Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laroe, a real estate development company, appealed the denial of its motion to intervene under FRCP 24 in pending litigation in which a now-deceased land developer filed suit against the Town of Chester, alleging a regulatory taking. The court vacated and remanded because the court does not require proposed intervenors in this circumstance to show that they independently have standing. Because neither a proposed intervenor’s lack of Article III standing nor its failure to state an independent claim necessarily renders a motion to intervene futile, the district court should have instead focused its analysis on the requirements of Rule 24. Because the factual record before the court is insufficiently developed at this stage to allow the court to resolve the issues, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Laroe satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. View "Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for narcoterrorism conspiracy (Count One); cocaine-importation conspiracy (Count Two); conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (Count Three); and conspiracy to acquire and transfer anti-aircraft missiles (Count Four). The court concluded that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction and rejected defendant's argument that Colombia violated the extradition treaty between it and the United States; the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove he knowingly participated in any of the conspiracies with which he was charged; the district court's supplemental "mere presence" instruction in response to a jury note was proper; and Count Three was not multiplicitous with Count One. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Garavito-Garcia" on Justia Law

In an antitrust class action brought on behalf of approximately 12 million merchants against Visa and Mastercard, as well as other various banks, plaintiffs alleged conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. After the parties agreed to a settlement releasing all claims, the district court certified two settlement-only classes and approved the settlement. Numerous objectors and opt‐out plaintiffs appealed and argued that the class action was improperly certified and that the settlement was unreasonable and inadequate. The court concluded that class members of the (b)(2) class were inadequately represented in violation of both FRCP 23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause. The court also concluded that procedural deficiencies produced substantive shortcomings in this class action and the settlement. Consequently, the court concluded that the class action was improperly certified and the settlement was unreasonable and inadequate. The court vacated the district court's certification of the class action and reversed the approval of the settlement. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust" on Justia Law

OneWest commenced a foreclosure action against defendant. The district court denied defendant's cross-motion to dismiss and granted OneWest's motion for summary judgment. The district court held in part that a national bank such as OneWest is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located - not also of the state of its principal place of business - and that OneWest’s main office is indisputably in California. The court agreed with the district court and joined its sister circuits in holding that, for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, a national bank is a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located. The court also concluded that OneWest had standing to foreclose based on LSA's assignment of all of its rights that FDIC previously had to defendant's loan as the conservator and receiver of IndyMac Federal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Melina" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Germany, seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's order of removal. Petitioner argued that his conviction for possession of child pornography under New York Penal Law 263.11 does not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(I), because it lacks an interstate commerce element that is present in the analogous federal child pornography statute. The court rejected petitioner's argument, concluding that the Supreme Court held in Torres v. Lynch that violation of a state criminal law may constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA even if the law lacks a federal jurisdictional element. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Weiland v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendant fraudulently obtained his federal trademark registration for the PUDGIE’S mark in connection with restaurants that principally serve pizza, pasta, and submarine sandwiches. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that no material issue of fact existed as to whether defendant knowingly made false, material representations in his application where the specimen he included with his application exhibited that the PUDGIE'S mark originally came from another source. The court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendant knew that other entities had rights to use the mark in the very manner in which he sought to use the mark, and whether he intended to mislead the PTO by attesting otherwise in his trademark application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "MPC Franchise, LLC v. Tarntino" on Justia Law

This case arose when Leeward and AUA entered into an agreement for Leeward to build a medical school for AUA in Antigua. AUA subsequently appealed the district court's confirmation of an international arbitration award entered in favor of Leeward. AUA principally argues that the district court erred in confirming the award because the arbitration panel failed to fulfill its obligation to produce a reasoned award.The court held, however, that an arbitration decision need not contain a line‐by‐line analysis of damages awarded to be considered a reasoned award. Rather, an arbitration award is a reasoned award when it contains a substantive discussion of the panel’s rationale. The court considered AUA's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court disposed of Case No. 15-1595-cv in a separate summary order issued concurrently with this decision. View "Leeward Construction Co. v. American Univ. of Antigua" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when the New York State court that had sentenced him in 2000 to 11 years of imprisonment amended his sentence - after he had been imprisoned for 11 years but remained imprisoned because of additional crimes he committed during that 11-year period - by adding a term of post-release supervision that, under New York law, was required to be part of his 2000 sentence. The court held that it is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States v. DiFrancesco for a state court to hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits the resentencing of a prisoner while he is still in prison, when such resentencing is necessary to impose a term of supervised release required by statute. The court also concluded that the State court's decision that Smith had no legitimate expectation that his determinate sentence had become final, based on the court's conclusion that his judicially imposed sentences could properly be aggregated by DOCCS pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 70.30 without further participation by the court, and on the fact that because of his intervening crimes he had not been released, did not constitute an unreasonable application of Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Wenderlich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pro se filed suit alleging claims against defendants which arise out of events spanning more than a decade and principally concern the Village’s allegedly wrongful interference with his business interests and its maintenance of a police force that plaintiff believes to be unauthorized by law. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court noted that plaintiff's principal brief fails to address adequately the merits of most - arguably all - of the claims dismissed by the district court where plaintiff's filing largely fails to set out identifiable arguments in his principal belief; to the extent that plaintiff has adequately argued the merits of any claims on appeal, those arguments must be rejected; for a variety of reasons, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and the court likewise was unconvinced by plaintiff's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiff obtained limited variances from a land-use regulation prohibiting accessory structures on the lot of their newly purchased home, allowing plaintiffs to install a fence, pool, and deck designed to accommodate their son's disability. The Town Board’s resolutions allowing the variances required removal of the structures when, inter alia, the disabled child’s residency in the house terminated (Restoration Provision). The district court dismissed the complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6). The district court determined that it did not need to reach the issue of whether the Restoration Provisions were reasonable under the FHA because plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show either an intent to discriminate or to constitute disparate impact discrimination. The court concluded, however, that the reasonableness of the Town’s accommodations is in issue. The reasonableness issue here cannot be determined on the pleadings because the relevant factors are numerous and balancing them requires a full evidentiary record. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal as to this issue. The court affirmed as to the dismissal of plaintiffs' retaliation claim where the Restoration Provisions on their face simply restore the requirements applicable to all such properties in the area once the needs of plaintiff's disabled child are not an issue. View "Austin v. Town of Farmington" on Justia Law