Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 20 year sentence after pleading guilty to three firearms violations. The court held that there was no error in the district court’s decision not to expressly discuss and reject defendant’s arguments for a downward departure and a variance; the district court’s application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) constituted impermissible double‐counting clearly prohibited by the Guidelines, and that its rulings concerning the obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 and the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 were not supported by the necessary factual findings; and in light of these holdings, the court did not reach defendant’s argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant, who conditionally plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence recovered and statements made following his warrantless arrest while he was standing inside the threshold of his home. The district court concluded that although defendant was inside the threshold of his home when he was arrested, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the police were able to effect the arrest without crossing the threshold themselves. The court concluded that, because it is uncontested that defendant remained inside his home, and was in his home when the officers placed him under arrest, his warrantless arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court vacated, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer and a member and officer of the police union, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant, a police chief, violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for various episodes of speech critical of defendant's performance as chief. The court concluded that the district court did not correctly apply the law for determining whether a state actor is entitled by reason of qualified immunity to dismissal of a suit charging her under section 1983 with unconstitutional conduct. In this case, defendant was entitled to have the court construe disputed facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and dismiss the claim if, at the time of defendant’s conduct, the law was unclear whether the facts, so construed, constituted a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant established her entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiff's 1983 claims by reason of her qualified immunity. The court reversed and remanded. View "Lynch v. Ackley" on Justia Law

Five former employees of Credit Suisse began arbitration proceedings before FINRA concerning employment-related disputes. The employees had entered into employment agreements with Credit Suisse that included provisions to resolve all employment‐related disputes by arbitration before a private arbitration provider.Credit Suisse sought to compel the employees to dismiss the FINRA arbitration and pursue their claims in a non‐FINRA arbitral forum. The district court granted Credit Suisse's petition and entered judgment ordering the employees to pursue their claims in a non‐FINRA arbitral forum. The court concluded that FINRA Rule 13200 does not prohibit the enforcement of pre‐dispute waivers of a FINRA arbitral forum. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Credit Suisse Secs. LLC v. Tracy" on Justia Law

The shipper petitioner appealed the district court's order confirming an arbitration award and award of attorney's fees and costs to the respondent carrier. The court concluded that the shipper has not established any ground for vacating the arbitral award. The court rejected the shipper's argument that the arbitral panel manifestly disregarded the substantive law of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, and the shipper's argument that the panel chairman was guilty of corruption or misbehavior because he failed to disclose his illness to the parties. The court affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitration award. The court concluded, however, that there was no finding that the petitioner shipper breached the charter agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs. View "Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers A.S." on Justia Law

FOA filed suit challenging the FWS's issuance of a “depredation permit” to the Port Authority, which authorizes the emergency “take” of migratory birds that threaten to interfere with aircraft at JFK airport. On appeal, FOA challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. On de novo review, the court agreed with FWS that its regulations unambiguously authorize the issuance of such a permit. Because the court held that FWS did not run afoul of 50 C.F.R. 21.41 in issuing to the Port Authority the 2014 depredation permit and affirmed the judgment. View "Friends of Animals v. Clay" on Justia Law

Main Street filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), seeking a judicial order compelling the NSC to produce requested records. The district court concluded that the NSC was not an agency and dismissed the case on the merits. On de novo review, the court construed the “agency” provision of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 551(1), 552(f)(1), the “function” provisions of the NSC’s statute, 50 U.S.C. 3021(a), and the current presidential directive organizing the NSC System, among other available legal sources, and concluded that the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA. The court further construed the FOIA's agency requirement to relate to the court’s remedial power rather than to its subject‐matter jurisdiction and concluded that the district court properly granted dismissal for failure to state a claim, rather than for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, the court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in granting dismissal without discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Main Street Legal Servs. v. National Security Council" on Justia Law

The Department appealed a judgment awarding plaintiffs reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., for one year of private school education for their daughter, L.K. The court concluded that the Department’s refusal to discuss the bullying of L.K. with her parents during the process of developing L.K.’s individualized education program (IEP), violated the IDEA. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have met their burden to show that their choice of a private placement for L.K. was appropriate and that the equities favored reimbursing them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Tyrone Simmons, a writer and performer of hip hop music, filed suit against hip hop producer William C. Stanberry, Jr., rapper 50 Cent, and various corporate entities involved in the production and distribution of the 2007 song, "I Get Money." Simmons alleged that in February 2006 he purchased from Stanberry an exclusive license to a beat and that Simmons therefore owns the right to bar all others from using the beat. Simmons further alleged that 50 Cent's recording of his song employing that beat was publicly released in 2007, violating Simmons' copyright. The court concluded that Simmons' complaint is barred by the statute of limitations because Simmons, although aware of defendants' acts of infringement, waited more than three years to sue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Simmons v. Stanberry" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from rival claims to the “Stolichnaya” trademarks. FTE and Cristall alleged that defendants unlawfully misappropriated and commercially exploited the Stolichnaya trademarks related to the sale of vodka and other spirits in the United States. Control over the marks in the United States is currently exercised by defendants as successors in interest to a Soviet state enterprise. In a prior suit, FTE brought claims against SPI under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and the court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the Russian Federation itself retained too great an interest in the marks for FTE to qualify as an "assign" with standing to sue. FTE's non-section 32(1) claims were either dismissed or dropped during the course of that litigation. At issue principally in this appeal is whether FTE, an agency of the Russian Federation, has been endowed by that government with rights and powers that give it standing to pursue claims under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining whether FTE’s asserted basis for standing was valid under Russian law. However, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed all of FTE's other claims as barred by both res judicata and laches. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l B.V." on Justia Law