Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brandon Washington pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court added a point to Washington's criminal history score for a prior state-court conviction for harassment, which was related to the sale of controlled substances from the same house involved in the current case. Washington appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly determined his criminal history category under the United States Sentencing Guidelines by improperly assessing a criminal history point for the prior harassment conviction.The district court had determined that the harassment conviction was similar to the current offense of possession with intent to distribute, and thus, under section 4A1.2(c)(1)(B) of the Guidelines, a one-point increase to Washington’s total criminal history points was warranted. Washington was then sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment, followed by six years’ supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed with the district court that Washington’s harassment conviction and his current offense were similar under section 4A1.2(c)(1)(B) of the Guidelines. Both offenses arose from the same conduct – the sale of controlled substances – and both offenses were committed at the same house. Therefore, the district court did not err in adding the extra criminal history point. The court also dismissed Washington's other arguments regarding the calculation of his criminal history score. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

The case involves Roman Sharikov, an employee of Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc., who was terminated after refusing to comply with the company's COVID-19 health and safety policies, including a vaccination mandate. Sharikov alleged that Philips discriminated against him because it regarded him as having a disability or a record of a disability and retaliated against him after he objected to the measures.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Sharikov's claims, stating that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that Philips' company-wide COVID safety and vaccine policies did not infringe on Sharikov's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court also concluded that Sharikov failed to plead a plausible retaliation claim because the company-wide policies that he failed to comply with, resulting in the termination of his employment, were in place before he began his alleged protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed that Philips' company-wide COVID-19 health and safety measures did not discriminate against Sharikov under the ADA. The court also found that Sharikov failed to establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination, thus failing to state a plausible retaliation claim. View "Sharikov v. Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted in 2003 for violating a New Jersey statute that criminalizes distributing a controlled substance on or near school property. In 2018, removal proceedings were initiated against her, with the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluding that her conviction was an aggravated felony, making her both removable and ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.The BIA dismissed Stankiewicz's appeal, maintaining its reasoning that her conviction was an aggravated felony. Stankiewicz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stankiewicz's conviction under the New Jersey statute is not an "aggravated felony" under federal law. The court applied the "categorical approach," comparing the state law to any federal controlled substance offense that is a felony subject to a prison sentence greater than one year. The court found that neither of the parties' proposed federal analogs categorically matches the New Jersey statute. The court therefore granted Stankiewicz's petition for review, vacated the agency’s ruling, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Stankiewicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case involves two legal permanent residents, Carol Williams Black and Keisy G.M., who were detained by the U.S. government for several months without a bond hearing under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), pending the conclusion of their separate removal proceedings. Black and G.M. each sought habeas relief, asserting that their prolonged detentions without any bond hearing violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The district court granted Black's petition and he was released, while G.M.'s petition was denied.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court concluded that the constitutional guarantee of due process precludes a noncitizen’s unreasonably prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting habeas relief to Black, concluding that the district court properly required the government to show the necessity of his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. As to G.M., the court concluded that his detention had become unreasonably prolonged and reversed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Black v. Decker" on Justia Law

Sanjay Tripathy, a former inmate in the New York correctional system, filed a lawsuit against state prison officials. He claimed that they forced him to enroll in a sex-offender program that required him to accept responsibility for his crimes, which he argued violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. He also claimed that he was assigned to a more intensive tier of the program in violation of his due process rights, and that he was retaliated against after he challenged the program by filing grievances and this lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed Tripathy's claims. The court ruled that his claim for damages under RLUIPA was barred by precedent that the statute does not permit individual-capacity damages. The court also found that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when his state convictions were vacated and he was released from prison. Regarding his constitutional claims, the court concluded that Tripathy’s free exercise claim under the First Amendment was barred by qualified immunity, that he lacked standing to seek damages for his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Tripathy's claim for damages under RLUIPA was barred by precedent, that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to his release from prison, and that his constitutional claims were properly dismissed by the district court. View "Tripathy v. McKoy" on Justia Law

