Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eleven American families filed suit against the PLO and the PA under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), for various terror attacks in Israel that killed or wounded plaintiffs or their families. A jury awarded plaintiffs damages of $218.5 million, an amount that was trebled automatically pursuant to the ATA, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), bringing the total award to $655.5 million. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the minimum contacts and fairness analysis is the same under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment in civil cases. On the merits, the court concluded that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Daimler, the district court could not properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court also concluded that, because the terror attacks in Israel at issue here were not expressly aimed at the United States and because the deaths and injuries suffered by the American plaintiffs in these attacks were “random [and] fortuitous” and because lobbying activities regarding American policy toward Israel are insufficiently “suit-related conduct” to support specific jurisdiction, the court lacks specific jurisdiction over these defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The court did not consider defendants' other arguments on appeal or plaintiffs' cross-appeal, all of which are now moot. View "Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two former employees of Astro, filed suit against Astro, Allied, and Sirva, alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. 296(15). The court noted that this case presents the following three questions that the New York Court of Appeals has not had the opportunity to address and thus the court certified to the New York State Court of Appeals: First, does Section 296(15) limit liability for unlawful denial of employment only to the aggrieved party’s “employer”? Second, if Section 296(15) is limited in that way, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” for the purposes of a claim under Section 296(15)? Third, does the “aiding and abetting” liability provision of the NYSHRL, Section 296(6), apply to Section 296(15) such that a non‐employer may be liable under Section 296(15) as an aider and abettor of an employer’s unlawful denial of employment? View "Griffin v. Sirva Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise and conspiracy, and a narcotics conspiracy. Defendant was also convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime: one for possession of a firearm in furtherance of the racketeering enterprise and conspiracy and the other for possession of a firearm in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy. Defendant appealed. The court held in United States v. Anglin, that the existence of a second or subsequent 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction is a sentencing factor that need not be determined by a jury. Alleyne v. United States has not altered the court's holding in Anglin. In this case, the court concluded that, given the evidence that defendant possessed multiple firearms on separate occasions, there was an ample basis for the jury to convict him of two separate violations of section 924(c); that there was no jury instruction clarifying that the firearms subject of each section 924(c) charge must have been possessed on separate occasions does not amount to plain error; and it was not plain error for the district court to find implicitly at sentencing that the two section 924(c) convictions were based on separate conduct, thereby subjecting defendant to mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences based on a “second or subsequent” section 924(c) conviction. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement providing that any disputes between her and her payday lender would be resolved by arbitration before the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). When plaintiff tried to take her case to arbitration, however, NAF refused to accept it pursuant to a consent decree that prohibited NAF from accepting consumer arbitrations. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration agreement contemplated arbitration only before NAF and thus affirmed the district court's decision declining to compel arbitration before a different arbitrator. View "Moss v. First Premier Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the New Your State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that plaintiff's employer could not have engaged in retaliation because it could not be held responsible for the retaliatory animus of plaintiff's co-worker, a low-level employee with no decisionmaking authority. The court held, however, that an employee’s retaliatory intent may be imputed to an employer where, as alleged here, the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s retaliatory animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of harassment in the second degree, an offense classified as a violation under state law, and sentenced to one year’s conditional discharge, requiring one day of community service. Before completing his sentence, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court concluded that petitioner's case did not present a live case or controversy sufficient to establish Article III standing because he fulfilled the requirements of his sentence during the pendency of the habeas proceeding. After granting a certificate of appealability, the court concluded that a sentence of conditional discharge and one day's community service, unfulfilled as of the time of filing the habeas petition, satisfies the "in custody" requirement of section 2254. The court also concluded that a presumption of continuing collateral consequences applies to petitioner's conviction, thus presenting a live case or controversy under Article III despite the expiration of his sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Nowakowski v. New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York City taxi driver, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the United States alleging that the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) deprived him of his Fourth Amendment rights in various ways. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiff argued that the TLC’s mandate that all New York City taxicabs install technology systems equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking abilities amounted to a property‐based search pursuant to United States v. Jones, and that this search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the record is devoid of evidence as to whether plaintiff had any interest in a taxi at the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion, plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his property‐based Fourth Amendment claim, and thus defendants are entitled to summary judgment. View "El-Nahal v. Yassky" on Justia Law

After plaintiff purchased a "1 Day Diet" weight loss product containing sibutramine, a controlled substance that had been removed from the market in October 2010, on Amazon.com, he filed suit alleging claims under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq., and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint based on the ground that the parties are bound by the mandatory arbitration provision in Amazon's Conditions of Use. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and held that Amazon failed to show that plaintiff was on notice and agreed to mandatory arbitration as a matter of law. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not establish a likelihood of future or continuing harm where, even assuming his past purchase of the product resulted in injury and that he may continue to suffer consequences as a result, he failed to show that he is likely subjected to further sales by Amazon of products containing sibutramine. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courtʹs denial of plaintiffʹs motion for a preliminary injunction, but vacated the dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that she was terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech when she spoke to local leaders about what she saw as a "scam" occurring in the police department. The district court held that the officials had not shown entitlement to summary judgment of qualified immunity because, accepting plaintiff's facts as true and drawing all permissible factual inferences in her favor, she had shown that they had violated her clearly established constitutional rights. The court concluded that, under plaintiff's version of the facts, there was no doubt that under the prevailing decisions, plaintiff's speech was not made "pursuant to" her official duties as a patrol officer. Therefore, defendants failed to show entitlement to fire plaintiff or entitlement to qualified immunity under her version of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ricciuti v. Gyzenis" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the revocation of his supervised release on his 2010 conviction for conspiring to traffic in cocaine and marijuana and sentence of 24 months in prison. The court concluded that where, as here, post‐supervision charges involve conduct related to the requisite timely charge and the defendant is afforded adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the district court is empowered to consider the related violations and to base revocation thereon. The court also concluded that defendant's sufficiency challenge fails on the merits. Therefore, the court affirmed the revocation judgment. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law