreed that Carpenter had plausibly stated a free speech claim. However, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction at this stage, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings to develop a factual record. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Carpenter’s other claims, including those related to free association, free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, and vagueness. The court concluded that the public accommodations laws were neutral, generally applicable, and did not provide for individualized exemptions that would undermine their general applicability. The court also found that Carpenter had waived her overbreadth claim due to inadequate pleading and briefing.The Second Circuit thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carpenter v. James" on Justia Law

Manoucheka Francois, a train conductor for Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, was injured in a car crash while being transported by a taxi hired by her employer. The taxi driver, Michael Cellante, had consumed four to five shots of alcohol before picking her up. As a result, the taxi crashed, and Francois sustained injuries.Francois sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging both direct liability for negligently hiring the impaired taxi driver and vicarious liability for the driver’s negligence. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Metro-North on both theories. The court found no evidence that Metro-North could have foreseen the driver’s intoxication, thus negating direct liability. It also concluded that the driver’s act of drinking removed him from the scope of his agency, precluding vicarious liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding direct liability, agreeing that Metro-North had no reason to foresee the driver’s intoxication. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on vicarious liability. It held that whether the driver acted within the scope of his agency while driving Francois, despite being impaired, presented a triable issue of fact. The court emphasized that in FELA cases, plaintiffs enjoy a relaxed burden of proof, and issues of agency and foreseeability should generally be decided by a jury.The Second Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s ruling on direct liability, vacated the ruling on vicarious liability, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Francois v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Shlomo Bador, an Israeli citizen, received conditional permanent resident status in the U.S. based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Two years later, he and his wife filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on his status. However, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) suspected the marriage was fraudulent. After interviewing Bador’s wife, she withdrew her support for the petition, leading to the automatic termination of Bador’s conditional status. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Bador, and he conceded his removability.An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the case, where Bador requested a good-faith waiver, claiming his marriage was genuine but had ended in divorce. During the hearing, Bador admitted the marriage was fraudulent, having paid his wife and a broker to secure his status. The IJ denied the good-faith waiver and ruled Bador ineligible for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which applies to aliens charged with being inadmissible at the time of admission due to fraud. The IJ found that Bador’s removal was based on the termination of his conditional status, not the fraud itself.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Bador could not use the fraud waiver to excuse his failure to file a joint petition. The BIA dismissed his appeal, leading Bador to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The Second Circuit denied Bador’s petition, holding that he was ineligible for the fraud waiver. The court concluded that Bador’s removal was due to the termination of his conditional status for failing to file a joint petition, not because of his fraudulent marriage. Therefore, the fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) did not apply. View "Bador v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves the Upstate Jobs Party (UJP) and two of its leaders who sued the Commissioners of the New York State Board of Elections over campaign finance regulations. UJP, an independent body, argued that it is similarly situated to political parties because both nominate candidates that compete in the same elections. UJP claimed that New York's preferential treatment of parties violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. UJP also asserted First Amendment violations, alleging that New York's campaign finance rules distinguishing between parties and independent bodies are not closely drawn to a sufficient state interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York determined that differences in contribution limits applicable to parties and independent bodies violate the Fourteenth and the First Amendments. However, it also determined that allowing parties but not independent bodies to maintain so-called “housekeeping accounts” did not violate either amendment. Both UJP and the State Board appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment. The court held that parties and independent bodies are not similarly situated, and that the state’s contribution limits and housekeeping account exception are closely drawn to serve the state’s anticorruption interests. Therefore, the court concluded that the state’s campaign finance laws withstand all constitutional challenges raised. View "Upstate Jobs Party v. Kosinksi" on Justia Law

Miguel Angel Garcia Carrera, a nonpermanent resident and citizen of Mexico, sought to cancel his removal from the United States. Garcia Carrera argued that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen daughter. The Department of Homeland Security had placed him in removal proceedings after he entered the U.S. without inspection. Garcia Carrera had been in the U.S. since 2005, with a brief return to Mexico in 2005. His removal proceedings began in 2012 following an arrest for driving while intoxicated.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Garcia Carrera's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he had not demonstrated the requisite hardship to his daughter. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that Garcia Carrera failed to establish the necessary hardship as his daughter, who would remain in the U.S. with her mother, had no serious physical or mental disabilities. Garcia Carrera, proceeding without counsel, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit, following the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review Garcia Carrera's claim. The court considered both the IJ's and the BIA's decisions and found no error in the agency's conclusion that Garcia Carrera failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. The court noted that the IJ correctly stated the applicable legal standards and addressed the hardships that Garcia Carrera claimed his daughter would suffer. The court also found no indication that the IJ failed to consider other relevant evidence. Therefore, the court denied Garcia Carrera's petition for review. View "Garcia Carrera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of bond investors (plaintiffs) who bought and sold certain types of corporate bonds from and to a group of financial institutions and major dealers in the corporate bond market (defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated antitrust laws by engaging in a pattern of parallel conduct and anticompetitive collusion to restrict forms of competition that would have improved odd-lot pricing for bond investors. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case.Several months after the district court's order, it was discovered that the district court judge had presided over part of the case while his wife owned stock in one of the defendants. Although she had divested that stock before the district court judge issued his decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court judge should have disqualified himself due to this prior financial interest of his wife.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with deciding whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, vacatur was warranted because the district court judge was required to disqualify himself before issuing his decision. The court concluded that while there was no outright conflict when the district court judge ruled on the merits of this action, § 455(a) and related precedents required pre-judgment disqualification, thus vacatur was warranted. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Litovich v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Broadway producer Garth Drabinsky alleged that the Actors’ Equity Association, a union representing theater actors and stage managers, unlawfully boycotted, defamed, and harassed him during his production of the musical Paradise Square. Drabinsky brought antitrust claims and New York state tort claims against the union.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Drabinsky’s antitrust claims were barred by the statutory labor exemption derived from the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. The court also held that his tort claims were barred under Martin v. Curran, a New York state case that requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a union liable for tortious wrongs to allege the individual liability of every single member.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that an antitrust plaintiff suing a union bears the burden of proving that the statutory labor exemption does not apply. The court found that Drabinsky failed to meet this burden, as the union was acting in its self-interest and did not combine with non-labor groups. The court also agreed with the lower court that Drabinsky's state-law tort claims were barred by the Martin v. Curran rule. View "Drabinsky v. Actors' Equity Association" on Justia Law