Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Attica Correctional Facility, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was incarcerated at Attica, defendant corrections officers Dennis Fleckenstein and Chester Kosmowski subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by depriving him of meals and defendant Fleckenstein physically assaulted him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. At trial, the jury found that both defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional right to nutritionally adequate food and awarded him nominal and punitive damages. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's admission of a prison monitoring report conducted by a private, nonprofit corporation. The court concluded that the report is hearsay that does not fall within the Business Records Exception nor the Public Records Exception. Furthermore, the report was inadmissible because it further contains hearsay in the form of statements from inmates complaining about abuse at Attica. Because admission of the report was not harmless error, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abascal v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vikas Goel founded and managed a computer‐equipment distribution company called eSys Informatics, Ltd. Plaintiff contracted to sell fifty‐one percent of eSys’s shares to Teledata, an Indian company purporting to be in the software business, at the price of $105 million. Plaintiff alleges that Teledata was a sham operation; that it carried on no legitimate business; and that it was only through the connivance of defendants, who participated with Teledata in a complex scheme that involved illegal loans used to generate profits from interest‐rate arbitrage, that Teledata was made to appear an attractive investment partner. On appeal, Goel and Rainforest Trading challenged the dismissal of their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. The district court also declined to exercised supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that their claims are timely under New York's so-called "savings statute," NY CPLR 205(a), and agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims are untimely. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by relying on materials outside the pleadings in deciding motions to dismiss brought by defendants. Presented with documents extrinsic to the complaint at the motion‐to‐dismiss stage, the district court should have either excluded the documents or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Goel v. Bunge, Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the New York City Council, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346; two counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; and one count of conspiracy to commit both substantive offenses, 18 U.S.C. 371. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his participation in two bribery schemes: 1) defendant accepted bribes in exchange for promising to funnel City funds to the bribe payers (Discretionary Funds Scheme) and 2) defendant was paid to help his co‐defendant, Malcolm A. Smith, bribe Republican Party officials to obtain what is known in New York as a Wilson‐Pakula certificate or authorization, which would have enabled Smith, a Democrat, to compete for the nomination of the Republican Party in the New York mayoral election (Wilson-Pakula Scheme). The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant took part in the Discretionary Funds Scheme with the intent required to sustain his convictions, and that defendant’s Wilson‐Pakula Scheme conduct violated both the Travel Act and the honest services fraud statute. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Halloran" on Justia Law

BNY appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Morgan Stanley, arguing that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Morgan Stanley was not contractually obliged to repurchase a mortgage loan allegedly issued in breach of a contract representation because (1) the Trustee’s duty to give “notice to cure” within three business days of becoming aware of a material breach was a condition precedent to the seller’s repurchase obligation, and (2) that condition was not performed within the specified three days, but two to four weeks later. The court concluded that the contract at issue did not require notice to cure as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley remedying breach where the phrase “notice to cure” does not appear in the contract. In this case, the contract contains distinct provisions for giving notice of breach and making request for cure, neither of which is cast in the express language of condition. Therefore, the request for cure is not a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations, and the timeliness of a request for cure, as well as of a notice of breach, is properly construed as a promise and reviewed for substantial performance. The court also concluded that the notice of breach and request for cure in this case cannot be held untimely as a matter of law, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York Mellon Trust v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a corrections officer at the Ulster County Jail, filed suit against the County and its officials, alleging that the denial of her request for an accommodation under the County's light duty policy amounted to pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim against the County and former Sheriff VanBlarcum. The district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff’s direct case, reasoning that the policy could not be discriminatory because it was facially neutral with respect to pregnancy. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which held that an employer’s facially neutral accommodation policy gives rise to an inference of pregnancy discrimination if it imposes a significant burden on pregnant employees that is not justified by the employer’s non‐discriminatory explanation. In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support a pregnancy discrimination claim under Young and therefore vacated the judgment in part and remanded with instructions to conduct a new trial. The court also vacated the post judgment orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Legg v. Ulster Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that defendant unlawfully retaliated against her for opposing an employment practice proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq. The court concluded that the conduct plaintiff opposed - the amendment of internal procedures in a manner that, she believed, would permit political considerations to influence the evaluation of discrimination claims - is not a “practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. Nor could plaintiff reasonably have believed otherwise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claims. View "Cooper v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor" on Justia Law

