Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Apotex filed suit alleging that Acorda filed a sham citizen petition with the FDA to hinder approval of Apotex's competing formulation of a drug for treating spasticity, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2, and that Acorda violated the Lanham Act's, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1), proscription on false advertising. The district court ruled that the simultaneous approval by the FDA of Apotex’s drug application and its denial of Acorda’s citizen petition was by itself insufficient to support a Sherman Act claim. The district court then granted summary judgment and dismissed all of Apotex’s false advertising claims on the grounds that (with the exception of one graph) no representation was literally false or likely to mislead consumers. In regard to the graph, Apotex failed to show that the false depiction would meaningfully impact consumers’ purchasing decisions. The court concluded that, although precedent supports an inference that a citizen petition is an anticompetitive weapon if it attacks a rival drug application and is denied the same day that the application is approved, that inference has been undercut by recent FDA guidance.  As to false advertising, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury could have found that Acorda made literally false or misleading representations in its advertisements, with the exception of a single representation that Apotex has failed to show affected decisions to purchase. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of charges related to his involvement in a wire fraud conspiracy. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that defendant was a leader or organizer of an “otherwise extensive” criminal activity and was thus subject to a four‐level sentencing enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(a). In this case, the district court failed to consider the factors the court explained in United States v. Carrozzella are central to the section 3B1.1(a) inquiry: namely, the number of knowing participants and the number of unknowing participants organized by the defendant to render services peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of drug-related charges, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, alleging that his counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, failed to timely inform him of the court's decision affirming his conviction and sentence. Petitioner argued that such failure deprived him of the opportunity to petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The court held that the CJA entitles defendants to representation in filing non‐frivolous petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Where counsel determines that a petition would be frivolous, counsel should inform the client of the opportunity to petition pro se, move to withdraw, and at the same time, move on behalf of the CJA client for an extension of time to file a pro se petition. In this case, petitioner has not had an opportunity to substantiate his allegations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further factual development. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two individual psychiatrists and three professional associations of psychiatrists, filed suit against defendants, four health‐insurance companies, alleging that the health insurers’ reimbursement practices discriminate against patients with mental health and substance use disorders in violation of the Mental Health Parity and Addition Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), 29 U.S.C. 1185(a), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. The court concluded that, because the psychiatrists are not among those expressly authorized to sue, they lack a cause of action under ERISA. The court also concluded that the association plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to pursue their respective ERISA and MHPAEA claims because their members lack standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that federal student loans were fraudulently procured on their behalf when the Wilford beauty schools falsely certified that plaintiffs had an ability‐to‐benefit (ATB) from the education they received from Wilfred. Plaintiffs allege that the DOE’s refusal to temporarily suspend collection of the student loan debt of putative class members, and refusal to send them notice of their potential eligibility for a discharge, was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to review this case because plaintiffs had standing when they filed their class action complaint and this case fits into the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine for class action claims that are “inherently transitory.” On the merits, the court held that plaintiffs are entitled to judicial review because there is sufficient law to apply to the challenged agency decisions. The text of the relevant statute directs that the DOE “shall” discharge a borrower’s loan liability when a school has falsely certified a student’s ATB.  DOE’s regulations and informal agency guidance direct that the DOE “shall” temporarily suspend collection on loans and notify borrowers of their possible eligibility for a discharge when the DOE has reliable information that a borrower “may be eligible” for discharge.  Because plaintiffs' claims are judicially reviewable under the APA, the court vacated and remanded. View "Salazar v. King" on Justia Law

Ritchie filed suit against GECC for civil conspiracy to commit fraud, for aiding and abetting fraud, and for negligence in connection with Thomas Petters' Ponzi scheme. The district court granted GECC's motion to dismiss based on Ritchie's lack of standing. The district court reasoned that Ritchie lacked standing to bring the conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims because the causes of action were the exclusive property of the Petters Estate and, in the alternative, that Ritchie failed to state a claim because Ritchie failed to plead proximate cause for the aiding and abetting claim and failed to plead an “overt act” for the civil conspiracy claim. The court concluded that Ritchie lacks standing to assert its claims because Ritchie has not alleged a particularized injury. The court adopted the district court's opinion and order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt. v. GECC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendants, alleging that they charged plaintiffs more than the statutory maximum fees allowed by N.Y. Pub. Health Law 18(2)(d) and (e) for providing copies of plaintiffs' medical records. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the complaint alleged that the requested records had been paid for by plaintiffs' attorneys, ruling that the complaint therefore did not plead injury-in-fact to plaintiffs themselves and that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that, in light of the ordinary principles of agency, the complaint's allegations that each named plaintiff "through [her or his] counsel" "paid" the charges demanded by defendants for providing the records and that "Plaintiffs" bore "the ultimate expense" for those records, plausibly alleged that plaintiffs themselves were injured by the claimed violations of New York law. Because the district court erred in dismissing the suit under Rule 12(b)(1), the court vacated and remanded. View "Carter v. HealthPort Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Relators filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), alleging that Wells Fargo defrauded the government within the meaning of the FCA by falsely certifying that they were in compliance with various banking laws and regulations when they borrowed money at favorable rates from the Federal Reserve’s discount window. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court held that the banks’ certifications of compliance were too general to constitute legally false claims under the FCA and that relators had otherwise failed to allege their fraud claims with particularity. The court agreed, concluding that it has long recognized that the FCA was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government. Even assuming relators’ accusations of widespread fraud are true, they have not plausibly connected those accusations to express or implied false claims submitted to the government for payment, as required to collect the treble damages and other statutory penalties available under the FCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. View "Bishop v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of investment adviser fraud, one count of securities fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and six counts of offenses in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. In this opinion, the court concluded that a criminal conviction premised on a violation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6, does not require proof of intent to harm. Therefore, the district court did not err in not instructing the jury that investment adviser fraud requires proof of intent to harm his clients. In a summary order filed herewith, the court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tagliaferri" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and related charges. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's 2015 decision modifying the special conditions of supervised release that had been imposed on him at the time of his sentencing in 2004 to include what are now standard conditions of supervision for individuals convicted of sex offenses. Because a change in defendant's circumstances is not a prerequisite to a modification under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the court declined to reverse the district court on that basis. The court held that a court may order special conditions of supervised release in addition to the usual general conditions, so long as they are “reasonably related” to criteria listed in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual section 5D1.3(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the new search condition was reasonably related to the offense conduct and purposes of the sentence or that it was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Defendant similarly fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the new polygraph/CVSA condition. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by not holding a second hearing on Probation Services’ modification request. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Parisi" on Justia Law