Quadri Garnes was charged with threatening to assault and murder employees of the United States Postal Service (USPS) and transmitting interstate communications containing threats to injure another person. These charges stemmed from a phone call Garnes made to the New York State Department of Labor (DOL) after his unemployment benefits claim was denied. During the call, Garnes made several statements referencing his criminal record. Before trial, Garnes moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were of limited probative value and could unfairly prejudice the jury. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted his motion, excluding the statements under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.The government appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the court had exceeded its discretion in excluding the statements. The government contended that the statements were highly probative as they were a significant part of the threat (the actus reus) and substantially indicative of Garnes's intent (the mens rea).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the government. The court found that the district court had incorrectly concluded that the statements were of limited probative value. The appellate court held that the statements were highly probative as they were both a significant part of the threat and substantially indicative of Garnes's intent. The court also found that the district court had overstated the risk of unfair prejudice. The court concluded that a jury instruction could mitigate any potential unfair prejudice. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order of exclusion and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garnes" on Justia Law

Julius Williams, convicted of racketeering and conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, appealed the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This law allows a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the original sentence was based on a Sentencing Guidelines range that the United States Sentencing Commission has subsequently lowered. Williams argued that the district court wrongly concluded that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the Commission’s 2014 revisions to the narcotics Guidelines because he participated in a narcotics-related murder that subjected him to a higher Guidelines range under the “murder cross-reference” provision of U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(d)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had denied Williams's motion for a sentence reduction, concluding that he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under the Commission’s 2014 revisions to the narcotics Guidelines. The court also found that a sentence reduction was not warranted under the objectives of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court did not reach the issue of Williams’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), but instead affirmed the lower court's decision based on the independent ground that a sentence reduction was not warranted under the objectives of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Trustees of the New York State Nurses Association Pension Plan (the Trustees) and White Oak Global Advisors, LLC (White Oak) entered into an investment management agreement, which included an arbitration clause. The Trustees later brought several fiduciary duty claims against White Oak under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which were resolved through arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the Trustees, which the Trustees sought to confirm in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.White Oak appealed the confirmation, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the court erroneously interpreted the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdiction, finding that the Trustees' petition to confirm the award was cognizable under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The court also affirmed the district court's interpretation of the award regarding the disgorgement of pre-award interest and the "Day One" fees. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court's confirmation of the disgorgement of White Oak's "profits," finding the award too ambiguous to enforce. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's order for White Oak to pay the Trustees' attorneys' fees and costs, finding the district court's findings insufficiently specific. View "Trustees of the NYSNAPP v. White Oak Glob. Adv." on Justia Law

The case involves Nano Dimension Ltd., an Israeli 3D printing and manufacturing company, and several defendants including Murchinson Ltd. and Anson Advisors Inc. Nano alleged that the defendants violated Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose that they acted as a group when acquiring more than five percent of Nano’s American Depository Shares (ADSs). As a remedy, Nano sought an order directing the defendants to disclose their alleged group status on amended Schedule 13Ds and an injunction prohibiting them from acquiring additional ADSs or voting their existing ADSs pending completion of the amended filings.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Nano's claims as moot. The court found that the defendants had cured the alleged Section 13(d) violations by amending their Schedule 13D filings to disclose Nano’s allegations and their position that the allegations were without merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the defendants' amended filings satisfied Section 13(d)’s disclosure requirements. The court also rejected Nano's argument that it was entitled to retroactive injunctive relief, noting that such relief is not available under Section 13(d) when corrective disclosures have been made and the vote in question did not effect a change in control over the issuer. View "Nano Dimension Ltd. v. Murchinson Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves a Ukrainian couple, Yasamin Karimi and Roman Tereshchenko, who divorced and disputed custody of their two children. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Tereshchenko agreed to Karimi removing the children from Ukraine for safety reasons, but requested that she bring them to him in Dubai. Instead, Karimi took the children to undisclosed locations, including the United States. Tereshchenko filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the children. The District Court granted Tereshchenko’s petition and ordered the children returned to him in France, where he was currently residing.Karimi appealed the decision, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction and arguing that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction and rejected Karimi's argument that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court had erred in determining that the children would not be exposed to a grave risk of harm if they were returned to western Ukraine. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court was permitted to order the return of the children to Tereshchenko in a third country, France, as a temporary measure due to the grave risk of harm in Ukraine. The case was remanded to the District Court to modify the order to maintain the Ukrainian courts’ authority over an ultimate custody determination. View "Tereshchenko v. Karimi" on Justia Law