The NFL suspended New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady for four games because of his involvement in a scheme to deflate footballs during the 2015 AFC Championship Game. After Brady requested arbitration, League Commissioner Roger Goodell, who served as arbitrator, entered an award confirming the discipline. The district court vacated the award based on the reasoning that Brady lacked notice that his conduct was prohibited and punishable by suspension, and that the manner in which the proceedings were conducted deprived him of fundamental fairness. The court concluded that the Commissioner properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy between the League and a player. In their collective bargaining agreement, the players and the League mutually decided many years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule violations, should impose appropriate sanctions, and may preside at arbitration challenging his discipline. In this case, the court concluded that Brady received adequate notice that deflation of footballs could lead to suspension, the Commissioner's decision to exclude testimony from NFL General Counsel fits within his broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and raises no questions of fundamental fairness, and there is no fundamental unfairness in the Commissioner's denial of notes and memoranda generated by the investigative team where the collective bargaining agreement does not require the exchange of such notes. The court concluded that the Association's remaining claims are without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute between the parties regarding the ownership of a 7.35 carat pear-shaped diamond. WGDC consigned the diamond to celebrity fashion stylist, Derek Khan. Khan, without WGDCʹs permission, subsequently sold the diamond to a third party. Through a series of transfers, the diamond ultimately came into the possession of the Zaretskys. The district court concluded that Khan had the power to transfer WGDCʹs rights to the diamond under NYUCC 2-403(2) solely because, by his occupation, he clearly held himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction. Therefore, the district court found that Khan qualified as a merchant. Pursuant to section 2-403(2), Khan had the power to transfer all rights in a "good" given to him by an "entruster" if he was at the time a merchant who "deals in goods of that kind." However, the court concluded that, although the New York Court of Appeals has not explicitly defined ʺdeal[ing] in goods of that kind,ʺ persuasive authority from New York courts and elsewhere leads the court to conclude that the phrase means the regular sale of the kind of goods at issue in the case; applying that definition, the court concluded that the Zaretskys have not raised a triable issue of fact as to Khanʹs capacity to transfer title under section 2‐403(2) because there is no record evidence that he regularly sold diamonds or other high‐end jewelry; and the Zaretskysʹ remaining arguments - regarding the timeliness of this appeal, whether the consignment is a ʺtransaction of purchaseʺ under section 2‐403(1) of the NYUCC, and the defense of laches - are without merit. Therefore, the court directed the district court to enter summary judgment for WGDC on remand. View "Zaretsky v. William Goldberg Diamond Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for child pornography-related charges, arguing that his plea was invalid because in accepting his guilty plea the district court failed to adhere strictly to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and because there was insufficient factual basis for finding the interstate commerce element of the production of child pornography count satisfied. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the failure to comply strictly with all aspects of Rule 11 was not plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, there was sufficient factual basis for the plea, and there was no procedural or substantive error in his sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pattee" on Justia Law

Evelyn Gustafson, plaintiff's decedent, filed suit against Target after she was injured from a fall in a Target bathroom. Gustafson alleged that Target was negligent in maintaining the bathroom door, which closed with excessive speed and force. The district court granted Target's motion for summary judgment based on insufficient evidence of causation. Although the reports of plaintiff's experts show a possibility of a defect with the door and that such defect could be dangerous to elderly or disabled users of the facility such as Gustafson, and there is evidence that the facility was expressly available to elderly and disabled users, these reports do not purport to assert that such a defect, if present, was in fact likely to be the cause of Gustafson's accident. In this case, the only direct evidence with respect to accident causation before the court on summary judgment are four statements made by Gustafson shortly after her accident and a video that, although it does not rule out the possibility, does not show that Gustafson’s fall was caused by being hit by the restroom door. The court concluded that the link between defendant’s purported negligence and Gustafson’s injury is too weak to permit a jury to conclude that Target’s asserted negligence caused Gustafson’s fall and injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Reginella v. Target Corp." on Justia Law