Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of certain contribution restrictions within New York City's campaign finance laws. Plaintiffs claimed that the laws’ restrictions on contributions unduly burdened their protected political speech in violation of the First Amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and dismissed their claims challenging the constitutionality of the contribution restrictions. Several years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. Plaintiffs contend in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration that McCutcheon established, inter alia, a more rigorous standard of review with respect to the government’s burden of proof and what constitutes a permissible governmental interest, a standard under which the “pay to play” rules do not pass muster. The court concluded that neither of plaintiffs' purported effects, considered alone or in combination, satisfies the threshold requirement under the third clause of Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment sought to be reconsidered apply prospectively. In this case, the February 2009 order at issue was immediately final and required nothing of the parties or the district court going forward; it did not apply prospectively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. View "Tapper v Hearn" on Justia Law

Cortron appealed the district court's award of damages pursuant to a jury verdict of MacDermid on its claims for violations of federal and Connecticut antitrust laws, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, spoliation, and violations of Connecticut statutes prohibiting computer crimes and unfair trade practices. At issue are the requirements for proving an adverse effect on competition for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, in cases where the plaintiff has not proved that the allegedly anticompetitive behavior led to higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality in the market. The court held that a plaintiff may not prevail under the “rule of reason” merely by proving that (1) the defendant exercised “market power,” and (2) the challenged behavior may have misled consumers to believe that certain products were no longer available, without showing that consumers actually experienced reduced access to those products. In this case, the court agreed with Cortron that the district court erred in denying Cortron judgment as a matter of law with respect to MacDermid’s antitrust claims because MacDermid failed to present evidence that Cortron’s conduct harmed competition. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this claim. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment and remanded for recalculation of damages. View "MacDermid Printing Sols. LLC v. Cortron Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants claim that some aluminum futures traders, having acquired some operators of aluminum warehouses, manipulated a price component for aluminum in the Detroit metro area. The district court dismissed the complaints and denied two groups of plaintiffs leave to amend, while permitting a third group to amend their complaint. The district court then concluded that appellants lacked antitrust standing because they did not demonstrate that they suffered antitrust injury or that they were efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, and that they would be unable to show that they were efficient enforcers through repleading. The district court also determined that appellants failed to state a claim under various state consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws. The court held that appellants lack antitrust standing on the ground that they did not (and could not) suffer antitrust injury. The court also held that their state law claims were inadequately pleaded. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) motion to set aside the court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion.  In Kellogg v. Strack, the court held that a COA is required to appeal a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment when the underlying order denied 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas relief. The court held that, because the principles animating Kellogg apply with equal force in the Rule 60(d) context, a COA is required to appeal a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(d) motion when the underlying order denied section 2255 relief. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for a COA and dismissed the appeal. View "Torres v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendants, the Donziger Firm and others, appealed the district court's grant of certain relief against them in favor of Chevron, in connection with an $8.646 billion judgment obtained against Chevron in Ecuador by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs represented by the Donziger Firm. The judgment award was for environmental damage in connection with the Texaco oil exploration activities in Ecuador from the 1960s-1990s. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's judgment, arguing principally that the action should have been dismissed on the ground that Chevron lacks Article III standing, and/or that the judgment should be reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that it violates principles of international comity and judicial estoppel, exceeds any legal authorization for equitable relief, and was entered without personal jurisdiction over defendants other than Donziger and his Firm. The court found no basis for dismissal or reversal in the absence of challenges to the district court's factual findings; considering the express disclaimers by the Ecuadorian appellate courts of their own jurisdiction to "hear and resolve" the above charges of corruption, "preserving the parties' rights" to pursue those charges in actions in the United States; and considering the district court's confinement of its injunction to a grant of in personam relief against the three defendants-appellants without disturbing the Ecuadorian judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641. Defendant principally argues that his conviction of a section 641 felony violated the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution because a violation of that section is a felony only if the value of the property stolen exceeded $1,000, and the indictment on which he was tried charged only a misdemeanor because it did not allege the value of the property stolen. The court concluded that the value of the property stolen is an element of the section 641 felony offense and that, in order to charge defendant with the felony, the indictment on which he was tried should have alleged that the value of the property stolen exceeded $1,000. However, in the circumstances of this case, in which, inter alia, the defense was fully aware, well in advance of the trial, of the government's intent to prosecute the offense as a felony, and the evidence that hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of government property had been stolen was overwhelming, the violation of the Grand Jury Clause was harmless. The court found no merit in defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance on board an aircraft registered in the United States and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance on board an aircraft registered in the United States. The court held that defendant's conduct falls squarely within the ambit of 21 U.S.C. 959 and that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with due process. In this case, a sufficient nexus existed between defendant's extraterritorial conduct and the United States, and defendant's ignorance of the aircraft's registration in the United States does not implicate due process. The court concluded that the remainder of defendant's arguments do not warrant significant explanation and are resolved by a separate Summary Order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Epskamp" on Justia Law

Defendants Jiamez-Dolores and Degante-Galeno were convicted of crimes related to their involvement in a prostitution ring, which involved four separate brothels and a delivery service by which women would be driven directly to customers' residences. The court concluded that Degante-Galeno’s 60 month sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. In addition to considering his role in the offense, the district court based the sentence on his complicity in the coercion applied to the victims - some of whom were forced into prostitution, the duration of his participation in the conspiracy, and his failure to acknowledge fully the seriousness of the offense. The court also concluded that Jiamez-Dolores's 60 month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. In this case, the record reflects the district court’s thorough, individualized consideration of the section 3553(a) factors and its justifications for imposing an upward variance in Jiamez-Dolores’s case. The court considered defendants' remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jiamez-Dolores" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for a firearm-related murder committed in the course of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), in this case, Hobbs Act robbery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1851(b)(1). The court held that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3). The court found that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies categorically as a crime of violence under the statute’s "force clause," and the court rejected defendant's argument that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States effectively rendered the “risk‐of‐force clause,” under section 924(c)(3)(B), void for vagueness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

FBK moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction SHW's appeal from the district court's ruling on motions by SHW relating to its entitlement to attorneys' fees as former counsel to certain plaintiffs in the underlying action. FBK contends that because SHW did not consent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), for all proceedings to be conducted before a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge's orders must be treated merely as recommendations to be reviewed by the district court, and that appeal directly to this court from the orders of the magistrate judge is unauthorized. The court denied the motion, concluding that the consent of SHW as counsel or former counsel was not required because section 636(c)'s consent requirement applies to parties (and to persons who move to become parties, see New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 996 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1993)), and the parties in this case had given the requisite consent. View "In re McCray, Richardson, Santana, Wise, and Salaam Litigation" on Justia Law