Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action against the Commissioner, challenging New York’s coverage restrictions on certain medical services provided under its Medicaid plan. Plaintiffs argued that New York’s 2011 plan amendments, which restrict coverage of orthopedic footwear and compression stockings to patients with certain enumerated medical conditions, violate the Medicaid Act’s, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., reasonable standards, home health services, due process, and comparability provisions, as well as the anti‐discrimination provision and integration mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. Because neither the Medicaid Act nor the Supremacy Clause confers a private cause of action to enforce the reasonable standards provision, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on that claim; the court declined to reach plaintiffs’ unequal treatment claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as largely duplicative of their integration mandate claim; and the court affirmed the summary judgment rulings with respect to the remaining claims. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' home health services plan because orthopedic footwear and compression stockings constitute optional “prosthetics” rather than mandatory “home health services” under the Medicaid Act; defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the hearing element and plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the notice element of plaintiffs’ due process claim, because the due process provision required New York to provide plaintiffs with written notice – though not evidentiary hearings – prior to terminating their benefits; plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their comparability provision claim because New York’s coverage restrictions deny some categorically needy individuals access to the same scope of medically necessary services made available to others; and plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their anti‐discrimination claims because New York’s restrictions violate the integration mandate of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the court vacated the injunction and remanded for further consideration on the appropriate relief because the injunction is broader than is warranted by the court's liability conclusions. View "Davis v. Shah" on Justia Law

Appellants, representatives of certain unsecured creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor Tribune Company, appealed the grant of a motion to dismiss their state law, constructive fraudulent conveyance claims brought against Tribune’s former shareholders. The court held that appellants are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay because they have been freed from its restrictions by orders of the bankruptcy court and by the debtors’ confirmed reorganization plan. The court also held that appellants’ claims are preempted by Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), where that section shields from avoidance proceedings brought by a bankruptcy trustee transfers by or to financial intermediaries effectuating settlement payments in securities transactions or made in connection with a securities contract, except through an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the award of costs against it in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, case, arguing that the district court improperly ordered it to pay defendants the costs of deposition transcripts under FRCP 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 190. Because "costs" and "expenses" have distinct meanings under Rule 54(d), section 1920, and the FCA, the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(4) does not preclude the award of the costs for deposition transcripts. Plaintiff forfeited its argument under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and, even if appropriately presented, the argument has no merit where the court has stated clearly that section 1920 permits the taxation of deposition expenses, when necessarily incurred for use of the deposition in the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Associates Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron" on Justia Law

Garden City appealed from a final judgment finding it liable for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1981; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the 2012 grant of summary judgment by the same district court in favor of Nassau County. The court held that plaintiffs have Article III standing and plaintiffs' claims are also not moot; the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Garden City’s decision to abandon R‐M zoning in favor of R‐T zoning was made with discriminatory intent, and that defendants failed to demonstrate they would have made the same decision absent discriminatory considerations; the court affirmed the judgment insofar as it found plaintiffs had established liability under 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) of the FHA based on a theory of disparate treatment; the court held that 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c) abrogated the court's prior precedent as to the burden‐shifting framework of proving a disparate impact claim; the court vacated the judgment insofar as it found liability under a disparate impact theory, and remanded for further proceedings; the court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage because plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County had legal responsibility for Garden City’s adoption of R‐T zoning; the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage; and the court remanded with respect to plaintiffs' claims under Section 804(a) and Title VI relating to Nassau County’s “steering” of affordable housing. View "MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that they received collection notices that were misleading because they stated the “current balance,” but did not disclose that the balance might increase due to interest and fees. The court held that Section 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' other claims in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC" on Justia Law

Binder, a law firm representing claimants before the SSA, appealed from summary judgment in two related cases where Binder seeks past attorney's fees. When Binder sought to hold the SSA liable for the fees, the district courts granted summary judgment to the SSA on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgments and held that, regardless of the SSA’s statutory duties to withhold attorney’s fees from payments to successful claimants, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 U.S.C. 406(a) that would permit Binder’s lawsuits for money damages. View "Binder & Binder v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision declining to certify, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(c), his untimely appeal of the May 14, 2013 order of removal of the IJ. The court concluded that the decision not to certify an untimely appeal is committed to agency discretion by law. Because the decision not to certify an untimely appeal is committed to BIA discretion, it is not subject to judicial review. The court remanded to the BIA for it to address the motion to reopen removal proceedings because the agency had not addressed the motion. View "Vela-Estrada v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven entities who are collectively attempting to develop a casino-resort complex in the Catskills, filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, alleging that defendants entered into an anti-competitive scheme to obstruct plaintiffs' resort development. At issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged a plausible relevant geographic market for their casino-related products and services. In this case, plaintiffs define the relevant market as the Racing/Gaming Market in the Catskills Region. The court held that plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to define a plausible relevant geographic or product market for antitrust purposes, and that the district court properly dismissed their Sherman Act claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Concord Assoc., L.P. v. Entertainment Properties Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven entities who are collectively attempting to develop a casino-resort complex in the Catskills, filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, alleging that defendants entered into an anti-competitive scheme to obstruct plaintiffs' resort development. At issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged a plausible relevant geographic market for their casino-related products and services. In this case, plaintiffs define the relevant market as the Racing/Gaming Market in the Catskills Region. The court held that plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to define a plausible relevant geographic or product market for antitrust purposes, and that the district court properly dismissed their Sherman Act claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Concord Assoc., L.P. v. Entertainment Properties Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a putative class of former participants in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) invested exclusively in Lehman’s common stock, alleging that the Plan Committee Defendants, who were fiduciaries of the ESOP, breached their duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Plan Committee Defendants breached ERISA by continuing to permit investment in Lehman stock in the face of circumstances arguably foreshadowing its eventual bankruptcy. Plaintiffs also filed claims against Lehman's former directors, including Richard S. Fuld. The district court dismissed plaintiff's consolidated amended complaint (CAC) and second consolidated amended complaint (SAC) for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer that ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence. After remand, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' third amended complaint (TAC). The court agreed with the district court that, even without the presumption of prudence rejected in Fifth Third, plaintiffs have failed to plead plausibly that the Plan Committee Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to recognize the imminence of Lehman’s collapse. The court concluded as it had before, that plaintiffs have not adequately shown that the Plan Committee Defendants should be held liable for their actions in attempting to meet their fiduciary duties under ERISA while simultaneously offering an undiversified investment option for employees’ retirement savings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rinehart v. Lehman Brothers Holdings" on Justia Law