Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Microsoft appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to quash a warrant issued under section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., and holding Microsoft in contempt of court for refusing to execute the warrant on the government’s behalf. The warrant directed Microsoft to seize and produce the contents of an e‐mail account - an account believed to be used in furtherance of narcotics trafficking - that it maintains for a customer who uses the company’s electronic communications services. Microsoft produced its customer’s non‐content information to the government, as directed. That data was stored in the United States. But Microsoft ascertained that, to comply fully with the warrant, it would need to access customer content that it stores and maintains in Ireland and to import that data into the United States for delivery to federal authorities. The court concluded that Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially. The focus of those provisions is protection of a user’s privacy interests. Accordingly, the SCA does not authorize a United States court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States‐based service provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located outside the United States. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court lacked authority to enforce the warrant against Microsoft. The court reversed the denial of the motion to quash because Microsoft has complied with the warrant’s domestic directives and resisted only its extraterritorial aspect; vacated the finding of civil contempt; and remanded with instructions to the district court to quash the warrant insofar as it directs Microsoft to collect, import, and produce to the government customer content stored outside the United States. View "Microsoft v. United States" on Justia Law

After Old GM filed for bankruptcy, New GM emerged. This case involves one of the consequences of the GM bankruptcy. Beginning in February 2014, New GM began recalling cars due to a defect in their ignition switches. Many of the cars in question were built years before the GM bankruptcy. Where individuals might have had claims against Old GM, a ʺfree and clearʺ provision in the bankruptcy courtʹs sale order barred those same claims from being brought against New GM as the successor corporation. Various individuals nonetheless initiated class action lawsuits against New GM, asserting ʺsuccessor liabilityʺ claims and seeking damages for losses and injuries arising from the ignition switch defect and other defects. The bankruptcy court enforced the Sale Order to enjoin many of these claims against New GM. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the Sale Order; the ʺfree and clearʺ provision covers pre‐closing accident claims and economic loss claims based on the ignition switch and other defects, but does not cover independent claims or Used Car Purchasersʹ claims; the court found no clear error in the bankruptcy court's finding that Old GM knew or should have known with reasonable diligence about the defect, and individuals with claims arising out of the ignition switch defect were entitled to notice by direct mail or some equivalent, as required by procedural due process; because enforcing the Sale Order would violate procedural due process in these circumstances, the bankruptcy court erred in granting New GMʹs motion to enforce and these plaintiffs cannot be bound by the terms of the Sales Order; and the bankruptcy courtʹs decision on equitable mootness was advisory. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "In re Motors Liquidation Co." on Justia Law

Defendant, a licensed physician, appealed convictions stemming from her participation in a broad scheme involving a number of medical services professional corporations (PCs) to defraud insurance companies in connection with claims submitted under New York’s No Fault Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparation Act, N.Y. Ins. Law 5102 et seq. Defendant held herself out as the owner of a PC and represented herself as such on claims. The jury found that, while defendant was the owner on paper, the true owners of the clinic were coconspirator nonphysicians. Defendant principally contends that the jury should have been instructed, in determining the question of ownership, to consider only the formal indicia of ownership, and not the economic realities. The court concluded, however, that New York law is clear that ownership for purposes of New York insurance law is based on actual economic ownership. The court held that, as in the civil context, a factfinder in a criminal case may properly consider factors beyond formal indicia of ownership in determining ownership under New York’s no‐fault insurance laws. The court rejected all of defendant's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gabinskaya" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Priatno and Gammone under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they brutally beat him for talking back to another officer when he was an inmate at Downstate Correctional Facility. At issue is whether plaintiff exhausted all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in the district court, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court concluded that the prison's grievance process was not available to plaintiff because the applicable grievance procedures are “so opaque” and confusing that they were, “practically speaking, incapable of use.” Because plaintiff satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the court reversed and remanded. View "Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno" on Justia Law

This case concerns a lease and a purported joint venture agreement entered into between defendant and his now-deceased father, the former president and majority shareholder of a real estate development corporation. The lease granted defendant control over a multi-million-dollar property for a period of 20 years in exchange for a payment of $20. AHC sought damages for defendant's use and occupancy of the property and a judgment declaring the lease and joint venture agreement void. Defendant counterclaimed. The district court granted AHC’s motion for partial summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claims and denied defendant's requests for additional discovery. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's FRCP 56(d) motion seeking more discovery materials where none of the items defendant specifically requested is germane to the issues before the court; the court applied Pennsylvania law to its analysis of the joint‐venture dispute and New York law to the lease dispute; and the district court correctly concluded that the business judgment rule should not apply to the lease and thus the lease was void as a gift or act of corporate waste. As to the joint venture agreement, the court declined to certify the issue of parol evidence to the state court. The court concluded that the parol evidence rule applies in this case and that the integration clause in the lease retains its preclusive effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran" on Justia Law

The United States appealed from an order suppressing statements made by defendant during a two‐hour interview that was conducted in her home while a search warrant was being executed. The court concluded that, based on the record, defendant was not in custody. In this case, defendant was told 20 minutes into the interview that she was not under arrest; she was never told that she was not free to leave; she did not seek to end the encounter, or to leave the house, or to join her husband; the tone of the questioning was largely conversational; there is no indication that the agents raised their voices, showed firearms, or made threats. Her movements were monitored but not restricted, certainly not to the degree of a person under formal arrest. She was thus never “completely at the mercy of” the agents in her home. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's statements should not have been suppressed, because no Miranda warnings were necessary. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Faux" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Barbados, and lawful permanent resident of the United States, seeks review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner was found deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) on the basis of a prior conviction in 1997 under Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act 780‐113(a)(30) (1997), which was determined to be a conviction that related to a federal controlled substance. The court concluded that, because a conviction under 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 780‐113(a)(30) is categorically a conviction under a law relating to a federal controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the court lacked jurisdiction to review the removability order. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Collymore v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his role as a closing attorney in several real estate transactions in upstate New York from approximately 2001 until 2007. The court focused primarily on defendant's challenge to the three substantive counts of conviction involving activity directed at BNC. The court held that evidence of fraudulent activity directed at BNC is not enough to support convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud) and 1014 (false statements) solely by virtue of the fact that BNC was owned by a federally insured financial institution. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's convictions on the three substantive counts. However, the court concluded that the conspiracy to violate section 1014 count of conviction involved fraudulent misstatements made directly to a federally insured bank. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction on that count and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bouchard" on Justia Law

Defendants Rivernider and Ponte plead guilty to charges arising from their orchestration of a Ponzi scheme and a related real estate scheme, in which defendants induced victims to purchase properties using mortgages based on an inflated appraisal price while pocketing the difference between the actual sales price and appraisal price as a “marketing fee,” without disclosing the fee to the buyer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in failing to appoint new counsel to represent Rivernider with respect to his motion to withdraw, or in denying his pro se motion, because there was a sufficient factual basis for Rivernider’s plea and because Rivernider did not sufficiently allege an actual conflict of interest between himself and his attorney. The court also rejected defendants’ challenges to their sentences and to the $22,140,765.99 restitution order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rivernider" on Justia Law